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Abstract  
The Hadoop framework has become the most deployed platform for processing Big Data. 
Despite its advantages, Hadoop’s infrastructure is still deployed within the secured 
network perimeter because the framework lacks adequate inherent security 
mechanisms against various security threats. However, this approach is not sufficient 
for providing adequate security layer against attacks such as Distributed Denial of 
Service.  Furthermore, current work to secure Hadoop’s infrastructure against DDoS 
attacks is unable to provide a distributed node-level detection mechanism. This thesis 
presents a software agent-based framework that allows distributed, real-time 
intelligent monitoring and detection of DDoS attack at Hadoop’s node-level. The agent’s 
cognitive system is ingrained with cumulative sum statistical technique to analyse 
network utilisation and average server load and detect attacks from these 
measurements. The framework is a multi-agent architecture with transducer agents 
that interface with each Hadoop node to provide real-time detection mechanism. 
Moreover, the agents contextualise their beliefs by training themselves with the 
contextual information of each node and monitor the activities of the node to 
differentiate between normal and anomalous behaviours. In the experiments, the 
framework was exposed to TCP SYN and UDP flooding attacks during a legitimate 
MapReduce job on the Hadoop testbed. The experimental results were evaluated 
regarding performance metrics such as false-positive ratio, false-negative ratio and 
response time to attack.  The results show that UDP and TCP SYN flooding attacks can 
be detected and confirmed on multiple nodes in nineteen seconds with 5.56% false-
positive ration, 7.70% false-negative ratio and 91.5% success rate of detection. The 
results represent an improvement compare to the state-of–the-art.   
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  Chapter 1
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The increase in the rate at which data is generated daily is staggering [1, 2, 3]. This 
surge is attributed to our technologically entrenched society. The large volumes of data 
that are generated can potentially tell us a lot about our lives, which in many ways can 
contribute to a high socio-economic value if captured, securely stored and analysed to 
infer knowledge. The intrinsic value of this data lies in the ability to collect, securely 
store and process the data to extract the valuable information that is not easily 
obtainable. One can easily recollect the era of structured file and database management 
systems (DBMS) which revolutionised the business and research ecosystem. That 
ecosystem has over the years evolved into Big Data (BD) technologies with the storage 
and processing capacity to manage a variety of large datasets. What drove such 
important evolution in the IT infrastructure space was the fact that the conventional 
database technologies at some point could not meet the storage and processing demand 
of current information management requirements [1, 2, 3]. Even though the concept of 
BD has not been around for long, many technological and research solutions serving 
either generic or security needs in the domain have been proposed. Irrespective of 
these technological advances, security remains fundamental requirements for their 
success.  
 
BD is a variety of data sets that are so huge and complex that the conventional data 
management and processing systems are ineffective to manage them. Consequently, a 
bespoke BD management system was developed to allow the effective management and 
processing of these large volumes of data [2]. One such BD processing platform is the 
Apache Hadoop software framework.  Hadoop is a software framework that allows the 
storage and distributed processing of large datasets across low-commodity computers 
[3]. Hadoop has indeed grown to become the key BD technology for the past years due 
to its efficiency and effectiveness in processing BD sets. However, the platform lacks 
inherent security mechanism to protect itself against cyber-attacks such as Distributed 
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Denial of Service (DDoS). DDoS is a malicious activity that seeks to prevent its target or 
victim from providing its legitimate service [4].  
 
Information communication technology (IT) is the backbone of data and communication 
management. Indeed, IT has become fundamental to coexistence in society and business 
continuity in the business community. Essentially, we rely on IT solutions such as the 
BD technologies to manage every aspect of our lives; from the storage of confidential 
information to the transmission of time-bound information regardless of the 
geographical locations of the parties involved. 
 
 Undoubtedly, IT platforms are known to be the targets of different kinds of malicious 
activities such as DDoS attacks. Consequently, the Hadoop framework has been 
revamped with some inherent security mechanism to encrypt residential data and also 
authenticate clients and applications to ensure confidentiality and legitimacy. However, 
the current inherent security mechanism of the framework is not sufficient to secure a 
Hadoop cluster against malicious activities such as DDoS attacks. Consequently, Hadoop 
clusters are deployed within a secured perimeter to ensure the safety of confidential 
data and the continuity of the cluster.  
 
Nonetheless, secured network perimeter does not guarantee uncompromising security. 
Thus, the Hadoop framework is still vulnerable to DDoS attacks in an event where the 
secured perimeter is compromised because there is  no inherent mechanism to provide 
secondary detection of DDoS attacks within the framework. As the attacks are getting 
smarter to evade detection and mitigation, a smarter approach to the detection of DDoS 
attacks is required to enhance current work. To address this security gap in the Hadoop 
framework, this work will seek to propose a multi-agent based DDoS detection 
framework that will address the gap.    
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1.2   Application of multi-agent concepts in automated networked management 
systems 
Network infrastructure is gradually becoming complex as resources are added to meet 
new information delivery demands. Consequently, automated network management 
technologies are introduced to abstract the operational complexity and also automate 
management functionalities to enhance efficiency and reduce the person-hours. The 
introduction of automated network management technologies has indeed contributed 
significantly to the improvement in managing network infrastructure. Nonetheless, 
current technologies proposed to assist the management functionalities are still 
confronted with inherent drawbacks due to their design principles and intrinsic 
protocols [5][6]. The need for the optimisation of these technologies attracted research 
interests from both academia and commercial developers. Researchers, however, took 
different viewpoints or approaches to their proposed solution.  
While some researchers focused on the designs of new networking management models, 
others, on the other hand, concentrated on the development of software-based network 
management framework [7].  The latter, however, has attracted much attention over the 
past years due to their ease of application and adaptation [7][8][9][10].  One of the 
emerging research directions in line with the latter approach of network management is 
the application of software agents’ paradigm [8]. Software agent paradigm has been in 
existence for many years and continues to remain the essential subject of research 
interest in the research community due to its diverse application benefits. Although 
agent-based technologies are still classified as an emerging domain, the concept is 
widely applied to solve complex system management problems on behalf of its owners 
[11].  The term software agent is associated with many definitions, partly because there 
is no universally accepted definition [12]. Consequently, the term assumes different 
definitions depending on the application context and the associated functionalities. 
Thus for some application, agent autonomy could largely influence the definition of 
software agents. Likewise, the cognitive capabilities of the agent may influence the 
definition of the term in other application domains [12].  However, definitions which 
emphasise the main characteristics of the software agent concept is adopted in this 
work [13]. In their work, the authors define a software agent as a “computer system 
situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this 
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environment to meet its delegated objective”. The meaning of software agent can, 
therefore, be inferred from this definition as a system capable (i.e. equipped with skills) 
of effecting changes in its environment autonomously. 
The concept is a software engineering paradigm which develops an intelligent and 
autonomous software module called agents. Unlike the native software modules, 
software agents are: 
a. Autonomous: that is they can take independent actions. 
b. Mobile: that is they can migrate to a remote location to carry out their specified 
functions on behalf of the user. 
c. Can be situated at multiple locations at the same time: Unlike the mobile agent, 
static agents are situated in single or multiple locations to carry out their 
specified functions concurrently.  
d.  Possess cognitive capabilities: that is they can reason about the environment 
and capable of making independent decisions.    
 
 The agent or intelligent software concept has been explored to address different 
network management demands such as data security as a result of the application 
benefits over the conventional software concepts.  
 
As network infrastructures are becoming more complex, the imminent threats to the 
networked elements are also getting smarter and more difficult to detect and mitigate. 
Consequently, a smarter or intelligent detection and mitigation approach need to be 
explored to create the required security against any malicious activities. In the quest for 
a plausible approach to combat, the emerging threats, intelligent network management 
concept has evolved significantly over the past decades [14]. Although, significant 
progress is made in the application of the software agent concept in addressing network 
management challenges. A novel approach to detect DDoS attacks in emerging BD 
technologies such as the Hadoop software framework is still required to further 
improve the current security vulnerabilities in Big Data technologies. 
5 
 
1.3 Big Data technology and security vulnerabilities   
BD technologies span across various institutions; from education to health. Each of 
these technologies features synonymous BD file systems. A study of these technologies’ 
file systems shows the diverse implementation of the design principles as proposed by 
Google [3][15][16]. Though diverse in the developmental approach, the technologies, 
however, share the common aim of storing, processing or facilitating the processing of 
large datasets. Thus each one is a scalable, distributed file system for large data-
intensive applications and delivers high aggregated performance to multiple clients. 
This means BD files are stored across low commodity nodes or servers supported by 
several local disks and can concurrently store and efficiently process high volumes of 
data and requests [17]. However, each implementation is best suited to its ecosystem.  
 
One widely distributed BD technology is the Hadoop software framework or the Hadoop 
distributed file system (HDFS) [18]. Hadoop has indeed become the de-facto in the BD 
ecosystem and hence will be adopted as the case study for this research. Thus the study 
of BD technologies will focus on the Hadoop distributed file system (HDFS) and the 
inherent security vulnerabilities.   
 
HDFS is an open source distributed file system designed to be deployed on low 
commodity hardware. An instance of HDFS can consist of a single node to hundreds of 
nodes. In such a distributed environment, if it is to run on low commodity hardware, 
then hardware failure will be the norm rather than the exception [17]. Given this, HDFS 
is designed to be fault tolerant, by discovering fault and recovering from failure without 
significant down time [19]. Also, the file system is designed with the following goal: 
a. Provide streaming data access: BD application can be single-purpose 
applications, designed to process large datasets, and will, as a result, need 
streaming access to data. So in principle, HDFS is designed with much focus on 
high data throughput rather than low latency [19].  
b. Manages large data sets: HDFS handles file size from gigabytes to terabytes. A 
single instance can process or manage hundreds to millions of files in a single 
cluster, i.e. it is designed to facilitate the storage and processing of large datasets 
and also seamlessly scale from a single node to hundreds of nodes with 
aggregate data bandwidth in a single cluster.  
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c. Moving computation is cheaper: Computation is moved to the location of the 
data, not vice versa because moving large data sets at regular intervals to 
applications can be very expensive and also congest network bandwidth. Hence 
HDFS moves computation to the data source to improve throughput [19].  
 
The architecture of HDFS consists of a single NameNode and several DataNodes in 
client-server architecture as shown in Figure 1.1. The NameNode manages the entire 
HDFS namespace and also regulates request and flow of data within the cluster. The 
DataNode is also responsible for reading and writing of data blocks to HDFS or the 
attached database, in this case, Apache HBase, which is a NoSQL (i.e. none SQL or No 
relational database) database developed to provide the BD storage facility within HDFS 
[20]. After a successful client authentication (i.e. when a read/write request is first 
received from the client), the file is further divided into blocks and replicated among the 
DataNodes based on a preconfigured write configuration policy. Then DataNode will 
finally commit the blocks in Apache HBase if it is meant for the database else the default 
file storage will be to write the file in the HDFS (Figure 1.2 depicts the internal HDFS 
operations). HDFS creates these replicas for reliability and fault tolerance. However, the 
security flaw in the file system is that there is no mechanism to ensure that DataNodes 
are not subjected to any form of attacks that will deny legitimate read/write requests. 
Thus HDFS lacks DoS detection mechanism to ensure the delivery of undeniable service 
in any Hadoop cluster.  
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Figure ‎1.1 HDFS External Architecture 
 
In addition to the user data, there are equally important HDFS systems files which are 
natively unprotected and as a result are exposed to security threats or malicious 
activities. For example, for HDFS to monitor the activities and also restore the cluster in 
the event of NameNode failure, NameNode creates and updates a transactional log 
called EditLog. NameNode uses EditLog to persistently record every activity and any 
change that occurs in the file system metadata, e.g. creating a file [14]. Such important 
file as EditLog is also stored in the HDFS unencrypted. Additionally, the technology lacks 
inherent security mechanism to combat DDoS attacks because Hadoop is designed to be 
deployed in secured network perimeter. Consequently, this work will address the lack 
of DDoS detection mechanism by proposing a mechanism to detect such attacks in the 
Hadoop framework. 
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1.4 Research problem   
The design of the Hadoop framework adopts a centralised network organisational 
model. Thus Hadoop’s elements (for example DataNodes) are managed by dummy 
residents agents who manage each node within the cluster based on the instruction 
received from the manager agent deployed in the NameNode. Furthermore, the load 
sharing technique of HDFS is designed to be intrinsically dynamic at runtime or as 
defined by the system administrator. Thus, each node may assume varied workload 
requirements during data processing and as a result, cause the nodes to exhibit 
unpredictable but legitimate behaviours regarding load and bandwidth utilisation. 
 
In addition to the distributed architecture and unpredictable behaviour of load and 
bandwidth utilisation of the nodes, Hadoop lacks inherent security framework to 
monitor in real time, the behaviour and the network traffic of each node to discriminate 
legitimate behaviour from malicious behaviour (e.g. when a node falls under DDoS 
attack for example).  Essentially, Hadoop is not designed to defend itself against 
different types of attacks such as DDoS without the reliance on secured network 
perimeter [21]. Consequently, multiple autonomous security tool sets are required to 
provide a secure perimeter for the Hadoop cluster against different malicious activities 
[22]. However, the overreliance on perimeter security renders the entire Hadoop 
cluster vulnerable when compromised.  
 
Recent versions of Hadoop have seen significant inherent security mechanisms to 
enhance the security of the framework. However, the mechanisms rather aim at 
providing a secure means to encrypt data at rest and also authenticate clients and 
applications [23][24]. Nonetheless, the lack of an inherent DDoS detection mechanism 
to provide a secondary security layer to the perimeter security still renders Hadoop 
susceptible to DDoS attacks. Moreover, the perimeter-based, DDoS detection techniques 
are not informed by the unique architectural and distributed operational requirements 
of the Hadoop framework. Therefore they are unable to accommodate and monitor the 
behaviour of the Hadoop nodes and also provide distributed DDoS detection in real-
time. Finally, they do not have access to key contextual information such as bandwidth 
utilisation and average server load metrics (peculiar to HDFS) of each Hadoop node to 
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provide real-time insight into the anomalous behaviour of the hadoop nodes.  Overall, 
the research problem can be summarised as follows: 
a. Hadoop lacks inherent security framework to monitor in real time, the behaviour 
and the network traffic of each node to discriminate legitimate behaviour from 
malicious behaviour.  
b. DDoS detection techniques in current literature are unable to accommodate and 
monitor the unpredictable behaviour of the Hadoop nodes and also provide 
distributed DDoS detection in real-time. 
1.4.1  Research Question  
The research question this work seeks to address is; how do we secure the Hadoop 
framework against DDoS attack by creating a framework that learns the dynamic 
behaviour of the BD cluster and discriminates DDoS attacks from normal behaviour in 
real-time?   
1.5  Research Objectives  
Given the DDoS detection gap in the Hadoop framework, the objective of this research is 
to; 
a. Review current work in the research domain to establish the  state of the art  
b. Design Multi-Agent framework to provide an inherent DDoS detection 
mechanism for the  Hadoop framework 
c. Implement a prototype of the proposed Multi-Agent framework as an inherent  
DDoS detection mechanism for Hadoop cluster  
d. Deploy and evaluate the veracity  of the prototype on a Hadoop testbed   
1.6 Research novelty  
The rapid improvement of security mechanism in Hadoop ideally demonstrates the 
premium interest researchers, and commercial developers attach to the safety of such a 
widely adopted platform. However, lack of internal security framework to provide DDoS 
detection layer in addition to the network perimeter security still renders a critical Big 
Data technology such as Hadoop susceptible to DDoS attacks. Additionally, current work 
to detect DDoS attacks in the Hadoop cluster is perimeter based and external to the 
Hadoop cluster. Incidentally, the external DDoS detection techniques are not informed 
by the unique architectural and distributed operational requirements of the Hadoop 
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framework. Furthermore, they are autonomous to the Hadoop framework and do not 
have access to the intrinsic behaviour of the cluster to provide internal security layer.   
 
External security in this work is explained as any software framework or third-party 
security elements such as firewall and intrusion detection and prevention systems 
(IDPS) that provide security to the perimeter of the Hadoop cluster from other 
networks. Likewise, inherent security is any software framework or technology that can 
be integrated into the Hadoop software framework to provide an internal security 
mechanism [25].   
 
Contrary to the state-of-the-art multi-agent based detection framework, this work 
proposes a multi-agent framework to provide distributed real-time DDoS detection 
mechanism to detect and report DDoS attack on the Hadoop nodes concurrently. 
Moreover, the agents are engrained with an intelligent training mechanism which 
allows them to build bespoke knowledge of the nodes dynamically. Consequently, the 
proposed framework is viable for detecting DDoS attack within the Hadoop framework.  
Essentially, this work will improve the current internal security mechanism in the 
Hadoop framework by providing a distributed, real-time intelligent DDoS detection 
mechanism to concurrently detect and confirm a DDoS attack on multiple Hadoop nodes 
in real-time.  
 
The operational advantages of the software agent concept have been explored to create 
DDoS detection solutions. Nonetheless, current work does not utilise the multi-agent 
framework which leverages network and server load flow metrics to detect the DDoS 
attack at Hadoop node level [26][4][27][28][29]. The bandwidth utilisation and average 
server load metrics give thoughtful insight into the real-time behaviour of the network 
and the Hadoop nodes. Moreover, the operational advantages of software agent concept 
have not been explored to create Hadoop internal security mechanism in the open 
literature. Consequently, this work will contribute to the current inherent DDoS 
detection gap in the Hadoop framework. The contributions of this work include; 
a. Provide a multi-agent distributed detection mechanism to advance the state of 
the art DDoS detection systems in BD technologies 
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b. A novel statically based DDoS detection technique that allows software agents to 
utilise bandwidth utilisation and average server load flow metrics to detect and 
confirm a DDoS attack in real-time on the Hadoop nodes.  
c. A novel time series data fusion technique that uses ontology description of DDoS 
attack to fuse multiple DDoS attack reports to infer and confirm DDoS attack 
across a Hadoop cluster.  
 
In this direction, this work will also develop a prototype of the multi-agent DDoS 
detection framework. An experiment will be conducted on a live Hadoop cluster to 
ascertain the viability of the proposed framework.  
 
Furthermore, the training technique will allow the agents to adapt to the changes in the 
normal behaviour of each node dynamically. Likewise, the data fusion technique allows 
the aggregation of the attacks reports from the agents assigned to each node to generate 
high-level insight into the anomalous activities in the cluster. 
1.7 Research approach  
The research approach adopted will provide the road-map to address the research 
problem and is presented in the following sub-sections.  
1.7.1 Conduct literature review to understand current work and also establish the 
research gap in chapter one 
An understanding of the research gap is paramount to establishing state of the art in the 
subject area and also making a novel contribution to existing work. Consequently, the 
current work in the research domain shall be reviewed to ascertain the research gap. An 
insight into the gap will inform the novel contribution to current knowledge in the 
research domain. Furthermore, the literature review will aid to achieve the following 
objectives: 
A. Elicit a clear understanding of the area of research 
B. Understand the limitations of current work in addressing the eminent Big Data 
security threat 
C. Inform the objective of a novel contribution to the current work.  
13 
 
D. Provide a summarised survey of current work and their limitations in securing 
the Hadoop framework.   
1.7.2 Employ an agent-based methodology to design and develop a multi-agent 
framework to detect DDoS attacks in a Hadoop cluster 
A novel software multi-agent-based approach to addressing the security gap will be 
proposed. A standardised methodology will be employed to facilitate the design and 
development of the agent-based framework [30].  
 
Software engineering methodology has evolved over the past decade through the 
development of many annotations to assist in the analysis, design and the development 
of software solutions [30]. Conversely, agent-based software engineering is an emerging 
field and therefore lacks a more standardised development life cycle. However, much 
software multi-agent engineering methodologies are proposed to assist in the design 
and development [30][31][11]. In this work, the design and development of the 
proposed framework will adopt the Gaia methodology an agent-based engineering 
methodology [30][32][33][34]. Gaia is an agent-based analysis and design methodology 
which provides significant software agent design concepts to assist with the design and 
development of multi-agent systems (MAS). The methodology is widely adopted in the 
research and commercial development communities as the standard multi-agent 
engineering methodology. Moreover, Gaia will be complemented by an ontology 
development methodology proposed in [35] to model the domain knowledge of the 
framework. Details of current multi-agent based design methodologies are presented in 
Section 4.5.  The methodology will also provide the theoretical demonstration of how 
the final design can contribute to the existing security gap in the research domain.  
 
Two statistical techniques, namely the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) and the Linear 
Weighted Moving Average (LWMA), are employed to create novel DDoS detection 
techniques to enable the agents to detect and report DDoS attacks on the assigned 
nodes. The novel node-based architectural approach allows the framework to provide a 
real-time distributed DDoS detection mechanism that is feasible to the Hadoop 
environment and also not available in the current literature.   
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1.7.3 Deployment of a Hadoop testbed  
The proposed framework aims to contribute to enhancing the existing internal security 
mechanism in the Hadoop software framework. Such objectives will require a clear 
understanding of the Big Data computing environment and the internal behaviour of the 
Hadoop framework which is the case study of the research. Furthermore, the computing 
environment will also serve as the evaluation platform for the proposed framework. An 
understanding of the real behaviour of the Hadoop framework is essential to first assess 
the behaviour of the framework during legitimate Big Data activities and also when 
under attack. Such insight will inform the design and implementation of a reflective 
solution which will seek to address the research problem. Consequently, this research 
will deploy a test bed of four-node Hadoop cluster. The cluster will comprise of the core 
of Hadoop components (i.e. HDFS, MapReduce framework, Apache HBase and Apache 
YARN).  
A MapReduce Job will also be deployed on the cluster to create different normal 
behaviour scenarios on the test bed. The normal activity will provide a distinctive 
scenario to discriminate the legitimate activity from malicious activity.  
1.7.4 Develop a prototype of the proposed multi-agent framework  
The adopted methodology will provide the design and the theoretical justification for 
the proposed solution to achieve the research objectives. Further to this, the framework 
will need to be evaluated to establish its efficiency and effectiveness concerning the 
research objectives. As a result, an agent development platform, Java-based Agent 
Development Environment (JADE. [36]) will be employed to develop a prototype of the 
proposed framework. The prototype will then be deployed in the Hadoop cluster where 
the framework will be evaluated.  
1.7.5 Evaluate the veracity of the prototype  
After a prototype of the proposed framework is developed, an evaluation will be 
conducted to ascertain the veracity of the proposed framework. The result of the 
evaluation will be analysed, using conventional key performance metrics to confirm if 
the research objective is achieved. Consequently, the evaluation will be conducted in 
two real case scenarios to detect TCP SYN and UDP flooding attacks in the Hadoop 
testbed. The exposure of the framework to a Hadoop environment will, first of all, 
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provide the right environment for the agents to build an intelligence of the legitimate 
behaviour of the nodes to discriminate normal behaviour from malicious behaviour 
accurately. Secondly, the accurate prediction of anomalous node behaviour in a Hadoop 
environment will affirm the proposed research novelty intended to fill the security gap 
in the Hadoop framework. The adopted conventional, performance metrics will be used 
as the yardstick to measure the performance of the framework.   
 
The evaluation results will confirm that the novel DDoS detection framework can detect 
DDoS attacks in the Hadoop cluster and hence viable to provide the missing DoS 
detection mechanism.   
1.8 Summary  
The BD computing paradigm has become a significant computing platform for 
businesses and institutions to manage volumes of data in a way that cannot be handled 
by the conventional Data Base Management Systems (DBMS). As organisations turn to 
BD technologies for the computing power to manage a large volume of sensitive 
information, so is will attackers for malicious exploitations. The breach of security 
compliance or denial of legitimate access to cooperate network resources can come 
with a devastating cost to organisations. So it is essential that necessary DDoS detection 
and mitigation measures be put in place to ensure the safety of the data and the 
management platforms. The challenge of ensuring comprehensive security in a BD 
cluster is that the security threats are constantly evolving, and in most cases, it becomes 
difficult to detect and mitigate. Such an unpredictable challenge will equally require a 
solution that can easily evolve and adapt to meet the demands of new threats to the 
network infrastructure or the data that resides in the network. 
Indeed, significant efforts are made to ensure secured perimeter of the BD platform 
because BD technologies such as Hadoop are designed with no security mechanism 
particularly to detect DDoS attacks. Nonetheless, the overreliance on the perimeter 
security creates further vulnerability in the BD infrastructure because comprehensive 
and uncompromising security cannot be guaranteed.  
Consequently, an internal security layer that will serve as the secondary DDoS detection 
mechanism to the perimeter security is essential especially in an event where the 
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network perimeter is compromised.  Moreover, the Hadoop framework is characterised 
by an unconventional behaviour which makes it impossible to directly employ the 
perimeter based DDoS technologies to create an internal security mechanism for 
Hadoop.  
This work will, therefore, provide a DDoS detection mechanism that will contribute to 
the resolution of the inherent security vulnerabilities in the Hadoop software 
framework.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the current literature, 
in Chapter 3 the Multi-Agent paradigm is discussed, application of the Multi-Agent 
concept in BD domain is discussed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 discuss the methodology and 
design of the proposed framework, the evaluation result and analysis is discussed in 
Chapter 6, Chapter 7 presents the conclusion and future work. 
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  Chapter 2
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Every human activity leaves traces of information being it digital or manual. The 
information in most cases provides a rich revelation of socio-economic activities. 
Nonetheless, the data in its raw state is not useful unless they are processed (that is 
transformed) into a form that provides previously unknown information. Moreover, the 
information must be equally shared or securely distributed among stakeholders to 
provide mutual benefits.  
 
Data processing and transmission are however not possible without the facilitation of 
the appropriate technological infrastructures. Technology provides the means to collect, 
secure, store and transform raw data into usable knowledge. Moreover, it provides the 
means to infer knowledge from the data which in turn influences the very same 
activities that generated the data. For example, sensors can be used to collect the heart 
rate of an athlete to ascertain the health condition and then recommend measures to 
improve the heart conditions. The significance of data is not only informed by the 
technological capabilities to transform it into meaningful information, but also the 
assurance of data security and integrity. Data security is essential to ensure that the 
outcome of the data processing activities truly reflect the ground truth and also genuine. 
Consequently, information technology is not only about harnessing computing and 
communication power to process and transmit data but also determine the means to 
ensure the security of the data, both at rest and in motion. The reason why data security 
is as important as data processing is that cyber threats are inevitable and so every 
necessary measure must be taken to ensure that both the underlying technologies and 
the data itself are secured against any malicious activities.  
  
Indeed data is used to inform different decisions whether for business or health 
purposes. The enormous benefits of valuable information have exponentially escalated 
the quest for the right technological infrastructure that can provide the storage and 
processing capabilities to process and securely transmit the information as required. 
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The demand for information, however, comes with different kinds of threats. Thus every 
level of demand introduces the data to another level of threats. Consequently, 
information management does not focus on the maintainability and evolution of the 
processing, storage and transmission technologies but also ensure that adequate 
detection and mitigation mechanism are in place to deal with imminent threats. Given 
these requirements, researchers and commercial developers have proposed several 
innovative information management approaches to ensure that existing technologies 
can constantly respond to the growing data processing and security demands. 
Regardless of the progress made in this regards, current security technologies are still 
not sufficient in their capabilities to meet the growing threat to the information and the 
underlying technology. Indeed further innovative approaches to information 
management and data security are still required to enhance the existing solutions.  
 
As a result of the constant demands, researchers and commercial developers have also 
sort innovative ways to improve on the existing technologies to meet the pertinent 
demands of the information users. The research advancement, however, does not only 
focus on enhancing the information management functionalities but also seek for ways 
to improve the security of the underlying infrastructure. Indeed, security management 
is an important subject area for secured collection, storage and processing of 
information. One approach largely adopted to enhance the management activities is via 
automation of the management activities.  
 
Automation of management activities is essentially substituting the human centred 
functions with a computerised module which tends to enhance efficiency and at the 
same time minimising human errors significantly. Consequently, researchers have 
explored various emerging computing concepts to achieve the management automation 
objectives. One emerging paradigm which has also been explored to secure the data and 
the underlying technology particularly is the application of software agents. However, 
current works still have associated challenges concerning current security 
requirements. Consequently, this chapter will present a review of the existing work in 
the area of application of software agents in networks management technologies, 
particularly under the Big Data paradigm. The chapter will also attempt to highlight the 
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current challenges associated with the current works. Their limitations will also be 
indicated in light of the present security threats to project the gap in the current work.  
 2.2 Application of software agent concept in network and system 
management 
Agent technology has been in existence for many years. It has remained an ample 
subject of research interest and discussion in the research community due to its diverse 
application benefits. Although agent-based technologies are still classified as an 
emerging domain, the concept is widely applied in a domain such as managing complex 
systems, embedded technologies, network and system administration [11].  
The term software agent is associated with many definitions, partly because there is no 
universally accepted definition [12].  However, the importance of the attributes 
associated with the agents in its application domain determines their core definition. 
Thus for some application autonomy largely defined the functional characteristics of the 
agent  
 The term autonomy is very broad and can convey different meaning depending on the 
context of the application. Autonomy from agent’s perspective is delegatory. Thus 
agents excise their autonomy within the confines of the given goal and situated 
environment. Of course, they may have full autonomy to pursue subgoals, but this must 
be carefully considered by the agent developers [12]. An autonomous agent also means 
the agent must be proactive; thus it can predict or infer the required action to take 
based on its domain knowledge and reactive; thus it can respond to a request or a given 
goal. Other general characteristics that pertain to the concept are agent capabilities 
(skills) and actions. Essentially agents are capable of taking actions under the given goal. 
However, the actions are subject to their skills, which is also determined by the 
functional requirement of the agent. For example, a policy management agent designed 
to translate high-level domain policy into low-level machine instructions will be 
endowed with the prerequisite skills to accomplish the desired objectives 
autonomously.  
Software agent skills determine their ability to execute a given action. However, not all 
of the skills will be useful in any instance. Thus the agent is faced with the challenge of 
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the choice of skills to employ to produce the expected result successfully. Moreover, the 
defined actions also have associated conditions which define its application context [12].  
For example, an action to sell a requested book in a bookshop is only applicable if the 
book is available to the selling agent. Every agent action, as indicated have associated 
conditions which will determine its context of the application. Consequently, a 
functional agent is not only equipped with skills but must equally possess the ability 
(equipped with inherent reasoning system) to reason and decide on the right action to 
take to achieve its given goal. Agent reasoning system is the inherent capabilities that 
allow the agent to make autonomous but intelligible decisions. Additionally, it is capable 
of building sufficient knowledge about its environment to comprehend its domain 
semantics as well as communicate with its domain entities. In essence, the skills and 
inherent reasoning system must seamlessly integrate as a single unit of software to 
have an intelligent agent capable of making autonomous decisions to accomplish a given 
task on behalf of its owner.  
Application of software agents concepts has become one of the emerging research 
approaches in network management because of the intrinsic benefits they provide [2]. 
The growing interest in the concept of network management solutions is attributed to 
the challenges associated with the existing network management models and 
protocols[8][9]. For example, the design of the centralised network management model 
tends to increase bandwidth utilisation as a result of the constant transmission of 
management information to a central source. Software agents, on the other hand, can be 
employed to share network management information with less utilisation impact on the 
bandwidth.  For example, the mobile agent can be dispatched to the remote location to 
carry out the management task without the transmission of the management 
information to a central location for processing. It can also reason about the network 
environment and proactively take the best network management decisions on behalf of 
its user [37][10][38]. 
Indeed the benefits of the application of the software agents in network management 
can be enormous. For example, considering specific network management scenarios;  
a. A mobile agent can be dispatch to carry network administration functions in a 
remote location to minimise network traffic. 
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b. User interface agent can also be leveraged to provide network usage intelligence 
to assist system administrators in making proactive decisions about their 
network usage.      
The agent concept has proven to be an effective and efficient approach to developing 
distributed and independent network management solutions [10][39][38][40].  
Nonetheless, developing agent-based network management systems requires a holistic 
appreciation of the network management model, protocols and associated challenges. 
Furthermore, understanding of the software agent concepts especially how each agent 
concept can effectively be employed in the intelligent network management domain is 
crucial.   
2.2.1  Application of multi-agent concept in network management 
Intelligent network management concept has evolved significantly over the past 
decades [14]. Researchers and developers have adopted deferent architectural and 
application approaches to address peculiar challenges in the domain. Although 
significant progress is made in the application of the concept in network management, 
novel approach to detect DDoS attacks in BD infrastructure is still required to further 
improve the current knowledge in the domain. This section will consider the current 
work under the application of a software agent in intelligent network management. The 
challenges associated with the approaches will also be highlighted.  
As part of a research effort to enhance existing network management technologies and 
protocols, the authors of [41] presented seaming challenges associated with 
conventional SNMP-based network management protocol. In the same work, the 
authors proposed a mobile agent-based network management framework which 
particularly aimed at improving on network traffic congestion, computing and 
communication overload largely introduced by extraneous transmission of SNMP 
network management information. The proposed framework provided a scalable and 
distributed approach to dispatching mobile agents to conduct network management 
requirements such as diagnostics and network management information gathering on 
remote elements. The framework is multi-agent and hence allows the deployment of 
multiple agents to simultaneously respond to network management needs. Nonetheless, 
the authors make use of one software agent philosophy (i.e. mobile agent). The 
challenge with such a multi-agent framework is that, the entire framework functionality 
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is limited by the capabilities of the dependant agent concept and as a result limits their 
application. Moreover, the functional requirement of the proposed framework is 
predetermined and cannot be employed for network management functions such as 
network security in a dynamic BD infrastructure.  
 
Autonomic network management is another emerging network management paradigm. 
The paradigm is a network management approach which employs the autonomic 
computing concept in the development of automated or intelligent network 
management systems. Autonomic computing is explained as a development of self-
characterised computing modules that can reorient itself (for example self-trained, self-
configurable) without external support or influence. In this regards Hong Chen [37] 
proposed an agent-based autonomic network architecture which decomposes network 
management functionality into autonomous agent functions and also allows transparent 
distribution of network management information among multiple network elements. 
The proposed architecture employs static wrapper agents which they install in each 
networked elements (the managed resources) to allow the legacy elements to adopt 
intelligent characteristics via the autonomic agents. Consequently, the network 
elements gain the ability to self-govern and share any network management 
information in a format (XML) that can easily be processed by other network 
management modules. A multi-agent approach to transparent distribution of network 
management information is once again utilised in slight different approach particular 
with the choice of agent philosophy employed. The challenge, however, is the 
architecture is designed to provide specific functions such as network information 
management. Further, the installation of wrapper agents in network element makes the 
framework vendor dependent and homogenous and cannot scale to integrate new 
heterogeneous network elements.  Indeed such an approach cannot be applied in BD 
framework which is characterised by multi-layer of autonomous technologies.  
2.2.2 Multi-Agent based DDoS detection techniques  
Different network management activities are required to ensure perpetual network 
infrastructure. Aside other network management functions such as reconfiguration, 
diagnosis or maintenance, network security continue to remain important management 
requirements and hence has not been left out in emerging multi-agent network 
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management paradigm. Application of multi-agent concept to secure network 
infrastructure from different malicious activities has seen significant research and 
development attention for some time now [28][42][43][14]. Anomaly detection and 
threat mitigation in the network has become a teeming requirement and have 
consequently attracted different multi-agent based network security solutions, 
particularly detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks.  
 
As a contribution to highlighting current anomaly detection techniques in light of 
present security demands, the authors of [14] presented a comprehensive survey of the 
current approach to anomaly and intrusion detection systems. Having given a 
theoretical background to intrusion detection systems, the authors described the 
premise of anomaly detection systems and gave a comprehensive description of the 
various detection techniques employed in developing anomaly detection system. The 
detection techniques the authors considered were statistical-based anomaly detection 
techniques and machine learning-based detection techniques. Regarding the statistical-
based detection technique, their work indicated that the technique is effective in 
instances where prior knowledge is required but also suffers some drawbacks. For 
example, the authors suggested that a statistical anomaly detection technique can be 
trained to accept the abnormal behaviour as normal by skilled attackers. Furthermore, 
the technique lacks an optimised means to set a balance threshold to reduce the 
likelihood of false negatives and the likelihood of false positives.  
 
Additionally, the authors also presented some machine learning-based anomaly 
detection techniques such as Bayesian networks, Markov models and classification-
based intrusion detection techniques. Although the authors confirmed that machine 
learning-based techniques answer the same questions as the statistical based-detection 
techniques, machine learning-based technique relies on previous results to constantly 
improve its performance. Consequently, they have the ability to change the detection 
strategy on the bases of newly acquired information, unlike the statistical-based 
anomaly detection techniques.  
 
Their work also discussed current trends and associated challenges in addressing 
pertinent network security requirements. In essence, it was indicated that current 
24 
 
anomaly and intrusion detection systems are associated with many problems such as 
high false alarm rate and failure to dynamically evolve to address new security threats. 
Further, it was concluded aside other suggestions that current anomaly and intrusion 
detection systems cannot still detect internally imitated network attacks. Their work 
indeed confirmed that current detection and mitigation techniques are still inadequate 
to manage the evolving cyber threats and further novel approaches to deal with 
emerging threats is essential.   
 
Web services which have over the years become a major network infrastructure 
deliverables are equally susceptible to pertinent network attacks. To enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of current anomaly detection system, the authors of [42] 
proposed a multi-agent based mechanism to classify SOAP (Simple Object Access 
Protocol) [42] messages to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. A soap message is a 
message protocol that allows autonomous applications to exchange information in a 
service-oriented systems. The contribution presented a two-phase classification 
mechanism incorporated into a software agent to classify and block malicious incoming 
soap messages. The mechanism employs decision tree, fuzzy logic rules and neural 
networks to first analyse some soap message properties such as RoutingTime, 
SubnetMask and then filter malicious messages from the legitimate messages. According 
to the result, the proposed solution attained a high classification rate of 96% relative to 
the number of SOAP message patterns analysed. However, the mechanism is only 
limited to the processing of soap messages. Furthermore, the large numbers of input 
metrics for the detection and mitigation algorithm incur high computational overhead.  
 
From this section, it is observed that multi-agent concept is not new to the network 
management paradigm. Indeed the concept is significantly employed to create different 
intelligent solutions to enhance the management and security of network infrastructure. 
However, it is observed that the existing solutions are also characterised by different 
challenges which hinder their ability to provide adequate network and data security. 
Consequently, more effort will be required to create intelligent solutions that can deal 
with imminent threats in emerging technologies such as the Big Data technology.  
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2.3 The Big Data technologies and security vulnerabilities   
2.3.1 Current Big Data technologies 
Another buzzword in the domain of network services is BD storage and processing. The 
concept has evolved rapidly and been redefining large-scale data storage and 
processing. One major technology which is driving the BD Paradigm is the Hadoop 
software framework [3]. Although Hadoop has recently been in existence, it has 
provided the storage, processing and data analytic resource to take full advantage of 
large datasets. Nonetheless, the software framework does not come without drawbacks. 
The associated inherent security flaws in Hadoop render the framework susceptible to 
attacks such as DDoS [44]. This section will present an overview of the BD paradigm and 
associated technologies (specifically the Hadoop framework). The security 
vulnerabilities and the challenges with the current effort being made to address the 
challenges will be highlighted. Application of the software agent concept in addressing 
the security challenges in the Hadoop framework will also be presented.  
 
Over the years, different researchers have designed different BD technologies 
implementations of Google File System (GFS) [20][23][2]. Nonetheless, all these 
implementations share the common aim of facilitating the storage and processing of 
large datasets, by being a scalable distributed file system for large data-intensive 
applications. Moreover, the underlying file system also delivers high aggregated 
performance to multiple clients, according to the author of [18]. The deployment of BD 
technologies including Hadoop, span across various institutions, from education to 
health. Each of these technologies features synonymous BD file systems. A study of the 
existing technologies’ file system shows the diverse implementation of the same design 
principles as proposed by Google [3][15][16]. That is, BD files are stored across low 
commodity nodes or servers supported by several local disks and can concurrently 
process high volumes of data and requests efficiently [17].  
 
One widely BD file system is Hadoop [18]. Hadoop is a distributed open-source Java-
based BD framework designed to facilitate the storage and processing of large datasets 
on low commodity hardware. The framework is also designed to be fault tolerant, by 
discovering faults and recovering from failures without significant downtime [19]. The 
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entire Hadoop technology is centred on the underlying file system called Hadoop 
distributed file system (HDFS).  
An instance of the HDFS consists of a single NameNode and several DataNodes in a 
client-server architecture. The NameNode manages the entire HDFS namespace and 
also regulates requests and flow of data within the cluster. DataNode is also responsible 
for reading and writing of data to the attached database, in this case, HBase, which is a 
NoSQL (originally referring to No SQL or No relational database [18]) database. Hbase is 
developed as part of the Apache HDFS to provide the BD storage facility within HDFS 
[20]. Additionally, DataNode also sends periodic heartbeats messages to NameNode to 
announce its existence within the cluster. Incidentally, NameNode marks the DataNode 
as down or dead and stops sending further requests to it if that DataNode does not send 
out heartbeat for some time. DataNodes also responds to subsequent read/write 
requests directly from external applications. For example, in a written scenario, the 
external application will first send the write request which will include the name of the 
file to NameNode. After a successful client authentication, the file is further divided into 
blocks and replicated among the DataNodes based on a preconfigured write 
configuration policy, then DataNode will finally commit the blocks in HBase if it is meant 
for the database otherwise the default file storage will be the HDFS.  
HDFS creates these replicas for reliability and fault tolerance; however, these blocks of 
user data are stored within the underlying file system unencrypted. Although the recent 
edition of Hadoop came with some transparent encryption solution to remedy the 
security challenge, it is not easily deployable and requires high technical knowledge to 
manage. In addition to the user data, there are equally important HDFS system files 
which are natively unprotected, and as a result, user data are exposed to security 
threats or other potential actions that can cause damage. For example, for HDFS to 
monitor the activities and restore to the point of NameNode failure, NameNode creates 
and updates a transactional log called EditLog. The EditLog file is used by NameNode to 
persistently record every activity and any change that occurs to the file system 
metadata [14].  
Such important file as EditLog is also stored in the NameNode unencrypted. Also, for 
NameNode to monitor and locate each data blog within the cluster, it creates a mapping 
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of all the data blogs in each DataNode. The entire namespace file, including the data blog 
mappings and any other important system properties, are stored in a single file called 
FsImage. HDFS requires this file to be able to start the entire cluster meaning; if 
FsImage gets corrupted, the cluster cannot start. FsImage is equally stored as part of the 
operating system files locally in the NameNode openly exposed to any security threat. 
Moreover, the framework lacks an internal mechanism to protect itself against attacks 
such as DDoS. Thus the current version of such important BD platform still lacks the 
internal DDoS detection mechanism and as a result, relies on the secured network 
perimeter for protection.   
These inherent security vulnerabilities among others are the security gaps in the BD 
technology file system inspired by the Google file system.   
2.3.2 Current BD security solutions and their challenges 
Current research work on security under the BD domain seeks to mitigate the security 
vulnerabilities in BD data stores. Although considerable advancement is made in this 
regard, Hadoop is not adequately secured against malicious activities within the 
framework. This section will show that despite the progress, Hadoop indeed lacks DoS 
detection mechanism because current security mechanism within the Hadoop domain 
rather focuses on data encryption and application and user authentication solutions.  
A.  A Transparent middleware for encrypting BD in MongoDB  
Under the research interest to secure the Hadoop software framework,  the authors of 
[45]  presented a middleware data encryption solution to improve on the security in 
MongoDB which is a NoSQL database based on HDFS. The work proposed a transparent 
encryption enforcement system that can easily be deployed on existing applications that 
employ MongoDB as its data store. In pursuit of that, the authors extended the core 
read/write objects of MongoDB. Furthermore, they overrode its methods as shown in 
Table ‎2-1. Since DBObject (the MongoDB object responsible for adding and getting data 
of any type from the data store) can store any object as a key-value pair, the main idea 
was to encrypt the data before passing it to DBObject. The overridden methods allowed 
the system to first decide on the document to encrypt. Documents meant for encryption 
are serialised, flagged and then encrypted and stored via the DBObject.  Conversely, 
flagged documents are first decrypted, un-flagged and then de-serialised.  
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The proposed approach is a simple and straightforward encryption solution. However, 
the solution only provides data encryption mechanism in the NoSQL database.  
Furthermore, it will require application modification at every configuration and change 
of policy and regulatory requirement. It is also product dependent and not easily 
configurable. In a heterogeneous environment like BD, regular modification to 
applications means the solution will be tightly coupled with the application, thereby 
making it not operable and un-scalable. Encryption results are also of generic Java data 
class “byte[]” meaning, without any effective encryption key management and 
authentication mechanism, encrypted data can be reverse engineered by an attacker.  
 
The table below  shows the comparison of the native and extended MongoDB classes 
 
Table ‎2-1 Extended classes  [45] 
Native MongoDB 
Classes 
Defined Classes 
Mongo EncryptedMongo 
DB EncryptedDB 
DBCollection EncryptedDBCollection 
BasicDBObject EncryptedBasicDBObject 
DBCursor EncryptedDBCursor 
 
B.   A data type classification and sensitive level approach to security to 
unstructured Big Data 
Based on the conjecture that there is no single approach to providing security for BD, 
the authors of [46]  developed a multi-solution approach to providing adequate security 
to big unstructured data by first considering the data types and the assigned sensitive 
levels. The authors are of the view that, classification of data concerning the assigned 
sensitive levels can improve overall system performance by enhancing the security 
system’s overhead. In doing so, some existing BD analytic tools such as Oracle BD 
Appliance [46], IBM’s InfoSphere BigInsight[46][47]  were leveraged to first classify the 
unstructured data into various data types like text, XML (Extensible Markup Language), 
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e-mail, image, video and audio. Dedicated data nodes were then assigned to store each 
data type. The selected BD analytic tools were further used to assign sensitive levels to 
each of the data types. Their approach was informed by the view that, unstructured data 
are of several types, so a single security solution to secure them will be ineffective or a 
difficult task.  Consequently, they proposed a security suite which contains several 
preselected security services (For example encryption algorithm, authentication 
mechanism and security standards) to provide adequate security to the data types and 
an algorithm which interfaces the data nodes and the security suite as shown in Figure 
2.1.  
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01
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01
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XML Text E-Mail
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The principle for data classification and assignment of sensitivity level is based on 
institutional legislation and regulatory requirements about certain data types. Thus 
data which are protected by the government and private regulations and sensitive 
agreement is classified as sensitive data, whereas any data whose alteration or illegal 
destruction only cause the minimal level of risk are classified as confidential data. 
Lastly, data whose unauthorised disclosure, alteration or destruction causes no risk are 
classified as public data.  
 
After data are successfully classified with assigned sensitivity levels, the algorithm 
interface then matches the preselected and pre-configured security solutions to the 
sensitivity level to provide the required security. For example, the algorithm uses the 
strongest security standard or algorithms (such as K-means fuzzy K-means, and logistic 
regression,) to provide the highest level of security to sensitive data. In the end, the 
analysis result mathematically indicated that securing unstructured data in BD stored 
by classification and sensitive level can improve overall system performance.  
Figure ‎2.1 Conceptual view of Data node and Security Suite 
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However, the principle of classification is relative because data protection and 
regulatory policies may differ from one organisation to the other or from country to 
country. Furthermore, it was observed that a multi-solution framework, is not easily 
configurable to quickly adapt to changes in policies and regulations, especially in highly 
dynamic ecosystems like BD. Secondly, the idea of dedicating data nodes to specific data 
types means, the BD cluster will scale based on the data types as compared to the 
general architectural principle of scalability based on data size. Incidentally, the 
introduction of a new data type will directly increase DataNodes in the cluster. Although 
the solution may improve on system performance, it is very likely to scale 
infrastructural, security and maintenance cost. Furthermore, the proposed framework 
only accommodates data encryption and user and application authentication tools.   
C.  Data masking approach to enhancing data privacy in BD systems  
Data privacy is also a major security concern in the BD ecosystem. The implications and 
negative impacts of a breach of data privacy can be very significant if necessary 
measures are not deployed to maintain high data privacy. One technique widely used to 
maintain data privacy is data masking [47]. Data masking is the process of replacing 
confidential data such as personal identifiable information (PII)  with operational but 
unrelated data [47]. Data masking is very helpful in an environment where data are 
shared, transferred or distributed for experimental or research purposes. IBM 
Infosphere Data Privacy for Hadoop is a BD security solution, to maintain data privacy 
by masking the data either at the source or in transit [47]. The technology first allows 
for the planning of a Hadoop project or clusters in line with the corporate data policy 
and also defines data sensitivity.  Unlike the pre-configured solution approach in [46], 
[47] adopted a more configurable approach which allows the solution to classify the 
data and its sensitivity based on the corporate data policy and other data regulatory 
acts, making this solution configurable and scalable to dynamically adapt to policy or 
regulatory changes. It also deals with any potential data privacy threats.  
 
The masking technology comprises four components in a layered architecture: 
a. The lower layer provides the algorithm that masks the data through techniques 
such as shuffling, random number generation and lookup tables. 
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b. On top of the lower layer, users can define masking functions, in line with new 
organisational policy and regulations. The technique then allows the user-
defined functions to be invoked through a standard SQL statement. 
c. The third layer entails the data masking tools which can be used to mask various 
unstructured and structured data such as XML (Extensible Markup Language). 
d. The fourth component is test management, which allows the extraction of data 
from a source database and then masks it purposefully for testing or 
experiment.  
 
The approach aims to provide an easily reconfigurable data masking solution to 
enhance data privacy in a BD cluster. Data masking can be very useful in BD 
infrastructure. However, the technique only satisfies the data privacy concerns and 
therefore will require additional security technologies to provide a comprehensive 
security solution for a BD cluster.  
 
As stated in the above sections, the inherent security mechanism was not considered 
very important in the design of the BD file systems and data stores technologies such as 
HDFS, HBase, and MongoDB. Nonetheless, there has been a clear shift of security focus 
from reliance on network perimeter security to improving inherent security 
mechanisms in BD file systems and storage technologies. Apache Accumulo [48], for 
example, is an open source BD data store technology with an inherent cell-level access 
control mechanism. The approach makes it possible to provide much granular security 
solutions in BD cluster. Thus Accumulo can provide cell level  BD data protection, and it 
also implements authentication techniques easily scalable along BD platform [48]. 
Leveraging the security solutions in Apache Accumulo [48] and other open sources 
technologies such as Apache Shiro, the authors of  adopted a more generic approach to 
their solution. The work rather aimed to provide multi-purpose security solution by 
integrating autonomous policy and security technologies. Coupled with Apache 
Accumulo’s fine grain cell-level access control, the layered solution also provides 
pluggable encryption mechanism to encrypt data at rest and in motion. The idea is to 
leverage Apache Accumulo’s cell labelling and access control capabilities to label each 
data in the database cell, using a predefined labelling scheme. Consequently, Apache 
Accumulo can enforce the right security on all read/write operations by inspecting the 
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labels attached to the fields in its cells to make sure that data access is restricted to 
authorised users [48].  The proposed approach, therefore, provides some level of 
scalability and interoperability, which gives organisations the flexibility to easily scale 
or complement current encryption solution with third-party solutions. However, the 
solution only provides a data encryption mechanism in BD data stores. 
D.   Application of attribute relationship evaluation methodology to secure data in 
BD systems 
One of the characteristics that produce BD value is volume. Big data comes and is 
processed in large volumes, and therefore any approach to protecting the entire BD can 
be very expensive.  As indicated by [49],  it is also an inefficient way to protect the entire 
BD, because the key deliverables of any BD solution are the value derived, which is the 
result of analytics. From this perspective, one can infer that value is the main asset of 
any BD project or cluster which requires all attention regarding security. The raw or 
unprocessed data itself according to [49] should not be the subject of protection. 
Additionally, the authors share the view that data mining techniques can be leveraged 
to create a solution that can selectively secure the BD value instead of the entire 
datasets in the BD cluster. Consequently, a selective-based security mechanism based 
on a data mining technique was proposed. The proposed technique first all selects the 
attributes of the BD sets meant for analytics.  Thus, the technique considers any 
instance of BD set for analytics as an object and suggests the appropriate security to 
apply to those objects based on their levels of relevance.   
 
The main functionality of the technique is centred on the evaluation of the relationships 
between the attributes of the targeted BD set. The evaluation considers the target BD 
set for analytics as a single object with multiple or various attributes. It also assumes 
that there is an unknown correlation between these attributes which is important in 
determining its relevance. Hence any mutual relationship which can lead to the 
identification of the attributes has to be protected. Before the attributes are evaluated, 
the process identifies and classifies the attribute correlations in three subsets and then 
assigns weight to each set to indicate the level of importance. The three classifications 
used are: 
a. Equivalence relation: meaning two attributes are the same 
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b. Hierarchical relation: attributes with hierarchical relation 
c. Unknown: attributes with neither of the above relations 
 
After the classification, it assigns the score of a quantitative comparison as the weight 
(indicating the level of importance) of each identified correlation for evaluation. At the 
evaluation stage, the attribute evaluation method first identifies the targeted data set. It 
compares the attributes relations between mutual BD objects using the assigned weight. 
Attributes with equivalence relation are assigned the highest weight, followed by the 
hierarchical and then unknown is assigned the lowest weight. The attribute relations 
between mutual BD objects are compared using the weight in ranking order. Attributes 
with the highest weighted correlations are then selected as the most important 
relationship that needs to be protected. Those responsible can then determine the right 
security technology to be employed to protect the data as the proposed tool does not 
define or provide any security mechanism to secure the BD set. 
 
Even though the proposed solution secures BD in a precise manner, it does not provide 
any comprehensive solution to secure BD at rest. The approach to protecting the value 
cannot be an independent solution in that; values are products of analytics which are 
dependent on the stored unprocessed data.  So if the stored raw data get compromised, 
it is likely to affect the value of the analytics, and therefore, this approach cannot 
provide adequate singleton security solution for a given BD cluster without the 
application of other third-party security tools and policy management tools.  
E.  A triple encryption scheme to secure BD in the cloud  
Towards a more secure means to address the data security issues in Hadoop’s  HDFS,  
and also manage encryption keys, the authors of [50] proposed a triple encryption 
scheme.  The scheme specifically secures BD in a cloud-based Hadoop storage system. 
Both symmetric and asymmetric encryption technique-base algorithms were leveraged 
to encrypt and decrypt data. Symmetric encryption technique encrypts and decrypts 
data with a single key; the key can be shared via a secured network. Asymmetric 
encryption technique, on the other hand, uses a key pair (private and public key) to 
encrypt and decrypt the data. In other words, when the data is encrypted with the 
private key, the data can only be decrypted by using the corresponding public key.  
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The hybrid encryption technique adopted in [50] first uses a symmetric encryption 
algorithm to encrypt the HDFS data. Secondary the encryption method uses RSA (an 
asymmetrically encryption based algorithm) encryption algorithm to encrypt the 
symmetric encryption key (data key), and then the RSA encryption key is also encrypted 
with IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm). In principle, the scheme uses DES 
algorithm to encrypt the files, and the RSA encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the 
data key (the secret key to decrypt the file). The user will then keep the private key 
generated by the RSA algorithm to decrypt the data key which will, in turn, be used to 
decrypt the file [50].  The scheme implements a key management module, encryption 
and decryption module, application server and a database to encrypt and decrypt data.  
For example, if a user wants to encrypt a file, the application server first receives the 
encryption request and then generates an RSA key pair (public and private). The private 
key is sent back to the user to keep. Moreover, before each file is encrypted, the user 
first sends a request to the data key management module, which upon successful 
authentication generates a data key (the key to decrypt the encrypted file) for the user. 
The module then links up with the encryption or decryption module, which then 
searches for the user’s ID from the database and then locates the public key of the user 
to encrypt the data key which is subsequently persisted in the database.  
 
Inversely if the user wants to decrypt a file, the application server uses the user’s 
private key and the file ID to find the data key in the database.  The key management 
module uses the user’s private key to decrypt the data key which is used to decrypt the 
file before it is finally sent to the user. Due to the importance and risk associated with 
the private key, the work further provides private key storage management, that 
generates, backups, restores and manages the user’s private key. The key management, 
however, needs to be installed by the user as a dedicated key management system. 
Furthermore, the key management component also uses DES, RSA and IDEA encryption 
algorithms to encrypt and decrypt the private keys.  
 
The approach leverages the strength of both symmetric and asymmetric encryption 
algorithms to provide a robust encryption solution for BD data storage system. The 
scheme also allows the integration of dedicated encryption key management systems to 
35 
 
store and manage encryption keys safely. Nonetheless, such an approach is likely to 
contribute to process overhead. Because data encryption requires much processing 
time, the employment of multiple encryption solutions despite its effectiveness can 
potentially increase the complexity of the implementation as a BD encryption solution 
[51]. 
F.    Multi-solution approach for a multifaceted BD security demand 
An enterprise BD solution is an ecosystem of several technologies [24]. BD technology 
such as Hadoop is made up of several inherent technologies. Additionally, each layer in 
the framework is a conglomeration of autonomous native and third-party technologies 
purposed to deliver specific functionality within the framework [52]. Another challenge 
that BD poses is the storage and management requirements of the large datasets. 
Organisations that deals with data are expected to comply with certain security 
standards and regulations. General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR), for example, is 
EU regulations that ensure that the citizenry of the EU’s data is protected [53]. 
Additionally, there are other institutional or industrial specific regulations such as  
HIPPA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) compliance for the 
healthcare industry [54],  PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards) 
compliance for the card payment industries [55].  Besides the external regulations, 
there are security threats that will require regular security interventions to subvert or 
mitigate the threats.  
 
Building and maintaining security infrastructure for a BD cluster is technically and 
economically expensive [56]. To be able to maintain holistic security solutions across all 
layers within the cluster will require the deployment of the right security solution at 
each layer within the cluster. Moreover, each of these technologies will equally need all 
necessary security measures to ensure that both data and the technology are adequately 
protected from any malicious activities.  
G.  Security vulnerabilities in Hadoop-based BD systems  
The premium security interest researchers and developers attached to BD technologies 
have resorted to different solutions all aiming at delivering a peculiar solution to the BD 
eco-system. For example, the authors of [24] presented an analysis of the various 
security solutions implemented in the core Hadoop components. Each security 
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component, as indicated in their results provides a tailored solution in what is 
summarised as “The 3ADE” representing the security concerns in each layer or platform 
within the Hadoop technology. In total, their work presented thirty-eight autonomous 
security solutions (such as data and user authorisation technologies, technologies for 
encrypting data at rest and in transit, and technologies for security auditing and 
authentication) provided to deal with respective security issues in each Hadoop layer 
[24]. Despite the high number of proposed BD technologies, BD DDoS detection 
mechanism is still not proposed according to the work of [24]. 
 
A significant advancement is made in the area of BD security, particularly securing data 
at rest and in transit. However, it can also be observed from current work that, the state 
of the art security mechanisms in Hadoop only aim to enhance client authentication 
mechanism and to protect data at rest. Consequently, the Hadoop framework is not 
resilient against DDoS attacks due to the lack of research attention in this regard. 
Moreover, although much research effort is committed to enhancing the existing DDoS 
detection techniques and technologies, they are however designed to operate on the 
network perimeter and not within the Hadoop cluster or framework. Incidentally, the 
perimeter based detection mechanisms cannot be directly employed within the Hadoop 
framework as DoS or DDoS detection solutions. The reason is that the framework 
adopts the Centralised organisational model. Thus Hadoop’s elements (for example 
DataNodes) are managed by dummy residents agents who manage each node within the 
cluster based on the instruction received from the manager deployed in the NameNode, 
in a star topology. Moreover, the load sharing technique of Hadoop File System (HDFS is 
designed to be intrinsically distributed at runtime or as defined by the system 
administrator. Essentially, each node may assume varied workload requirements during 
data processing which can cause the nodes to exhibit different characteristics regarding 
load and processing activities. Perimeter-based DDoS detection systems, however, are 
not cognisance of such unique topological and processing characteristics of the Hadoop 
framework [29][26][4][28]. Consequently, they cannot be viable to discriminate the 
normal behaviour of the nodes and then predict the presence of a DDoS attack on each 
node.  
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H.   Addressing the DDoS security gap in Hadoop framework 
Creating a detection technique that can satisfy the unique topological and operational 
characteristics will demand an unconventional approach to the detection of DDoS 
attacks. Thus, the proposed solutions must be able to dynamically understand the 
normal behaviour of the nodes in the cluster and accurately judge if a node is depicting 
malicious activities. Furthermore, it is equally imperative to consider the operational 
cost to the cluster. Thus, the performance of the Hadoop clusters should not deplete or 
be compromised because of a technique with high computational overhead. 
Consequently, the proposed solution will employ some detection techniques that can 
deliver the expected result with minimal computational cost.  
 
From the understanding of the capabilities of software agents, the concept has the 
intrinsic means to provide an intelligent and dynamic approach to learn the behaviour 
of the nodes and make an accurate judgement about malicious activities on each node 
autonomously. Moreover, the agent concepts provide the means to create a single 
framework that can satisfy the architectural requirements of the Hadoop framework. 
The idea of employing intelligence software agents to create autonomous and intelligent 
security solutions have gain exponential interest in recent years [28][57][58]. However, 
the application of agent-based inherent security techniques to detect DoS attacks in the 
Hadoop framework is still lacking. 
 
Whiles the software agent concepts provide the means to create a framework that can 
seat within the Hadoop cluster; two light weighted statistical techniques, namely the 
Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) and the Linear Weighted Moving Average (LWMA), will be 
employed to create a prerequisite DDoS detection skill for the agents. CUSUM and 
LWMA are significantly adopted by the state of the art DDoS detections technologies 
[59][60][61]. They are largely employed to detect DDoS attacks in unpredictable 
situations because it is non-parametric and does not incur a high computational cost. 
Likewise, variations of the averaged-base statistical techniques such as LWMA and 
Exponential Linear Weighted Moving Average (ELWMA) is utilised in the domain for the 
same reason [62].  
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Contrarily to the current approaches, this work will adopt a multi-disciplinary approach 
that will leverage the software agent concept, and light weighted statistical technique 
(CUSUM and LWMA) to propose a multi-agent framework that will address the DDoS 
detection gap in the Hadoop framework.  
2.4 Summary  
DDoS attacks are known to be very disruptive and dangerous to any computer 
infrastructure. They are designed to explore and bypass existing security structures to 
have direct access to the target victim. As the techniques employed in this kind of 
attacks are getting smarter by the day, the detection and mitigation techniques equally 
need to evolve to avoid the consequences of the attacks. This chapter has presented the 
state of the art and security challenges in the BD technologies particularly about the 
current advancement and the research direction of the internal security mechanism of 
the Hadoop framework. The literature review has confirmed that BD technology such as 
Hadoop has made significant progress in providing an inherent security mechanism to 
encrypt data and also ensures robust client and user authentication. However, the 
current state of the technology still lacks inherent security mechanisms to detect DDoS 
attacks and as a result, relies on a secured network perimeter to protect itself against 
such attacks. The literature review has also shown that the software agent concept has 
been employed in the research community to create smart DDoS detection in a dynamic 
computing environment. However, current work does not utilise a singleton software 
agent-based framework that allows intelligent, real-time distributed monitoring and 
analysis of the network and average server load measurements to detect DDoS within 
the Hadoop framework. Moreover, the operational advantages of a software agent 
concept have not been explored in the Hadoop framework. Consequently, a multi-agent-
based framework to detect DDoS attack within the Hadoop framework is proposed. 
Contrary to existing DDoS detection techniques, the proposed framework is informed 
by Hadoop’s unique design and inherent security requirement to provide internal 
security mechanism within a Hadoop framework. The employment of a software agent 
further introduces intelligent operation into the BD technologies which are currently 
not the case. Thus, a secondary security layer which will ensure the security of the 
cluster against DDoS attacks is available in an event where the network parameter 
security is compromised.  
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Chapter 3  
Overview and Application of Multi-Agent Concepts in Automated Big Data 
Security System Management 
 3.1 Introduction   
Software agent paradigm has been in existence for many years and continues to remain 
the essential subject of research interest in the research community due to its diverse 
application benefits. Though agent-based technologies are still classified as an emerging 
domain, the concept is widely applied to solve complex problems on behalf of humans 
[11].  
The term software agent is associated with many definitions, partly because there is no 
universally accepted definition [12]. Consequently, the term assumes different 
definitions depending on the application context and the associated functionalities. 
Thus for some application, agent autonomy could largely influence the definition of 
software agents. Likewise, the cognitive capabilities of the agent may influence the 
definition of the term in other application domain [12]. However, more generic 
definitions which emphasise the main characteristics of the software agent concept was 
proposed by the authors of [13]. The authors define a software agent as a “computer 
system situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this 
environment to meet its delegated objective”. The meaning of software agent can, 
therefore, be inferred from this definition as a system capable (i.e. equipped with skills) 
of effecting changes in its environment autonomously.   
Software agent skills determine their ability to execute a given action. Howbeit, not all 
of the skills, will be useful in any instance. Thus the agent is faced with the challenge of 
the choice of skills to employ to produce the expected result successfully. Moreover, the 
defined actions also have associated conditions which define its application context [12]. 
Every agent action, have associated conditions which will determine its context of the 
application. 
Consequently, a functional agent is not only equipped with skills but must equally 
possess the ability to reason and decide (i.e. Each agent is equipped with inherent 
reasoning system) on the right action to take to achieve its given goal. Agent reasoning 
system is the inherent capabilities that allow the agent to make autonomous but 
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intelligible decisions. Additionally, the cognitive system is capable of building sufficient 
knowledge about its environment to comprehend its domain semantics as well as 
communicating with its domain entities.  
The introduction of automated network management technologies has contributed 
significantly to the improvement in managing network infrastructure. Nonetheless, the 
current network management technologies are still confronted with some inherent 
drawbacks due to their underlying management model and intrinsic protocols. The 
need for the optimisation of these management models and technologies consequently 
attracted research interests from both academia and commercial developers. 
Researchers, however, took different viewpoints or approaches to their proposed 
solution. Some researchers focused on the development of new networking 
management models and protocols to optimise existing ones [7]. Others, on the other 
hand, concentrate on the development of software-based network management 
framework to leverage existing network management models and protocols. The latter, 
however, has attracted much attention over the past years due to their ease of 
application and adaptation  [7] [5][9]. 
One of the emerging research approaches in line with the latter approach of network 
management is the application of software agents’ paradigm[5]. The software agent 
concepts have proven to be an effective and efficient approach to developing distributed 
and independent network management solutions [10][39][38][40].  Nonetheless, 
developing agent-based network management systems requires a holistic appreciation 
of the network management model, protocols and associated challenges.  Consequently, 
this chapter will present an overview and state of the art (SOTA) of the software agent 
paradigm. Additionally, a dedicated section will attempt to map each respective agent 
concept to a network management requirement in the BD system (i.e. Hadoop software 
framework). Contrary to current literature the proposed mapping will aim to contribute 
to how various agent concepts can be leveraged to address the class of management 
challenges associated with SOTA BD technologies. Furthermore, the proposed 
framework will be introduced in this chapter and will further be employed to 
demonstrate how the multi-agent concept can be leveraged to address the 
interoperability challenge in a heterogeneous environment such as the Hadoop 
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framework.  In the end, the chapter will confirm that a software agent is capable of 
addressing the DDoS detection gap in the Hadoop software framework. 
3.2 Types of software agents 
The term agent applies to a wide range of application domains. as indicated in Section 
3.1. However, the application domains differ in their characteristics, operational 
requirements and goals. Essentially, different types of software agents philosophies are 
required to be applicable in the plethora of the application domain. In this section, 
agents type based classification is employed to attempt to create a taxonomy of the 
available philosophies. The classification approach employed will present the types 
based on their functional characteristics, goal and design approach.  
It is essential to adopt a set of criteria to classify software agents. Consequently, the 
classification topology proposed in [63] is employed to classify agents as: functionally   
a. Interface agents 
b. Information agents 
c. Collaborative Agent 
d. Mobile agents 
e. Smart agents 
The rest of this section present briefly introduce the technical functionality of each 
classification. 
3.2.1 Interface agent 
Autonomy and cognitive capabilities are the main characteristics of Interface Agents. 
Essentially, they are designed to create a knowledge model of its user’s activities over 
time by using its cognitive system. The knowledge base then allows it to predict user’s 
activity and also provide proactive assistance to enhance productivity and efficiency.  
For example, the interface agent out of its knowledge base can suggest or provide a 
more efficient way of user’s functional activity. Another functionality of the interface 
agent can be to provide an evaluation report of user activity and also to act as a 
feedback tool. In essence, the concept can be employed to intelligently assist with end-
user performance evaluation and also provide an efficient way to enhance productivity 
by cooperating with other agents and end users [63].  
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3.2.2 Information agent 
The prevailing challenge of managing heterogeneous information from distributed 
sources necessitated the role of the information agent [63]. The main functional 
requirements, therefore, are collating, managing and analysis of distributed information.  
Information agent can be implemented as mobile, collaborative or static agents and may 
also exhibit some or all of the agent's characteristics depending on the design 
expectation. The aim as suggested in [63] is to provide efficient and intelligent means of 
managing heterogeneous information from distributed sources.  
3.2.3 Collaborative agent  
Collaborative agents are autonomous as the rest of the philosophies but are also 
designed to be social entities.  The concept may to some extent have cognitive 
capabilities, but that is not a key design decision comparative to the ability to effectively 
negotiate with other agents to accomplish the corporate task. Essentially their design 
philosophy is to negotiate with other agents to mutually agree on the subject of interest. 
Consequently, they are mostly situated in high coarse-grain multi-agent systems to act 
rationally and autonomously.  Regarding the operational benefits,  collaborative agents 
are employed to:  
a. Collaborate with other agents to perform a task not achievable by a single 
agent. 
b. Provide aggregated information, especially from heterogeneous systems. 
c. Facilitate the optimisation of systems resource in heterogeneous network 
infrastructure  
3.2.4 Mobile agents 
Mobile agents are endowed with the skills to perform their functions remotely on 
behave of its host (i.e. the mobile agent manager). The elimination of the high 
operational cost associated with remote procedure calls (RPC) (i.e. a conventional 
approach for processes to communicate over network channels – as shown in Figure 3.1. 
largely contributed to the fruition of the mobile agent philosophy [12].  
 
The idea of a mobile agent is to avoid such potential network congestion by sending an 
agent to the remote source to do the computation.  In this case, the store agent will 
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rather migrate to carry out the transaction remotely. Figure 3.2. depicts the mobile 
agent model.  
 
Application of mobile agents comes with more operational benefits than other agent 
implementations [64]. Thus the concept has the potential to maximise the benefits of 
the multi-agent implementation further if their functional requirements and social 
responsibilities are precisely defined.  
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of  conventional remote procedure call (RPC) [2] 
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Figure 3.2 Illustration mobile agent in remote procedure call (RPC) [2] 
 
3.3 Agent reasoning system 
The reasoning is the act of engaging the mind in processing contextualised information 
to infer knowledge for decision making. Decision making, therefore, can be inferred as a  
(reasoning system) cognitive function. Software agents as mentioned in section 3.1 is 
equally capable of making an autonomous decision to reactively or proactively inform 
their action. To be able to perform such a rational function means the agent will have a 
cognitive system that will enable the whole decision-making process to take place [65]. 
Consequently, the research community has proposed a wide range of software agent’s 
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cognitive systems [66][65]. Nonetheless, the Procedural Reasoning System(PRS), 
proposed in [66] has become the defacto of software agents reasoning systems due to 
its stability and ease of adapting to various application domains [67][68][69]. For the 
same reason, PRS is adopted in this work as the cognitive model for the proposed multi- 
agent-based framework.  
 
PRS is as reasoning system endowed with the attitude of belief, desire, and intention 
[66]. These attitude at any instance influence the action being considered by PRS. This 
system depends on its beliefs( current domain knowledge) and previous judgement to 
decide on the right course of action under its desires or goals. Also, the reasoning 
system must be reactive and proactive to deal with any arbitrary request or constant 
changing of its environment [66].  The attitude of the PRS which is also referred to as 
BDI (Belief, Desire and Intend) system is further explained in the next section.  
 
Belief: Is the system’s knowledge about its environment persisted in a database. An 
instance of the database represents the current domain knowledge of the software 
agent [66].  
 
Goals: Goals in BDI are intended task that has to be performed by the agent. For 
example, creating and storing new technology profile can be a goal the system must 
achieve. The goal can also involve subgoals such as testing for the network for 
connectivity and storing of the profile in the database.  
 
Knowledge Area (KA): Is a set of procedures describing the sequence of the plan of 
achieving the current goal. Essentially, a set of KA constitutes a procedural description 
of how the agent can accomplish its current goal.  An instance of KA consists of a body 
that is a description of the process and predicate that specifies the condition for 
decisions. Additionally, KA includes meta level KAs, which provide further information 
on the manipulation of the BDI (Belief, Desires and Intentions).  
 
Despite the enormous success in the application of the BDI, the reasoning system is 
equally notable of some challenges, particularly when it comes to the description and 
interpretation of the KAs[70]. In this work, an ontology concept is employed to describe 
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the agent plans and their skills. The application of the ontological description then 
allowed mapping of the actions to the respective skill required to take action Figure 3.3. 
is a conceptual representation of the implementation of the BDIS system.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
  
 
           
 
             
 
    
           
Interpreter: The interpreter is the heart of PRS; thus it runs the entire system by 
ensuring the effective execution of its KA under a given goal. Conceptually, at any 
processing time, certain goals will be active with an instance of its beliefs held in the 
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Figure 3.3 Example of Belief-Desire-Itend model 
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Figure 3.4 Schematic description of KA to read resource utilisation metrics 
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database. Given these set of goals and beliefs, the interpreter decides on the KAs 
relevant to achieve these goals and then place them on the process stack one at a time 
base on the description of the body of the KA (a process stack is a temporal storage for 
active KA).   New goals or sub-goals may arrive in the course of execution. When new 
sub-goals are a place on the goals stack, the interpreter will again determine on the 
relevant KAs and execute them by placing them on the process stack sequentially[66].   
 
The interpreter inherently relies on its meta-level data to form its decision on the 
selection and execution path of the KA. For example, a new sub-goal may arrive on the 
process stack which will require a change of execution path or a temporally suspend the 
current goal to deal with a more urgent situation. The meta-level data provide enough 
information on procedural and exertional decision to help the interpreter make inform 
choices in such cases. Figure 3.3. is a schematic model of KA with a goal description to 
read resource utilisation metrics.  
3.4 Agent communication  
3.4.1 Agent-to-agent communication 
Software agent communication remains central to the design and implementation of 
agent-oriented systems.  The reason is, information relay and data sharing among agent 
cohort are achieved via the inherent communication mechanism [36]. Contrarily to 
object-oriented method invocation, software agents communicate their intents to the 
recipient to utilise its inherent skills. In essence, agents use communication to change 
the state of other agents or employ their skills to complete a given task. However, the 
aforementioned does not imply that the communicator has direct control to change the 
internal state or skills of the recipient. On the contrarily, each agent has full control over 
its behaviour or skills. Thus they decide when to apply its skills or can even decide if it is 
appropriate to perform the requested task. In essence, agents cannot be forced to act on 
their wish[12].  
 
Consequently, agent to agent or agent to environment communication needs to take 
place in an instance of data or information sharing. Thus the communicating parties 
must all subscribe to a common language to have meaningful communication.  As a 
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result, many formalisms which seek to provide multi-agent communication languages 
have been proposed by researchers and commercial developers[12].  
3.4.2 Agent communication language 
Software agents communicate with each other by use of agent communication language, 
a speech act oriented language. Speech acts are performative utterances that aimed to 
influence an action intended by the communicator[12]. This section will seek to present 
current standardised agent communication language and its application in the 
development of software agents. The reader is however referred to [12] for further 
insight into the evolution of the agent communication language.  
 
Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KMQL) was the first agent 
communication language developed by the US government under the ARPA knowledge 
sharing initiative [36].  KMQL was an integration of both language and language 
protocols which defines several performative verbs and also represent a message in a 
first-order logic language called KIF [36]. The downside, however, was KMQL vendor 
dependent, making it impossible for agents from different vendors to talk to each other 
due to the language barrier [12]. This barrier subsequently led to the development of a 
more standardised Agent Communication Language (ACL) by FIPA(Foundation for 
Intelligent Physical Agent) which has now become widely adopted agent 
communication language [36].  FIPA-ACL is a speech act based language grounded on 
the notion that utterances or messages are an action [36].  
 
FIPA-ACL provides 22 communicative acts where modal logic is used to describe each 
act in a formal semantics and narrative form. The modal logic formally stipulates the 
intent of sending the message to have the right mental influence on the receiver[36]. 
Examples  of the FIPA-ACL communicative act are:  
 Request: The communicative act is stipulating the intend to request the recipient to act. 
 Query-If: the communicative act used in asking a recipient to confirm or deny a given 
proposition. 
Not understood: the communicative act to indicate that a perceived action performed 
was not understood. The reader is referred to [36] for an extensive representation of 
the FIPA-ACL communicative acts. 
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Figure 3.5. is a representation of how ACL message is constructed and conveyed by the 
agents. In this instance, the example depicts communication between IC agent and HDFS 
agent. In the message, IC agent is requesting HDFS agent to perform the action 
SystemReview(defined in the SystemReviewOntology model) on the HDFS file systems. 
Additionally, the message contains a set of parameters needed for successful 
communication [36].  Additionally, the actual message the sender wants to convey is 
expressed in a standardised format to ensure proper encoding and decoding. The 
formal definition of the semantic notations for the representation of the message or 
content of the communication is the content language.  
3.4.3 Description of the FIPA_SL language  
In principle, agents communicate by use of mutually understandable language over a 
message transport service without concern of missunderstanding [71]. Communications 
in the multi-agent ecosystem are exchanging of high-level concept between two or more 
agents to accomplish a purported action. The message, however, needs to be encoded in 
a standardised format to convey the mutual semantics of the higher level abstraction.  
 
(Request 
 :sender (agent-identifier :name IC@localhost:111/JADE) 
 :receiver(agent-identifier :name HDFS@localhost:111/JADE) 
 :ontology SystemReviewOntology 
 :language FIPA SL 
 :protocol fipa-request 
 :Content “” 
       ((action 
          (agent-identifier :name HDFS@localhost:111/JADE) 
          (SystemReview : HDFS) 
   
      ))” ” 
   ) 
 
Figure 3.5 Application of the communicative act (request performative) in a FIPA-ACL 
Message 
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Figure 3.6 Agent communication model 
Figure 3.6. is a  simplified agent communication model depicting communication 
between two agents (Sender and Receiver). In the model, the sender agent constructs 
an ACL message intended to convey information(i.e. the content of the message) to the 
receiver agent. The content of the message is an expression of the intent of the message, 
properly encoded in a standardised format with content language. Upon receipt, the 
receiving agent will decode the message with the same content language, infer the 
meaning using the content language and carry out the required action. The receiving 
agent may reply by use of the same model.  
 
The content language provides an encoding description of the message content. 
Moreover, it also ensures the actual representation of the ACL message over the 
message transmission medium [71]. The most adopted content language is FIPA 
Semantic Language(SL) specification.  The SL language defines the semantics of the 
message content.  It also specifies the syntax of encoding the content of the ACL Message 
so that the receiver can parse and unequivocally infer the intent of the message[36].  
 
The communication cycle also involves the sharing of complex domain knowledge. Thus 
both the sender and receiver must mutually understand the concept and symbols used 
in expressing the content of any content message to encode and infer the meaning of the 
message.  
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3.4.4 Utilisation of ontology in multi-agent communication  
Ontology is the specification of concepts and symbols aimed at providing a mutual 
understanding of some domain [12]. The reader is referred to [12] for an extensive 
presentation of the subject area. However, the application of ontology in agent 
communication is briefly presented to provide a further understanding of how the 
ontology is employed to describe and communicate complex objects in the domain.  
 
Unlike ACL message, ontology is domain specific. Thus the aim of providing software 
agents with a common understanding of their domain is achieved by the formal 
definition of the taxonomy of entities and their relationships. Moreover, in any instance, 
an entity of a domain will be described as a class with properties [12]. 
 
Classes:  A group of entities having attributes or properties in common is a class of that 
enetity[12]. A class also has an instance, which is an occurrence or an example of a class. 
MySQL server, for example, is an instance of a server.  
 
Properties: Are the elements which define the entity. Alternatively, it can be termed as 
the standard features of the entity. The server, for example, will have properties of a 
name, IP address, hard disk capacity, operating system.   
 
 For example, if network manager knows that servers have these properties and  MySQL 
server, Apache web server and Hadoop NameNode are instances of servers, then it can 
be inferred that each server instance shares the same properties such as names, IP 
address, operating system and admin accounts [12]. Figure 3.7. a is a model of the 
relations and the class inheritance of the above description.  
 
Another key component of ontology is an axiom. Axiom is a model representation of 
every piece of information(including rules) that constitutes domain knowledge that 
must be well represented in the ontology. Essentially the inherent domain knowledge 
which defines the intelligence of the software agent is the axiom of the ontology and a 
collection of the ontology instances.   
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Figure 3.7 A model of the Network administrator's knowledge of the network infrastructure. Classes are 
represented as oval and instances as a rectangle 
3.4.5 Ontology development 
Ontology development is an autonomous discipline not traceable to the software or 
agent engineering paradigm.  The concept requires an ontological methodology to 
knowledge engineer the agents cognitive and information management systems. Thus 
the agent developer at some point in the development cycle may need to employ 
ontology development methodology to create the knowledge model of the agent-based 
system. The reader is referred to [35] for a detail description of the ontology 
methodology. The same methodology is employed to describe the agent’s knowledge of 
DDoS attacks  
 
The general understanding of the software agent paradigm is indeed essential in making 
an informed decision about the application of the concept. Sections 3.1 to 3.5 have 
presented an overview of the paradigm and considered the various agent philosophies, 
operational benefits and application context of the agent types. The cognitive system 
and communication principles have also been presented to affirm to the potential of the 
concept to address the DDoS detection gap in the Hadoop framework. The general 
overview as presented so far indicates that multi-agent concept is viable for the 
proposed solution. However, the background knowledge is not enough to ensure a 
successful implementation of any multi-agent solutions.  Understanding the various 
development methodologies is a fundamental requirement for the design and 
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development of any multi-agent solution. Consequently, the section will present a brief 
description of the available software agent development methodologies and also adopt 
a methodology for the development of the proposed framework.  
3.5 Brief overview of software agents design methodologies  
Software engineering methodology has evolved over the past decade through the 
development of many annotations to assist in the analysis, design and development of 
software solutions[30]. Conversely, agent-based software engineering is an emerging 
field and therefore lacks a more standardised development life cycle. However, some 
philosophies are proposed to assist in the analysis and development [30][31][11].  
 
Nonetheless,  globally accepted software agent development methodology is still not 
proposed or recommended [12]. This gap is to some extent attributed to the fact that 
the domain is still in the early stage and most development methodologies are still 
maturing through extensive experimentation and application [12].  Consequently, 
specific or group of methodologies will not be recommended in this section but will 
rather present a brief overview of mostly adopted Software agent engineering 
methodology. The feasible development methodology employed for the research will 
also be presented.  
3.5.1 Australian artificial intelligent institute methodology 
The Australian Artificial Intelligent Institute (AAII) methodology [12] was initially 
developed to assist with the development of an agent-based system using the PRS BDI 
(believe-desire-intention) reasoning systems. It, however, evolved to become a 
recognised agent-based development methodology through experimentation. The AAII 
design philosophy employs object-oriented methodology with agent-oriented 
modifications.  It uses an iterative approach to elaborate initially constructed internal 
and external models into a fully defined agent system specification.  Detail description 
of the AAII methodology is presented in. Figure 3.8. is a flows chart summarising the 
AAII methodology and the processes involved [70][12].    
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Figure 3.8 A summary of the AAII Methodology 
3.5.2 Gaia methodology  
Gaia methodology [30] provides a systematic approach to agent-based system 
development. The methodology encourages a good understanding of the domain 
problem and then translates the identified problem into a requirement statement. The 
requirement statement in principle becomes the guiding document for the next stage of 
the analysis. An abstract model of the system is then produced from the requirement 
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statement to satisfy the system requirement. The overall system will sequentially evolve 
as salient details are added at each analytical stage [12].   
 
Similar to the AAII methodology, Gaia conceptualises its systems from an organisational 
point of view. Thus each system is perceived as an institution made of departments. 
Each department has been assigned a role and a goal to achieve. Likewise, Gaia views 
each system as a collection of collaborative roles that contribute to the achievement of 
the statement of requirement. The methodology presents two concepts: abstract and 
concrete as depicted in Table 3.1. Entities are used to conceptualise the system during 
the analysis stage without any detail internal specification.  Contrary, the concrete 
entries specify detail functional requirements of the system and each agent in light of 
their defined roles and goals.  
The key focus of Gaia is to identify, define and model the agents, their interactions and 
operational constraints.  
The table presents the two concepts used under the AAII methodology. 
 
Table 3-1 Abstract and concrete concept [30] 
Abstract concept Concrete Concept 
Roles 
Permissions 
Responsiblities 
Protocols 
Activities 
Liveness properties 
Safety 
Agent Types 
Services 
Acquaintances 
 
 
 
There are two key stages involved in the Gaia methodology, i.e. analysis and design. 
a. The analysis stage: The analysis stage aims to understand the structure of the 
proposed system informed by the problem statement. A problem statement is a 
sufficient description of the problem to be addressed by the agent-based system. 
Moreover, it is used to define the scope and objectives of the proposed system and 
hence required to commence the analysis stage. Essentially, the analysis stage does 
not concern with the detail design but rather aims at providing a logical and 
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structural model of the system to address the problems described in the problem 
statement. Consequently, the deliverable of the analysis stage is a high-level 
conceptual model of the entire system, indicating the inherent component, 
interdependencies and the interaction pattern among the subcomponents. 
Additionally, the outcome of the analysis stage forms the basis for the design stage 
which concentrates on transforming the abstract models into low-level models 
detailed enough to implement as a multi-agent system.  
b. The design stage: The objective of the design stage is to translate the abstract 
models developed during the analysis stage into detail low-level description that can 
easily be implemented with multi-agent development tool. At this stage, the Gaia 
methodology is concerned about how each specific role function identified in the 
analysis stage should be implemented. Thus, the methodology now considers the 
type of agents and levels of interaction needed to realise the proposed system.  
 
The analysis stage is concerned about assisting the developer in gaining understanding 
about the structure of the system.  The identified roles, responsibilities, permission, 
safety properties, liveness properties and their interaction are modelled at this stage as 
depicted in Figure 3.10.  The design stage on the other hand models the concrete 
entities within the systems. These models will involve the agent model, service model 
and acquaintance model. Figure 3.9 depicts the stages, the relationship and model 
transition. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Requirement 
statement 
Roles model  
Interaction 
model 
Agent model  Service model   Acquaintance 
model   
Figure 3.9 Gaia relationship and model transition   [30] 
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3.5.3 Tropos methodology 
The Tropos methodology is a hybrid of the AAII methodology and the Gaia methodology 
[12]. Although Tropos is more of agent-centred in the development life cycle, it still 
shares similar concepts such as the identification and definition of agent’s goals, roles 
and plans. Unlike AAII and Gaia methodology, Tropos methodology is a conceptualised 
framework that allows the modelling  of the entities in an agent-based system as Actors, 
Goals, Plan, Resources, Dependencies, Capabilities and Beliefs[12]: 
3.6 Application of multi-agent concepts in automated big data security 
system management   
The introduction of automated network management technologies has contributed 
significantly to the improvement in managing network infrastructure. Nonetheless, the 
current network management technologies are still confronted with some inherent 
drawbacks due to their underlying management model and intrinsic protocols. The 
need for the optimisation of these management models and technologies consequently 
attracted research interests from both academia and commercial developers. 
Researchers, however, took different viewpoints or approaches to their proposed 
solution. Some researchers focused on the development of new networking 
management models and protocols to optimise existing ones [7]. Others, on the other 
hand, concentrate on the development of software-based network management 
framework to leverage existing network management models and protocols. The latter, 
System  
Roles   
Responsibility   
Safety properties   
Interaction    
Permission    
Liveness properties     
Figure 3.10 Gaia analysis concept [30] 
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however, has attracted much attention over the past years due to their ease of 
application and adaptation  [7] [5][9]. One of the emerging research approaches in line 
with the latter approach of network management is the application of software agents’ 
paradigm [5].  
The growing interest in the application of software agents in the development of 
network management solutions is attributed to the challenges associated with the 
existing network management models and protocols [2][9]. For example, the 
centralised design of the network management model which is adopted by the Hadoop 
framework and their native protocol increases bandwidth utilisation.  
The software agent concepts have proven to be an effective and efficient approach to 
developing distributed and independent network management solutions 
[10][39][38][40].  Nonetheless, developing agent-based network management systems 
requires a holistic appreciation of the network management model, protocols and 
associated challenges. Consequently, an understanding of the software agent concepts, 
especially how each agent concept applies to the network management functionalities 
are equally required.   
Consequently, the remaining part of this section presents a summary of the network 
management model, and the underlying protocol will be presented. Various challenges 
associated with these models and protocols will also be presented; highlighting how the 
challenges introduce complexity into the network management task. Moreover, this 
section will present the state of the art (SOTA) of the software agent paradigm. 
Additionally, a dedicated section will attempt to map each respective agent concept to a 
network management requirement in the BD system (i.e. Hadoop software framework). 
Contrary to current literature the proposed mapping will aim to contribute to how 
various agent concepts can be leveraged to address the class of management challenges 
associated with SOTA BD technologies. The mappings will particularly focus on how the 
concept is applied in the automated network management requirements in the Hadoop 
BD system.  
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3.6.1 Network management model and protocol   
The introduction of BD paradigm indeed required a bespoke Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure that will facilitate the core objectives 
of the paradigm. Consequently, BD technologies or systems were developed to provide 
the needed computing environment. BD systems are a by-product of ICT, like any other 
information management platforms BD systems are built on the same network 
management models and protocols. Thus, they are developed to store, process and 
transmit BD by use of existing network management models and communication 
protocols. In essence, BD systems have inherited the complexity and management 
challenges associated with underlying models and protocols. Consequently, various 
network management models which allow for the automation of network 
administration functionalities have been proposed [2][8] [9].  
 
The network management models have evolved since the 1980s because of the extreme 
technological advancement and increasing communication demands. The models are 
however characterised by several limitations brought about by the application of 
several vendor-specific technologies and the need to create an interoperable network 
infrastructure [2] [9]. Four of the main state-of-the-art network management are:  
a. Information model 
b. Functional model 
c. Communication model 
d. Organisational model 
Details of the main network management models and their limitations are presented in 
[2].   
A. Information model 
The model is a specification to ensure standardisation of the information exchanged 
between the network elements. The aim is to ensure interoperability between 
autonomous components regarding the creation and sharing of network management 
information. 
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B.  Functional model 
The functional model defines all the management requirements or functionalities that 
can be enforced on the network elements [5]. The network management functions that 
ensure the continuity of any network infrastructure are; 
a) Fault management 
b) Accounting Management 
c) Configuration management 
d) Performance management 
e) Security management 
f) Quality of service management 
The reader is referred to [72] for a detail description of each network management 
functions. 
C.  Communication model 
The communication model defines the mode of exchange of network management 
information between the agents and their managers. The model is logically constructed 
to operate on the definition of the underlying network infrastructure (i.e. the managed 
objects) [2].  Some of the most employed communication models are: 
a. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP): Used to exchange network 
management information in IP-based networks 
b. Common Open Policy Service (COPS): Used to exchange management 
information in a policy-based network management platform. 
c. Common Management Information Protocol (CMIP): Use to exchange 
management information between the network elements in 
telecommunication infrastructure.  
 
Each of these communication models is utilised extensively in their application domains. 
However, the rest of this section will focus on the SNMP which is the adopted 
communication model for BD systems [7][5] 
D.    Organisational model 
Organisational model describes the network management task, the participants in the 
management task and their functionalities. It first describes the entities and also defines 
the management roles of each entity and their relationship. The three most important 
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organisational models used in network management systems are; the centralised 
organisational model, hierarchical organisational mode and Distributed organisational 
model. For example, current BD systems adopt the centralised model because they are 
easy to design and implement. The downside however is: the constant message passing 
and data sharing between the agents and the manager creates a bottleneck at the 
manager and also impact significantly on the network bandwidth utilisation[10]. 
3.7 Utilisation of software agent concepts in managing BD systems  
Some software agents-concepts have been utilised to promote the benefits of the 
paradigm to addressing different network management challenges such as the detection 
of DDoS in the BD system [26][27][28]. However, existing literature and commercial 
approaches only utilise limited agent types such as mobile agents without much 
consideration of other agent concepts [38], [41]. Essentially, an outline of the benefits of 
various agent types is necessary to: 
a. Increase the knowledge of the application of software agents in the BD domain 
b. To maximise the benefits of utilising different types of software agents in BD 
systems.  
 
Consequently, the rest of the section will present how each agent can be utilised to 
create automated management solutions in BD cluster (i.e. an IP-based network 
infrastructure) or develop an agent-based BD management system. Furthermore, the 
benefits of the agent concepts will be demonstrated in the implementation of the 
proposed multi agent-based BD management framework. Additionally, the section will 
attempt to align each software agent concept with the network management 
requirements of the functional model. The alignment aims to present an understanding 
of how each software agent concept can be employed to address the BD system 
management requirement under the functional model. The alignments are presented as 
follows. 
3.7.1 Application of mobile agent in automated management solutions in BD 
cluster   
A mobile agent is the type of software agent that can migrate to a remote location to 
perform computation at the instruction of its manager (i.e. mobile agents are 
despatched and manage by agent management module). One of the main operational 
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benefits of Mobile agent is network bandwidth optimisation. According to Figure 3.11, 
network manager through a mobile agent manager can dispatch mobile agents to 
remotely monitor and manage the Hadoop nodes without the need to send regular 
network management information to a centralised or remote machine for further 
analysis [6]. The mobile agents are designed to reside in the mobile agent manager 
(which can be a mobile agent management software module or mobile agent 
application server). The design approach allows the mobile manager to clone and 
dispatch mobile agents to carry out computation remotely nodes such as DataNodes and 
the SQL servers. Once the task is completed, the mobile agent reports on the outcome of 
the assigned task and then reverts to the mobile agent manager where it permanently 
resides.  The benefit is; the network bandwidth can be optimised for faster user and 
application data transmission to improve overall network latency. The specific 
application impacts of the mobile agent are however subject to the application domain 
[6]. 
 
Furthermore, an attempt is made in Table ‎3-2 to align the benefits of the agent concepts 
with the network management functional model and highlight on areas where the 
mobile agent concept can be employed to manage the network element to reduce traffic 
congestion in a BD system. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 A schematic representation of the mobile agent dispatched unto remote network elements 
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Table 3-2 Summary of the application of the software agent concepts in network management 
 Best suited Network management functionality  
Agent 
Concept 
AM FM PM SM CM CMT Functional 
limitation 
 
Interface 
Software 
Agent 
 
√ 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
 
√ 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
Their functionality is 
only to manage and 
monitor external 
interaction with the 
network 
infrastructure 
Mobile 
Software 
Agent 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
× 
 
Their total reliance on 
active network link 
makes them 
susceptible to 
network failure  
 
Collaborative 
Software 
Agent 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
They are only 
applicable in a multi-
agent environment.  
 
Information 
Software 
Agent 
 
× 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
× 
 
Their functionalities 
are limited.  They are 
only suitable for 
information 
management.   
 
Hybrid 
Software 
Agent 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
√ 
They are a complex 
agent concept, difficult 
to develop and 
maintain. Unless it is 
extremely necessary, 
the Collaborative 
agent should be 
employed to create a 
hybrid solution.  
 
Meaning of column headings  
AM = Accounting management  
FM = Fault management 
PM = Performance management 
SM = Security management 
CMT = Complex Management Task 
CM = Configuration Management 
√ indicates the proposed alignment of the software agent concept to a network management model  
× indicates that the software agent concept is not aligned with the network management model.  
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3.7.2 Application of interface agent in automated management solutions in BD 
cluster   
Interface agent concept is essentially employed to interface with user’s activities. They 
are static agents and not designed for specific low-level BD system management 
functionalities and hence not ideal for all network management functionality except 
Accounting Management. However, it is very effective in building a good profile and 
predicts user’s activities over time. Consequently, Table ‎3-2 suggest how the agent 
concept can be leveraged to address the management functions in BD systems.  
3.7.3 Application of Collaborative agent in automated management solutions in 
BD cluster   
The conventional approach to satisfy all management requirements has been, to share 
the requirements among individuals with the prerequisite knowledge or employ a 
dedicated network management tool such as a firewall. However, each functionality 
must be well coordinated and if possible integrated to ensure that the various sub-
management systems work in a collaborated effort to provide a holistic solution. 
Likewise, collaborative agents are employable in the multi-agent system management 
paradigm, especially to take up the role to ensure harmonisation among multi-agent 
software. Although they are operationally autonomous, they are however not the best 
choice to employ to deliver management functionality such as system configuration. 
Notwithstanding their limitations, they are equally essential in creating multi-agent 
based BD system management solutions. 
3.8 The proposed multi-agent framework approach to automated system 
management task in the BD system 
Agent-based network management framework is gradually becoming an important 
research approach to developing network management solution [6][10][38]. 
Consequently, the concept of a multi-agent management framework is significantly 
employed in the BD domain to enhance system management functions in BD systems 
[41]. However, several types of research under the theme turn to focus on the 
application of specific agent concepts (Example mobile agent) in a management 
framework [10],[38],[41],[64]. The downside of this approach, however, is, operational 
benefits of other concepts are ignored and hence limit the capabilities of the entire 
management framework. Contrary to the current multi-agent based techniques, a 
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transparent agent-based framework that leverages the multiple agent concepts 
presented is proposed. The advantages of the proposed framework are: 
a. It allows integration of multiple agent concepts in a single network management 
framework  
b. Functional capabilities of a single framework can be scaled by plugging in of 
multiple agent concepts. 
 
A standardised methodology and development principles guide the design and 
development of multi-agent systems. This research consequently adopted the standard 
and design principles to design and implement the proposed multi-agent framework. 
Chapter five of this work presents the evolution of the design and implementation of the 
framework. The chapter also provides the theoretical justification of the choice of agent 
concepts and design principles adopted for the proposed multi-agent framework. The 
reader is therefore referred to chapter five for detail explanation on the design and the 
functions of the proposed system on the BD system.  
However, this section aims to demonstrate the benefits of leveraging multi-agent concept 
to managing BD systems contrary to the human centred and single-agent approaches. 
Consequently, this section is devoid of detail explanation of the design choices and 
functions of the framework since that is addressed by chapter five extensively.   
3.8.1 Brief description of the proposed multi-agent technique  
The proposed framework is presented with dedicated static agents who wrap 
technology-based functionalities as agent functionalities for demonstration purposes. 
The framework is schematically represented in Figure 3.12.  and Figure 3.13.  
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Figure 3.12 Schematic representation of the proposed framework 
The design aims to allow the separation of related network management functions into 
respective layers, where their functional requirements are implemented by the 
modularised components (the agents). Thus, the architecture allows seamless module 
integration, interoperability, and effective communication across the Hadoop framework 
layers. Interoperability and seamless integration of multiple agent concepts is achieved 
via the module interface and communication protocols, which ensure standardisation on 
the design and development of the modules. Also, there is a dedicated software module 
(Communication Protocol and Integration Engine (CPIE)) that ensures full compliance 
among the modules. CPIE, in addition to its core tasks, is responsible for the deployment 
of the software agent modules. As part of the integration process, it also performs 
module integrity check, which checks (e.g. Interface agent) to make sure each agent is 
designed to interface with the internal structure and design reliably. 
The functional requirements of the proposed layers are aligned with the four network 
management models. The novel alignment allows the framework to be deployed as an 
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integrated solution for the functional model requirements and also granular scalability 
to adopt new management requirements in the Hadoop framework is possible.   
The alignment of the framework layers and the network management models is 
provided below.  
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Figure 3.13 Schematic representation of the framework implementation 
Figure 3.13 models how the proposed framework is presented in this case to address 
the network management requirements. The model shows that the framework is 
implemented to interface with the key external platforms (i.e. the Hadoop platform, 
MySQL Server and the System administration platform) through its interface agents 
such as user interface Agent, MySQL DP Agent Hbase Agent and HDFS Agent. The model 
also depicts the auxiliary agents and inherent software modules such as the Intelligent 
Controller and the communication protocol and integration engine which regulate and 
enforce the communications protocols among the agents. The agent register, techProfile 
persist in the system and agent profile. The solid and broken arrows also depict the data 
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flow and the communications among the agent. Moreover, Table 3-3 shows how the 
layers in the framework align with the respective network management models.  
Table 3.4 shows the type of the agent concept employed in the framework 
 
Table 3-3 Alignment of the framework layers to the network management model 
 
 
Table 3-4 Application of the software agent concept 
Software agent  Implemented Software agent concept 
User Interface agent  Interface agent 
Policy management agent Information agent  
System integration and management agent  Information agent  
Data Persistent agent  Information agent  
Intelligent agent controller Collaborative Agent  
External technology agent  Transducer agent with skills of 
information and collaborative agent  
 
An attempt is made in this section to demonstrate how the software agent concepts can 
be leveraged to create a multi-agent-based BD management system. The demonstration 
will employ the proposed framework to deliver a system management requirement in 
the Hadoop framework. The aim of this section, therefore, is not to present the detail 
description and explanation of the framework (detail implementation is presented in 
Framework Layer Network management model 
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chapter five). Essentially, the focus is to demonstrate the viability of the multi-agent 
concept in this domain and also provide an alternative approach to the application of 
the multi-agent techniques to BD system management. 
3.8.2 Description of the  real-case scenario  
 The framework (i.e. the multi-agent system) will be demonstrated in an instantiated 
scenario where system administrators periodically conduct system reviews (i.e. 
generate periodic system resource information) within a Hadoop cluster. 
Conventionally, retrieving periodic server resource information or log records could be 
carried out by platform-dependent scripts or administration of native commands on 
each server. The challenge with these conventional approaches resides in the fact that 
changes in resource information requirements would require corresponding updates in 
all the scripts, and system administrators will periodically run separate system 
commands on each platform. The approach may not seem challenging when dealing 
with a cluster of few hardware and application platforms, but it can certainly impact on 
downtime for example, when dealing with a large-scale corporate BD cluster running on 
various autonomous platforms. 
Apache Ambari 2.0.1 is used to deploy a four-node Hadoop 2.0 cluster on Ubuntu 
12.04.2 server running on Dell Power Edge SC 1435.   
The specifications of the servers are: 
a. CPU-Quad-core AMD Opteron 2800 MHZ,  
b.  Memory was of 8049 (UNITS).  
Also, JADE framework 4.4.0 was used to develop the framework using Eclipse MARS .1 
IDE running on Ubuntu 14 desktop edition. 
 
A schematic representation of this framework is shown in Figure 3.12, and Figure 3.13. 
Firstly, all agents have been implemented according to their functional description 
(Figure 3.15 presents the class diagram of the implementation). The class diagram is the 
object model of the implementation of the framework and the agents as depicted in 
Figure 3.15. According to the class diagram, each layer will include a type of agent 
concept, which is assigned a specific function within the framework. The class diagram 
further depicts all the specialise agent concepts that were employed in the 
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implementation according to Figure 3.14. The class attributes also allow the capturing 
and detail description of each object in the framework. System element (Technologies) 
and their functions are also defined and implemented as a class object in the 
implementation. Thus, multiple instances of the system elements (e.g. Hadoop 
NameNode and DataNodes) can be instantiated in the framework. 
 
Figure 3.14 Ontology schema of the system review scenario 
 
 
    Composite association      Class diagram   Inheritance association       Generic Association  
 
 
Figure 3.14. is the UML model of the ontological description of the system review 
scenario. The UML model is made of up of elements which describe the concepts, 
actions, predicates and their relationship. The class diagram is used to describe the 
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Concept which represents the system elements the agents will interact with. 
Furthermore, the class diagram is used to describe the Action (Ontology actions 
describe the task the agent is required to perform ) and Predicates which is the 
expression which enables the agent to determine the status of the associated concepts. 
The UML diagram also employes three associations to model the various relations 
between the UML elements. The composite association represents an inclusive 
relationship between the ontology concept. For example, it can be inferred from Figure 
3.14. that each technology includes or has a set of functions they perform. The 
inheritance association indicates that the sub-concept inherits part or all the elements 
of the main concepts. In this scenario, SystemReviewPolicy concept is an instance of the 
SecurityPolicy concept and as a result inherent the main security elements of the 
SecurityPolicy. The generic association is used to model a general relationship between 
ontology elements.  
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Figure 3.15 Class diagram of the framework implementation 
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Figure 3.15 is the UML model (i.e. the class diagram) of the implementation of the 
framework. The class diagram models the architecture of the implementation of the 
framework. Each class object describes the various agent implementations. For example, 
it can be inferred from the model that each agent type is a derived concept which 
incorporates the structure and behaviour of the main agent concept. The association 
arrows also depict the relationships between the object implementation.  Auxiliary 
classes such as Technologies were implemented to instantiate the technologies the 
agent will interact within the framework.  
In this case, the administrator needed to execute multiple domain dependent 
commands to achieve the expected outcome. However, the result of the abstraction of 
all these complexities by the application of the framework can be seen in Figure 3.16. 
One non-technical domain language (i.e. system review) produced the same results from 
the abstracted technologies. Assuming that scripting language was used to accomplish 
this task, multiple vendor or domain dependent scripts will be required. 
With the help of the transducer agents, the framework allows the interoperability of 
autonomous technology. The JADE framework adopted for this implementation is FIPA 
compliant framework, meaning vendor agents can readily be available by simply 
plugging and registering their service in Directory Facilitator (DF) agent [73]. 
Consequently, other agents can query the agent and transparently request for their 
services. Also, the standardisation of agent communication in FIPA will allow the 
interoperability of any FIPA compliant Multi-Agent System (MAS) [73]. Domain agent 
knowledge is equally made available by the existence of the ontology. 
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Figure 3.16 The implementation results on the Hadoop cluster 
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3.9 Summary 
Software agent development is an emerging development paradigm with many 
development and application potentials worth leveraging. Orchestra of agent-based 
solutions is widely deployed in many industries to deliver intelligent results that cannot 
necessarily be achieved by the conventional software solution. Nonetheless, the 
paradigm has its downside which also requires equal attention, at least for the 
avoidance of development and implementation failures.  An overview of the 
development paradigm is presented in this chapter in an attempt to provide general 
knowledge into the concept. Consequently, an outline of the underlying philosophies of 
the types of software agents is presented and in a characterised manner for further 
appreciation of agents capabilities and limitations. A brief presentation of the 
communication processes and communication languages is also explained as a key 
functional component of software agents, existing development methodologies and 
reasoning systems are presented to broaden the knowledge about the emerging 
software paradigm.  
Software agents have proven to be an effective and efficient approach to developing 
distributed and independent network management solutions [2][4][5][6].  Nonetheless, 
developing agent-based network management systems require a holistic appreciation of 
the network management model, protocols, and associated challenges. An 
understanding of the software agent concepts, especially how each agent concept 
applies to the network management functionalities is equally essential.   
Consequently, this chapter has attempted to provide technical insight into the emerging 
software agent-based network management concept. The chapter seeks to contribute to 
the needed information in making an informed decision on the application of the multi-
agent paradigm to create automation management solutions for BD systems.  
Given the objective, application of the software agents’ taxonomy to the development of 
agent-based BD management technologies was introduced.  Their design and functional 
limitations were highlighted to provide the optimum insight into the paradigm.   
An introduction to the network management model and the underlying protocol were 
presented. The challenges associated with these models and protocols were also 
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presented; highlighting how the challenges introduce complexity into the network 
management task. 
  A proposed agent-based network management framework was introduced to 
practically demonstrate the application of the agent concepts in the BD management 
domain as well as give rational justification to the proposed framework. The proposed 
framework was implemented to address the management complexity and 
interoperability issues associated with heterogeneity in BD cluster. A specific use case 
scenario has been presented as a proof of concept to demonstrate the viability of the 
framework. The outcome of the demonstration highlighted the technical contribution of 
agent-based network management solution.  
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Chapter 4  
Distributed Denial of Service Attack Classification and State-Of-The-Art 
Detection Techniques 
4.1 Introduction 
The number of threats that confront organisations is staggering and requires every 
feasible measure to ensure uninterrupted business activities. Indeed, the surge of such 
security requirements compels institutions and business organisations to deploy and 
maintain feasible detection and mitigation solutions to avoid the significant cost of 
falling prey to any form of attacks. 
One of such attacks which have the potential to disrupt business activities and 
legitimate access to information resources is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). 
DDoS attacks have evolved over the years to become one of the major threats to the 
information technology (IT) echo system because of the cooperate damage and the 
operating cost they cause. Moreover, they are designed to achieve its aim (i.e. denial 
legitimate access to computing resources) before they are mitigated. To secure any 
computing resources against such DDoS will indeed require efficient and effective 
monitoring solutions to ensure that DDoS attacks are detected at the earliest possible 
time to avoid any colossal damage to the organisation. Consequently, researchers and 
business have developed different monitoring and mitigation techniques to ensure that 
computing resources are available to deliver their mandates.  
Creating an effective DDoS attack detection requires an understanding of the DDoS 
attack and the attacking techniques. Consequently, this chapter will attempt to provide 
an overview and classifications of the DDoS attacks and the state of the art of detection 
and mitigation solutions. 
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4.2 Defining DDoS attack  
DDoS attack is an attempt to disrupt legitimate activities on a targeted network server 
or traffic on the network by flooding the network with malicious traffic, with the aim of 
denying legitimate users access to the networked resources[74]. DDoS is achieved by 
compromising some networked computers to launch intense traffic unto its victim. 
Those compromised computers are referred to as zombies. Zombies are used by the 
attacker to build a high-performance computing resource to generate the volumes that 
can cause a denial of service within the shortest possible time. Zombies are also used by 
the attackers to disguise the source of the attack.  
DDoS attack techniques are good at exploring vulnerabilities to bypass any existing 
security measures to launch the attack. Such malicious activities are made possible by 
the number of technologies designed to create the enabling environment to launch 
different forms of attacks. Ensuring the security of IT resources against these form of 
attacks require a counter DDoS attack techniques or system that can monitor the 
behaviour of the computing systems to detect any abnormal or malicious behaviour at 
the earliest possible time. Consequently, different forms of DDoS attack detections 
solutions have been proposed both in academia and industries, each one aiming to 
provide the required detection and mitigation solutions. Although the proposed 
solutions have succeeded in providing the secure environment to a large extent, they 
are still limited to provide adequate detection and mitigation solution. Essentially, 
further approaches to the detection and mitigation of the DDoS attacks are required to 
provide adequate security against DDoS attacks.  
4.3 Classifications of DDoS attacks 
As described in section 4.2, the DDoS attack occurs when some networked machines are 
infected with malicious software to saturate its victim’s resources to denial legitimate 
access to computing and network resources. Typically, the attacker scans through the 
network for vulnerable access root to install malicious software on all accessible 
machines to form a network of compromised (i.e. zombies) machine to launch the attack 
[75]. Figure ‎2.17 depicts a scenario of a DDoS attack. According to the diagram, the 
attacker creates the master-slave architecture of the compromised machines. In this 
scenario the attacker manipulates the master zombies through the malicious software 
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and the master zombies, in turn, manipulate the slave zombies to send the victim large 
volumes of packets to overwhelm its resources.  
 There are various types of DDoS attacks that are being used in the networking domain 
to hamper legitimate usage of the networked resources [75][76]. 
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Figure ‎2.17 Architecture of DDoS attack  
4.3.1 Types of DDoS attacks 
Most often the first step in the DDoS attack is to scan the network for vulnerable 
computers or access root that can be further explored by the attack. Attackers use port 
scanners tools to scan through a target network for susceptible services. Such 
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vulnerabilities when identified serve as the gateway for the attacker to gain access to 
the networked machines regardless of the type of attack employed.  
Different techniques can be used to cause a denial of service as long they can prevent 
regular service delivery. The number of techniques and tools to launch denial of service 
attacks has grown significantly and have been covered by current literature 
extensively[76]. Nonetheless, this section will briefly describe some of the DDoS attack 
techniques[76]. 
A.  ICMP Flooding attack  
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is internet layer protocol used by internet 
nodes to communicate or exchange information [4]. For example, ICMP is used by 
network diagnostic tools to diagnose the inactive node in the network by pinging each 
to determine if a node is active or inactive. ICMP flooding attack occurs when an 
attacker forms a botnet (a network of zombies) to send large volumes of the ICMP 
requests to a victim. In this case, the victim is tricked to commit its resources to these 
requests. Essentially, the victim will not be able to keep up with the pace and volume of 
requests and eventually run out of the capacity to respond to any other requests, 
especially from legitimate users.  
B.  TCP SYN Flooding attack  
SYN flooding attack is a form of DDoS attack where the attacker floods the victim’s TCP 
port with successive SYN requests with the aim of overwhelming the victim’s resources 
(e.g. bandwidth or CPU) to the make the victim unresponsive to legitimate requests. The 
SYN flooding attack exploits the handshake process of the TCP connections. Typically, 
TCP uses a three-way process to establish a connection among network nodes [75]. The 
handshake process depicted in Figure ‎2.18 involves; 
1. The client will send SYN packet to  initiate a connection 
2. The server will then respond to the initiation with SYN/ACK packet to 
acknowledge the communication 
3. The client will send an ACK packet to the server to also acknowledge the 
SYN/ACK packet from the server. After the three-way handshake has been 
completed, TCP connection will be open between the client and the server for the 
client and server to exchange data. 
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TCP SYN flooding attack exploits the fact that when the initial SYN packet is sent, the 
server will always respond with the SYN/ACK packet and wait for the anticipated ACK 
packet from the client. So in the case of a SYN flooding attack, the attacker will flood the 
victim with SYN packets to initiate the handshake process. As a result, the victim will try 
to respond with SYN/ACK packet and leave a port open in anticipation to receive the 
ACK packets from the client (i.e. the attacker), which never arrives. Whiles the victim is 
waiting for the final response, the attacker continues to flood the victim with more SYN 
packets. Eventually, the victim will run out of resources to respond to another request 
from legitimate clients.  
 
 Client sends  SYN packet 
TCP Client TCP server
Step 1
Step 3
 server responds with SYN/ACK packetStep 2
Client responds with ACK packet
 
Figure ‎2.18 TCP three-way handshake 
Figure ‎2.18 models the TCP three-way handshake. The diagram shows the three steps 
involved in the process. The first step is where the TCP client initiates the process the 
with SYN request. The TCP server then replies with SYN/ACK responds. Finally (in step 
3) the TCP client ACKs (i.e. acknowledges) the TCP server’s responds.  
C.  UDP Flooding attack 
Unlike TCP, UDP (User Datagram Protocol) is a connectionless protocol. Thus it requires 
no handshake connection process to establish a connection. UDP flooding attack is a 
form DDoS attack where the attacker floods the random ports of the victim with IP 
packets containing UDP datagram. The victim will check for applications that are 
associated with the UDP datagrams packets as it receives the packets from the attacker. 
Where no correlated application is found, the victim responds with ICMP destination 
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unreachable packet. As the victim responds to the malicious packets, the victim will 
eventually run out of the capacity to meet the demand both from legitimate clients and 
the subsequent malicious packets [75].   
4.3.2 DDoS attack Victims  
The main target for DDoS attack varies, although the attack is generally designed to 
exhaust resources. The target could be any resources that users or applications rely on 
for service. Such resources can be server applications, network access or the entire 
network infrastructure [74].     
A.  Server application attack 
A DDoS attack can target the application to limit the application to deliver its legitimate 
service as expected. Essentially users of such applications are denied access to the 
interested server resources. One approach that attacker use to deny users access to 
server application is to use a DDoS tool or deploy a worm (a malicious computer 
program designed to spread from among computers) to flood the application’s 
resources with unbearable requests until the application finally crushes. Alternatively, 
the worm can clone itself to initiate multiple operations to deny the application 
resources (such as memory, and CPU time) to function. Nevertheless, some new 
application servers are designed to avert such instances with resource optimisation 
technologies which optimise server resources among applications.  However, the 
applications need to implement inherent mitigation measures to ensure operational 
continuity in an event such as application denial of service [76].  
B.  Network access attack 
This attack target and disables the victim’s communication mechanism by flooding it 
with uncontrollable packets.  UDP flooding attacks are typical of targeting and denying 
legitimate access to the network. The high volume of malicious traffic consumes the 
victim’s bandwidth thereby preventing access to the same network resource. Victims of 
network access attacks rely on upstream detection technologies such firewall and 
routers to for security.  
C.  Network infrastructure attack 
These types of attacks are designed to target crucial network resources such as domain 
servers, certificate servers and client authentication server. The key element of t such 
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attack is not the attack mechanism but the impact. Hence they are deployed to cause 
network-wide havoc by disabling major network element.   
4.4 State-of-the-Art DDoS defence mechanism  
This section will briefly describe some DDoS defence technologies and also indicate how 
they have been utilised. DDoS defence technologies consist of three sub-functions [75]; 
1. Monitoring and detection 
2. Mitigation  
3. IP Traceback  
The monitoring and detection stage is where the defence technologies observe the 
behaviour of the network elements for any malicious activities on the network element 
under observation. An alarm is raised for further action to be taking when malicious 
activity is detected and confirmed. A mitigation step is initiated when an attack is 
confirmed. 
 The detection mechanism is foremost and crucial to the success of any DDoS defence 
technologies. Consequently, the detection mechanism is designed to be intelligent and 
sensitive to malicious activities DDoS. Nevertheless, the large amount of open DDoS 
attack technologies makes it possible for attackers to bypass the detection mechanism 
and even deceive the detection algorithm to classify malicious traffic as legitimate. The 
next stage is to mitigate any attack that is detected in the first stage without causing 
significant disruption to legitimate traffic. Consequently, several mitigation techniques 
have been proposed by researchers and developers to enhance the existing ones. 
However, the state-of-the-art technologies are confronted with the challenge of blocking 
DDoS attacks without affecting the legitimate traffic. 
The last step in the DDoS detection process is to trace back to the source of the attack or 
the attacker to terminate the attack. Thus the DDoS detection technology is endowed 
with an IP Traceback algorithm that can identify the malicious IP address or the device 
attached to the IP address.   
The following sections briefly present some of the academic and industrial state-of-the-
art technologies and techniques which are being used for the detection and mitigation 
of DDoS attacks.  
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4.4.1 Artificial intelligence DDoS detection techniques  
A significant number of techniques under this theme have been proposed both by 
academics and commercial developers [77]. However, this section will briefly highlight 
some of the state-of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques.  The AI techniques are 
either machine learning-based algorithms or deep learning-based algorithms.  
Machine learning algorithms have been used in recent times for anomaly detection [78]. 
The growing interests in the application of machine learning techniques stem from the 
fact that the technique is accurate in discriminating normal behaviour from abnormal 
behaviour. Some of the machine learning techniques used in recent DDoS detection and 
prevention systems are [79][77]; 
1. Artificial neural networks 
2. Support vector machines  
3. Bayes classification  
An artificial neural network is a pattern recognition technique that is capable of 
learning from normal behaviour to predict or detect abnormal behaviour from the 
abnormal. The neural network is a supervised learning technique. Thus the technique 
needs first to observe training data through the input layer to develop the knowledge of 
normal behaviour. The normal view is then used to match with subsequent data to 
confirm or deny their legitimacy. For example, the authors of [77] presented a DDoS 
detection system based on a neural network that is composed of five modules (i.e. 
packet collector, Hadoop HDFS, format converter, data processor and neural network 
detection module). The neural network detection algorithm detects DDoS attacks with 
seven parameters. Essentially, the neural network input layer has seven nodes and the 
input parameters obtained from the Data processor. The parameters consist of some 
packets, an average of packet size, time interval variance, packet size variance, number 
of bytes, packet rate and bit rate.  Each neuron in the network will multiply the initial 
input values by a predetermined weight, sums the results with other parameters values 
arriving into the same neurons. The neuron will further adjust the value of the 
computation by the neuron’s bias. The output of the adjustment is then normalised with 
an activation function. 
 A key feature of the proposed neural network algorithm is the iterative training process 
which presents the input parameter to the network to train one at a time. The network 
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which is composed of layers of computational units called neurons, with connections in 
different layers transform the data until they classify it as a trained data of the 
legitimate network behaviour. The authors used a packet collector to capture legitimate 
traffic to train the proposed neural network algorithm before exposing the algorithm to 
malicious traffic. The results of the experiment confirmed that the neural network could 
successfully discriminate the features of legitimate packets from the malicious packets.  
However, neural networks do not perform better with small data sets. Thus they 
require a longer training period to develop knowledge legitimate network behaviour 
[78][80][14]. 
Support vector machine (SVM) is a supervised classification technique formally defined 
by a hyperplane. Similarly, SVM can output optimal classification given a labelled data 
(supervised learning). In the context of the implementation of the DDoS detection 
systems, SVM algorithms are used to analyse network traffic and classify legitimate 
network traffic from malicious network traffic [77]. The algorithm is based on the idea 
of searching a hyperplane that best separates a dataset in two classes. Before then the 
training data must be labelled as belonging to a category. The algorithm will then use 
the labelled dataset to classify the dataset. At this point, the algorithm builds a model 
that classifies subsequent datasets if they fall within the trained category.  
An SVM algorithm that uses packet header statistical information to detect DDoS DNS 
amplification attack was presented by [77]. The algorithm was given labelled packet 
header statistical information which classifies them based on a predetermined 
classification parameters such packets arrival time, the probability of the occurrence of 
one IP address and packet size. The outcome of the proposed algorithm indicated that 
SVM can discriminate legitimate DNS behaviour from DNS amplification attacks.  
However, the SVM algorithm was found shot of choosing appropriate hyperparameters 
that will allow for adequate generalisation performance.  .  
Naive Bayes classification is a probabilistic classifier that is capable of distinguishing the 
occurrence of events. The key strength of these techniques resides in the ability to 
classify the data or events. In the context of DDoS detection, the Bayes classification is 
mostly employed at the anomaly detection stage to classify normal network traffic or 
packets from malicious traffic [77].  The naive Bayes algorithm specifies joint 
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conditional probability distributions. Thus the algorithm can predict class membership 
probability such as the probability that an identified packet is malicious. naive Bayes 
classification algorithm or Bayesian probabilistic network allows conditional 
independence to be defined between subsets of variables. The naive Bayes classification 
algorithm is based on the assumption that the value of a particular feature is 
independent of the features of other independent values given a classification. For 
example, a packet can be considered to be malicious if the packet size exceeds a given 
threshold and originates from a certain IP address. Essentially naive Bayes classifier 
takes into consideration these features to add to the probability that the packet is 
malicious. This assertion is known as prior probability.  Thus prior probability is based 
on previous experience, in this instance, the legitimate packet sizes and IP addresses 
over time. After the naive Bayes algorithm is trained (i.e. forming the prior probability), 
the experience is used to classify or predict the legitimacy of the subsequent packets.  
Naive Bayes classification-based DDoS detection technique presented in [77] confirmed 
that the technique naive Bayes algorithm is most efficient in classifying malicious traffic 
and normal traffic for their better performance if they are well trained with a larger 
dataset.   
However, the disadvantage of naive Bayes algorithm is that it has strong feature 
independence assumptions and it is unable to classify subsequent data without prior 
knowledge[77].    
4.4.2 Multi-agent DDoS detection techniques  
One of the main characteristics of DDoS attack is that the transmission source can be 
spread over large network nodes to generate disastrous traffic amplitude and also make 
it virtually impossible terminate the source of the malicious traffic before any 
significant impact. Indeed detecting and blocking DDoS attack remains a difficult task, 
especially in a distributed computing environment. In such an environment, the 
attacker can easily leverage any number of networked computers or servers to form a 
widespread botnet to launch a DDoS attack.  Despite the significant improvement in the 
detection accuracy of the detection algorithm, dropping malicious traffic and also 
terminating the transmission source is difficult to achieve with a centralised DDoS 
detection technology.  Consequently, researchers have adopted a more distributed and 
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intelligent approach such as multi-agent systems to secure large-scale computing 
infrastructure from DDoS attacks [28], [58], [81]. Multi-agent systems are distributed 
and autonomous. Their design principles and operational benefits (such as autonomy 
and collaborative) allowed the creating of real-time and distributed DDoS detection and 
mitigation systems that can detect and mitigate multiple attack sources concurrently 
[57][28][42].  
The rest of the section will highlight some of the approaches adopted by researchers to 
create a multi-agent based DDoS detection system.  
A.   Application of mobile agent concept in DDoS detection system 
The mobile agent philosophy allows the creation of an autonomous and intelligent 
software module that can migrate a computation function to a remote location [32]. The 
benefit of the mobile agent concept is that a mobile agent server can clone multiple 
mobile agents and dispatched to different remote locations to carry out different 
functions concurrently. The concept allows researchers to create DDoS detection 
solutions that can manage multiple compromised networked nodes at the same time. In 
the event of a DDoS attack, multiple mobile agents can be dispatched to the affected 
victims to investigate and mitigate the malicious traffic concurrently [58]. However, 
because the mobile agents require active or available network bandwidth to migrate, 
their movements are greatly restricted by network congestions. Consequently, they are 
unable to migrate effectively to perform DDoS detection functions their path is equally 
congested by the DDoS attack.  Although the mobile agent can reroute if their primary 
route fails, the resulted delays subsequently affect the response time to the attack.  
B.   Application of multi-agent based DDoS detection systems 
To further improve upon the limitation of employing a single agent concept, researchers 
utilise multiple agent concepts (for example mobile agent, collaborative agent and 
wrapper agent) to create a distributed multi-agent DDoS detection system. The 
advantage of this approach is that the function and efficiency of the system are not 
restricted by the limitation of a single software agent concept [7]. Moreover, the entire 
DDoS detection processes can be handled by different agent concepts collaboratively. 
Such approach is indeed not susceptible to a single point of failures such as the 
centralised DDoS detection systems or a single agent-based detection solution such as 
the mobile agent-based approach [82][7][57]. The application of the multi-agent agent 
87 
 
concepts in the development of the DDoS detection system has indeed made a 
significant contribution in improving the existing techniques such as the machine 
learning-based detection systems. Moreover, the concepts provide a distributed and 
autonomous approach to the detection of the of DDoS attacks in a distributed 
computing environment.  
4.5 Summary  
The impact of DDoS attacks are disruptive and also comes with significant economic and 
operation cost. Indeed significant progress is made in the development of detection and 
mitigation technologies. Nevertheless, open technologies have made it possible for 
attackers to create even more complex DDoS and evasive attack techniques. 
Consequently, researchers are exploring state-of-the-art techniques and development 
paradigms to create smarter detection and mitigation technologies that can easily 
evolve and scale to avert the potential threats of DDoS attacks.  
The chapter has presented an overview of the DDoS attack. Some of the existing attack 
techniques employed by attackers have been presented. The understanding of the 
attacking techniques is essential to the development of effective detection and 
mitigation technologies. Some of the state-of-the-art detection and mitigation 
techniques have been presented to highlight the advancement in the DDoS attack 
detection technologies.  
The multi-agent based approach of creating intelligent and distributed solutions 
provides the means to create DDoS attack detection technologies in a distributed 
computing environment such as the Hadoop framework. The advancement made in the 
BD domain particularly in the application of the multi-agent paradigm to detect DDoS 
attacks has been highlighted. Moreover, the chapter has presented some current 
approaches to the development of a multi-agent based DDoS detection system.  
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  Chapter 5
Design of Multi-Agent Based Real-Time DDoS Detection Framework on Big 
Data Systems 
5.1 Introduction 
As presented and explained in chapter four, the proposed framework aims to provide a 
multi-agent-based approach to the detection DDoS attacks in BD technologies such as 
the Hadoop framework [83][38][10]. The proposed multi-agent approach of real-time 
DDoS detection is viable and novel in that, a single solution which provides the design 
and architectural framework for the implementation of a multi-agent based solution, 
particularly to secure BD technologies is still lacking in the BD domain.  In Chapter Four, 
the philosophies and principles of the multi-agent paradigm were employed to create a 
transparent agent-based framework to provide an intelligent and distributed DDoS 
detection mechanism. Moreover, a real case demonstration justified the proposed 
architecture and design principle as a viable multi-agent design for the BD data domain. 
However, the chapter did not provided detail methodical approach to the design and 
implementation of the multi-agent system.  A systematic and methodical approach to 
the development of the multi-agent system is indeed essential to both the research and 
commercial development community. Consequently, this chapter will employ a 
conventional methodology to evolve the proposed framework into the agent-based 
distributed DDoS detection system.   
 
As a proof of concept, a prototype of the proposed framework will be developed to 
provide a multi-agent based distributed DDoS detection mechanism within the Hadoop 
framework. The implementation is aimed at contributing to the existing inherent 
security vulnerability within the Hadoop software framework, specifically the lack of 
internal security mechanism to detect the DDoS attack. The design and development of 
agent-based systems follow a standardised methodology as explained in Section 4.5 of 
chapter four.  As a result, this chapter will present the evolution of the proposed 
framework based on the employed methodology.  
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5.2 Methodology for the analysis and design of the multi-agent based DDoS 
detection mechanism 
The design and implementation of the proposed framework adopted the Gaia 
methodology, which is an agent-based analysis and design methodology 
[30][32][33][34]. Moreover, Gaia was complimented by an ontology development 
methodology by [35] to model the domain knowledge of the framework.   
 
Before proceeding with the development sequence with Gaia, it is essential to highlight 
the implementation requirement to inform the design and development objectives of 
the framework. As already indicated, the requirement is an implementation of the 
proposed framework to detect DDoS attacks within the Hadoop software framework. 
The stipulated requirement then informed the objective of creating a prototype of a 
multi-agent framework for real-time detection of DDoS within a Hadoop framework. 
Consequently, the adopted methodology is now used to design and realise the 
conceptual model of the framework. 
 
Gaia is an agent-based analysis and design methodology proposed by [30]. Although the 
methodology borrows some terminologies and notations from the object-oriented 
paradigm, Gaia provides significant software agent design concepts which enable 
software engineer to communicate the conceptual model of a multi-agent system. 
Likewise, the ontology development methodology facilitates the modelling of the 
domain knowledge (i.e. the description of the DDoS attack) about the system. In Gaia, 
the agent system is viewed as a human organisation that is composed of related sub-
roles with well-defined unique responsibilities, communication patterns and protocols 
to regulate their functions.  
 
In physical institutions, these defined roles can either be instantiated by the humans or 
computerised systems which assumes and execute those responsibilities accordingly. 
The advantage of using the Gaia methodology to evolve a multi-agent based system is 
that the concept and abstraction provide a natural transition from the problem 
description from the organisational standpoint to multi-agent system models. For 
example, the highest abstraction in the Gaia methodology is the system (i.e. the 
proposed multi-agent DDoS detection framework in this case) which is synonymous 
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with an organisation. Essentially, if organisations are composed of roles and each role 
have defined functions, interaction pattern and protocols to govern their functions, then 
likewise, the proposed DDoS detection framework will be composed of subsystems or 
roles with defined functions, interaction pattern and protocol to govern the pattern. 
From the multi-agent system perspective, the defined roles will be instantiated by 
agents[33][32][30]. Indeed the approach provides a natural approach to conceptualise 
how the proposed system will achieve its objectives of providing inherent DDoS 
detection mechanism in Hadoop framework.   
 
In this chapter, the Gaia methodology description presented in section 3.5.2 is employed 
to model the implementation of the proposed multi-agent framework to detect DDoS 
attacks in the Hadoop cluster.   
 
Although Gaia acknowledges the requirement of domain knowledge for agents to be 
aware of and respond to the changes in their environment, the methodology is limited 
in its concepts to model the domain knowledge of the system.  Consequently, the  
Ontology development guide by [35] is adopted to model the agent’s domain knowledge 
(the purpose of agent domain knowledge or ontology is described in chapter four). 
Moreover, Gaia is complemented by the use case model to elicit the system’s functional 
requirement and depict the roles and interaction of the framework with external users 
or subsystems. Figure 5.1 is the use case diagram depicting the agent (that is Roles in 
the Gaia terms) responsibilities identified for the implementation. The design and 
implementation process is initiated by a description of the problem the proposed 
system is expected to solve. The description is referred to as the problem statement. In 
this context, the problem statement will present the challenge in the research domain 
and the goal of the proposed framework as identified in chapter one.  
5.3 Problem Statement  
The design of the Hadoop framework adopts the centralised organisational model. Thus 
Hadoop’s elements (For example DataNodes) are managed by dummy residents agents 
who manage each node within the cluster based on the instruction received from the 
manager which is deployed in the NameNode, in a star topology. Moreover, the load 
sharing technique of HDFS is designed to be intrinsically distributed at runtime or as 
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defined by the system administrator. Essentially, each node may assume varied 
workload requirements during data processing which may cause each node to exhibit 
different characteristics regarding load and processing activities. Current DDoS 
detection systems, however, are not cognisance of such unique topological and 
processing characteristics of the Hadoop framework [29][26][4][28]. Consequently, 
they cannot provide a distributed DDoS attack detection mechanism within the Hadoop 
framework. 
 
 Additionally, Hadoop is designed to be modularised and scalable by allowing for the 
integration of vendor applications in each layer to extend the framework’s functionality. 
Thus the framework is not designed to defend itself against cyber-attacks such as DDoS 
without the reliance on secured network perimeter. Consequently, multiple 
autonomous security tools sets are required to provide a secure perimeter for the 
Hadoop cluster against different types of security threat [22]. However, the overreliance 
on perimeter security renders the entire Hadoop cluster vulnerable ones compromised.   
 
Moreover, the external, generic DDoS detection and mitigation techniques are not 
informed by the unique architectural and distributed operational requirements of the 
Hadoop framework. Furthermore, they do not have access to key performance metrics 
such as bandwidth utilisation and average server load (Peculiar to HDFS) of each 
Hadoop node to provide further insight into anomalies in the cluster.   
 
To address challenges aforementioned, a distributed intelligent monitoring and 
detection approach that is node dependent is required. Thus each Hadoop node is 
interfaced with a dedicated agent type, synonymous with Hadoop’s conventional 
organisational model. Except that, the agents in the framework will be intelligent (i.e. 
they can observe changes in their environments which is the assigned Node and take 
appropriate decisions), and autonomous. Additionally, the agents need to possess 
inherent skills which among another task will allow each agent to collect bandwidth and 
server load flow metrics to analyse for accurate discrimination of legitimate and 
malicious activities in the cluster. An intrinsic dynamic training technique will also be 
required to allow the agents (especially the transducer agents) train themselves to 
detect the random changes in the legitimate behaviour of the Hadoop nodes. 
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Consequently, a dynamic and distributed DDoS solution that is capable of adapting to 
the volatility of the Hadoop environment is expected at the end of the implementation.  
5.4 Background to use case modelling 
The problem statement describes the requirements of the proposed system and also 
provides sufficient knowledge to proceed with the analysis process which is the first 
step in the Gaia methodology. The merits of the problem description are that it 
describes the problem and the scope in clear and unambiguous terms, devoid of 
technical jargons. Also, the description of the problem in plain terms provides the 
context to tease out, at the preliminary stage the mitigation actions (i.e. the DDoS 
detection mechanism) for the problem. In this context, the problem description has 
provided an understanding and the scope of the problem the proposed framework must 
aim to resolve. Although one can have a good understanding of the problem from the 
problem statement, it does not give any indication of mitigation actions. For example, it 
does not answer questions such as: what actions needs to be taking to detect malicious 
activities on the Hadoop nodes or how will those agents (i.e. the roles in GAIA terms) 
cooperate with each other to detect and confirm DDoS attack in a Hadoop cluster? Thus 
it is observed that the problem statement is generic and will require additional design 
and analysis technique to elicit the functional requirements of the framework. For this 
purpose, the Use Case modelling and analysis technique is employed. The use case 
analysis process will help answer questions such as: 
a. Which functions or operations are required to create the required solution for 
the problem 
b. How will the individual functions interact with other external entities (.i.e. 
human or machines) in their operational domain or vice versa 
c. How will the various functions interact with each other to achieve the cooperate 
objective  
 
Essentially, the use process translates the problem statement into a system structure 
that provides an operational context regarding how the problem can be resolved.  
  
 Use case modelling and analysis is used in the object-oriented engineering domain  [84] 
to model the operational instances and how external entities will engage with the 
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proposed system (i.e. the proposed framework) to accomplish an intended task. The 
outcome of the use case analysis is a use case model of all the actors (in this case the 
agents), the use cases (functions) and description of the use cases and how they interact 
with each other. The elicitation of the core system functions and their interaction with 
the external entities is crucial to designing a multi-agent system which delivers all user-
defined requirements. Moreover, the model serves as the bases to verify if the core 
functions of the system have been captured. This section presents the use case 
modelling process and demonstrates how the use case is used to elicit the requirements 
(both functional and non-functional) of the proposed implementation.  
5.4.1 Application of use case in modelling the functions of the framework  
The functions required to provide the DDoS detection mechanism were first elicited 
from the problem statement by the application of the requirement elicitation or 
engineering technique proposed in [84]. According to Fig 5.2 the various functions that 
need to be carried to address the intelligent DDoS detection mechanism are instantiated 
as a use case in each layer. Moreover, the main actors that will be interacting with the 
functions in the layers are also depicted. The communication lines also show the main 
line of interaction between the actors and the functions and also show the interaction 
between the use cases.  
 
Use Case is commonly used in the preliminary stage of system requirement elicitation to 
present various ways the system will interact with external entities without 
consideration for implementation details. Many standards are proposed to present use 
case scenarios, but UML (Unified Modelling Language) graphical notation specification 
is the most adopted [85]. The focus of use case modelling, in this case, is to illustrate 
what the proposed framework is going to do to achieve the overall goal (.i.e. the real-
time detection of a DDoS attack) and not how it will be done [84].  
 
Use case diagram comprises three major components [84]: 
a. Actor(s): External entities (E.g. people, hardware or external systems) that 
interact or share information with the system. An actor is represented in Fig 5.1 
as Actor (notation 1).   
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b. Use Case and communication: a description or abstraction of the functionalities 
of the system. They may also include a description of the interaction between the 
actors.  Use Case is represented Fig 5.1 as the Use Case (notation 2) and 
communications as Communication with Actor or Use case (notation 3).  
c. Complementary information or documentation which further describes the use 
cases and any possible deliverable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure ‎5.1   is the UML notations used to depict the elements of the proposed use case 
diagram.  
 
Based on the framework architecture and the description of the domain problem the 
preliminary functional requirements identified for each agent in the framework model 
is presented in a Use Case diagram as showed in Fig ‎5.2.  The use case analysis provides 
a requirement elicitation process which assists in teasing out the actors, use cases and 
interaction among the use cases from the problem statement. The details of the 
requirement elicitation process itself are not presented in this text. However, the reader 
is referred to [84] for further explanation.  
 
 
Use Case  
Communication with 
Actor or Use case 
1 2 3 
 Actor
Figure ‎5.1 Example of the use case diagram symbols 
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PMKIL
DMAL
AMRL
Map user commands to
agent ontologies
Instantiate agent
ontologies
User InterfaceInteface ExternalUI
Translate User
commands to agent language
Translate ontologies
into UI response
Send heart beat
response
Manage Agent
Register
Create Agent profile
and technology profile
Send heart beat
response
Apache Hbase
Send heart beat
response Interface Apache
Habase
Translate request
into Hbase command
Retrieve and store
ontology instances
Send heart beat
response
Receive and send
agent messages
Receive and send
agent messages
Send heart beat
request
Initialise agents
at Boot up
Receive and
validate agent request
Enforce protocol on
all interaction
Hadoop Cluster
Send Policy
request to IC Agent
Interface Hadoop
Node
Read network and
Load Measurement
Detect and report
DoS
Train agent for DoS
Monitor Node
Activity
send heart beat
response
Aggregate DoS dectection
report and confiim attack
behaviour
Create DDoS
detection report graph
«uses»
«uses»
Policy Management and Knowledge Integration Layer 
(PMKIL)
Data Management and Assurance Layer 
(DMAL) 
Agent Management and Regulatory Layer (AMRL) 
 
Figure ‎5.2 Use case diagram of the DDoS detection implementation 
 
Sub section A models the main functions required to be carried out in the PMKI layer. 
Sub section B models the main functions required to be carried out in the DMA layer.  
Sub section C models the main functions required to be carried out in the AMRL layer. 
(Subsection A) 
(Subsection B) 
(Subsection C) 
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Consequently, it can be inferred from Figure ‎5.2 that, the functions of the first layer will 
mainly be interacting with an external entity (i.e. user interface) via the defined 
communication channels. Similar inferences can be made from the representations in 
the next two layers. Furthermore, Table ‎5-1, Table ‎5-2 and Table ‎5-3 present a 
description of the use cases to provide further insight into each use case and how they 
will interact with each other to perform their role.  
 
The outcome of the use case analysis will then serve as the basis for the Gaia analysis 
which involves the identification of the types of agents to rightly instantiate the use 
cases, their responsibilities, operational permission, protocols and activities. 
 
5.4.2 Use case description 
The use case scenarios identified in the use case diagram are briefly described in 
abstract terms. Table ‎5-1, Table 5-2 and Table ‎5-3 provide a brief description of the use 
cases in each layer. Thus the functions or operations required in each layer to create the 
real-time multi-agent DDoS detection solution are described in the sub-section tables. 
The required functions were derived from the problem statement after applying the 
requirement elicitation technique proposed in [85].  The description of each use case 
and their interactions are important because it gives further insight into the roles 
identified and also confirms if all functional requirements have been captured at the 
preliminary stage.   
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Table ‎5-1 Description of all the use cases in the PMKL 
Descriptions of Use cases in PMKL 
Use case Actor Description 
External user 
interface 
Platform 
  User interface 
(UI) 
The user interface agent uses the external 
application API to implement agent behaviours to 
interface with the end user platform and translate 
user-level instructions (e.g. an instruction to 
change the size of the sliding window) into agent 
communication language.  
Send 
heartbeat 
response 
User(UI) Interface 
and policy 
management(PM) 
Agents  
The UI and PM agents response to a heartbeat 
request from Intelligent controller agent to 
indicate the agent’s activeness in the framework 
Map user 
commands to 
agents 
ontologies 
Policy 
management 
Agent 
The use case process involves creating an instance 
of the agent ontologies when a new property is 
received from the user interface in the form of 
agent request. It also translates user-level 
instructions to agent ontology objects and 
forwards it to PM agent  
Send Policy 
request to IC 
Agent  
Policy 
management (PM) 
agent   
The PM, in this case, sends to a policy management 
agent specific request to IC agent to either notify 
other agents about the changes in high-level policy 
(e.g. when the target for the legitimate traffic is 
redefined by the end user) or request to inform 
other agents about the new policy.  
Translate 
ontologies 
into UI 
response 
User interface 
agent  
The UI agent translates domain ontologies 
received in the form of complex agent message 
into end-user information for the consumption of 
the end user.  
Translate 
User 
commands to 
agent 
language 
User interface 
agent 
The use case is a sub-function of the ‘Map user 
commands to agents ontologies’ which specifically 
translates agent ontologies into agent 
communication language   
Create DDoS 
detection 
report graph 
User interface (UI) 
agent 
The UI agent creates an attack graph of the DDoS 
report generated by the transducer agents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
Table ‎5-2 Description of all the use cases in the DMAL   
Descriptions of Use cases in DMAL 
Use case Actor Description 
Send heartbeat 
response 
System Registration 
(SR) Agent and Data 
Persistent (DP) 
Agent 
The  SR agents response to heartbeat 
request from Intelligent controller agent to 
signal that the agents are still alive in the 
framework 
Create agent and 
technology profile 
System Registration 
Agent  
The SR agent creates a profile of all the 
agents at startup of the framework and 
persists the profile for future reference.  
Manage Agent 
Register  
SR Agent The SR agent manages the agent register on 
behalf of the other agents (the 
management activities involve adding, 
updating, deleting and searching agent 
profile) 
Receive and send 
agent Messages 
SR and DP Agent  SR and DP Agents receive and send agent 
communication messages in the form of 
information or request for an action to be 
taking.  
Translate agent 
request Into 
Apache Hbase 
command  
DP Agent  DP agent translates agent request into 
HBase command to interact with  the  
HBase database platform 
Interface Apache 
HBase 
DP Agent  DP Agent implements Behaviour with 
Apache HBase API to interface with the 
Hadoop HBase platform.  
Retrieve and 
persist ontology 
instances.  
DP Agent DP Agent receives and persists ontology 
instances in the Apache HBase ontology 
base. It also manages all queries. Instance.  
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Table ‎5-3 Brief descriptions of all the use cases in the AMRL 
Descriptions of Use cases in AMRL 
Use Case Actor Description  
Initialise 
agents at 
Bootup  
Intelligent 
Controller (IC) 
Agent 
The case involves the starting and registering of 
the agent at startup 
Send Heartbeat 
request 
IC Agent  The heartbeat is a mechanism to ensure 
availability of Agents. This is done by sending a 
request to all agents to respond to indicate their 
availability.  
Receive and 
validate agent 
request  
IC Agent  All communication meant for another agent 
outside the native layer is received and processed 
by the IC agent.  
Enforce 
protocol on all 
interaction  
IC Agent Each agent communication is subject to the 
scrutiny to ensure adherence to the internal 
protocol. 
Instantiate 
agent 
ontologies  
IC Agent The process is an inclusive function to initialise 
agents and the domain ontology at Boot up.  
Interface 
Hadoop Node  
Hadoop Node 
(Transducer) 
Agent 
The Transducer agent implements behaviour to 
allow it to interface with the Hadoop platform. 
Moreover, it also translates agent request into 
HDFS command.  
Detect and 
Report DoS 
attack  
Hadoop Node 
(Transducer) 
Agent 
The Transducer agent implements a behaviour 
that allows the real-time collection and analysis of 
flow data to detect DoS attack.  
Monitor Node 
Activity  
Hadoop Node 
(Transducer) 
Agent 
The transducer agent monitors the load schedule 
on each interfaced node to determine when 
retraining is required.  
Read network 
and Load 
management  
Hadoop Node 
(Transducer) 
Agent 
The agent collects network and average server 
load metrics in real-time for analysis. 
Aggregate DoS 
detection 
report and 
confirm attack 
behaviour 
IC Agent  IC Agent aggregate DoS reports from Transducer 
agents and confirm DDoS in the Hadoop cluster.  
Send heart 
response  
Hadoop Node 
(Transducer) 
Agent 
Transducer agents response to heartbeat request 
from Intelligent controller agent to signal that the 
agents are still alive in the framework 
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5.5 Gaia analysis 
The purpose of the analysis stage is to gain an understanding of the organisation of the 
proposed system[30].  
 
As stated earlier, the use case modelling process does not fall under the Gaia 
methodology but plays an essential role in the methodology. In a top-down order, Gaia 
methodology starts with the analysis stage. The stage, however, relies on requirement 
elicitation methods such as the use case modelling process and detail problem 
description to provide an organisational model of the domain and a detail description of 
the proposed systems requirements. Once the organisational models and problem 
description are provided, the analysis stage will then aim at providing an understanding 
of the system and its structure from the multi-agent system (MAS) standpoint. 
Consequently, the analysis stage provides four sequences of activities, and each activity 
delivers a specific model of the system [30].  
 
The activities are: 
a. Elicitation of the roles in the system:  
Output: The output of the first activity is a role model depicting the key roles that 
will constitute the system with a brief description of each role. 
b. Identification and documentation of protocols. According to Gaia methodology, 
protocols are the definition of the pattern of interaction that will occur between 
the identify roles within the system.  
Output: The output for this activity is the interaction model which presents the 
iterative or sequence of interaction between the roles.  
c. An elaboration of the role description identified in step two. 
Output: a detail description of the role model, describing the major roles of the 
system, their permission and responsibilities, the associated protocols and 
finally the activities the roles are allowed to participate.  
d. The last stage is to iterate stage one to three until the entire systems functions 
are fully captured.  
 
101 
 
5.5.1 Transition from use case modelling to Gaia analysis stage 
The current state of Gaia requires sufficient understanding of what the system is 
required to do before commencing the analysis stage. However, the methodology does 
not provide or suggest any process to migrate from the requirement elicitation stage 
(such as use case analysis and modelling) to the Gaia analysis stage. Consequently, a 
transition process is therefore suggested in this chapter to address the gap in this 
implementation.   
 
As explained earlier, a use case represents a function that has to be performed by a 
system which also represents activities in the context of Gaia. Once the use cases (i.e. 
activities) are identified, the main task during the Gaia analysis stage will be to identify 
the type of agents suitable to carry out those functions and how the agents can 
collaborate to achieve the cooperate aim in each layer. Concerning the proposed 
framework, the model presented in chapter four identifies the types of agents (which 
also represent roles in the context of Gaia) in each layer. Consequently, the analysis will 
then seek to align each agent type with the use cases or the activities and then spell out 
the communication patterns between the agents and across the layers. The alignment 
will then result in an integrated model that represents a high-level abstraction of how 
the multi-agent framework will work collaboratively as an internal DDoS detection 
mechanism for the Hadoop framework.   
 
In this implementation, the preliminary models obtained from the analysis process 
were iteratively refined by comparing the model representations with the problem 
statement to ensure that the final model captures the requirements described in the 
problem statement presented in section 5.3. Table ‎5-4 is the agent role model for the 
proposed implementation. The table is an integrated representation of all the outcome 
of the three processes in the analysis stage.  Thus the table gives further insight into the 
agents and their responsibilities. It also describes their permission and internal 
protocols.  
 
The definition of internal protocols and permissions are essential in multi-agent 
systems in that, agents are designed to be autonomous entities, and therefore it is 
imperative that their activities or operations be regulated to ensure that they operate 
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along preferred guidelines. Moreover, the integration of standard protocols also allows 
the owners to redefine their operation by standard regulations or cooperative policies.    
 
Table ‎5-4 Schema for all the roles of proposed system 
Roles or Agents  Responsibilities Permission or 
Protocols to enforce  
Corresponding Skills 
to execute the 
responsibilities 
User Interface 
agent  
Liveness properties(Main 
Functions): 
 Translate Domain 
command to agent 
language 
 Translate agent language 
into domain response 
 Send heartbeat response 
 Receive and process agent 
messages 
 Create DDoS report graph 
 Send ontology properties to 
PM agent to create ontology 
instance 
Safety properties(Complementary 
Functions): 
 Maintain connection with 
external UI 
 
UI agent accesses and 
interprets the DDoS 
ontology 
 
UI agent can request 
PM agent to create an 
ontology instance  
 
UI agent can receive a 
DDoS attack report 
from IC agent.  
Send and create 
ontology request to PM 
agent  
 
Receive Create DDoS 
attack graph request 
from IC agent 
 
Create an ontology 
report graph 
 
Receive and send 
heartbeat response 
Policy 
management 
agent  
Liveness properties (Main 
Functions): 
 Map domain command to 
agent ontologies 
 Send heartbeat response 
 Send policy request to IC 
agent 
 Receive Ontology 
properties from UI agent 
and create ontology 
instance 
 
PM agent manages the 
DDoS ontology 
instances.  
Receive create ontology 
instance request  
 
Create ontology 
instance 
 
Receive and send 
heartbeat response  
Data persistent 
Agent 
Liveness properties(Main 
Functions): 
 Translate agent request 
into agent apache Hbase 
commands 
 Retrieve and store agent 
ontology instance 
 Send heartbeat response 
 Receive and process agent 
messages  
Safety properties(Complementary 
Functions): 
 Maintain active connection 
with apache Hbase server 
DP agent can access 
apache HBase (the 
OntoBase) 
 
DP agent can Store 
and retrieve ontology 
instance from Apache 
HBase.  
 
Receive and process 
ontology request from 
IC agent 
 
Manage Apache HBase 
connection 
 
Store and retrieve 
ontology instance from 
Apache HBase.  
 
Receive and send 
heartbeat response 
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System 
registration and 
Management 
Agent  
Liveness properties(Main 
Functions): 
 Create agent and 
technology profile 
 Store and retrieve Agent 
profile from agent register 
 Send heartbeat response 
 Receive and process agent 
messages 
Safety properties(Complementary 
Functions): 
 Maintain active connection 
with agent register 
SRM agent can read 
agent profile from 
agent register 
 
SRM agent can add a 
new agent profile to 
the agent register  
Manage agent profile 
request from the IC 
agent 
 
Read agent profile from 
agent register 
Add new agent profile 
to the agent register  
 
Receive and send 
heartbeat response 
Intelligent 
Controller Agent 
Liveness properties(Main 
Functions): 
 Receive and validate agent 
request 
 Aggregate DDoS detection 
report and confirm attack 
behaviour  
 Initialise Agents and boot 
up 
 Send heartbeat request 
 Receive and process heart 
response 
 Load and initialise System 
and DDoS ontologies  
Safety properties(Complementary 
Functions): 
 Ensure all agents are active 
via the heartbeat  
mechanism  
 
IC agent is permitted 
the following 
activities: 
Read DDoS ontology 
instances  
 
Read agent profile  
 
Read and fuse DDoS 
attack report from the 
transducer agents 
 
Analyse DDoS attack 
report from the 
transducer agents 
 
Request for agent 
health status 
 
Analyse heat beat 
response from agents 
 
Communicate across 
all layers  
Send health check 
request 
 
Manage ontology 
requests with  DP agent 
 
Register domain 
ontology with all agents  
 
Enforce internal 
protocol on agent 
requests.  
 
Receive DDoS attack 
reports from transducer 
agents  
 
Fuse and analyse DoS 
attack reports  
 
Confirm DDoS attack  
Hadoop Node 
Transducer 
agent 
Liveness properties:  
 Collect and analysis 
network and average 
server load metrics 
 Detect and report DoS 
attack to IC Agent 
 Train agent node’s normal 
behaviour for abnormal 
detection 
 Send heartbeat response 
 Translate agent request to 
Hadoop command.  
Safety properties:  
a. Maintain active connection 
with Hadoop nodes.  
Transducer agent is 
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5.6 Design of the proposed multi-agent framework  
The analysis process aims to elicit the system requirement and also provide a 
preliminary approach to addressing the problem statement. The main focus at this stage 
is to identify the main components of the proposed system, functions of each 
component and also outline how these components will deliver their assigned 
responsibilities. Consequently, Table ‎5-4 presents the deliverable of the analysis process. 
The models derived from the analysis stage provide a high-level understanding of the 
requirements of the multi-agent framework. Once the functional requirements of the 
framework are established the next step in the development process then establishes 
how those functional requirements will be achieved. In other words, the system design 
stage aims to transform the models obtained during the analysis stage into low-level 
abstractions that can easily be implemented on any agent development platform. 
Consequently, this stage will aim at transforming the analysis model into adequately 
low-level abstractions that classical system design and development techniques (such 
as object-oriented design techniques) can be applied to implement the agents. 
Essentially, the design stage is only interested in modelling how the agent community 
and protocols can be implemented to achieve the ultimate result.   
 
The design process entails three modelling activities.  
a. The agent modelling: which identifies types of agents that will constitute the 
entire system 
b. The service modelling: which will identify the key services required to realise the 
role of the agents 
c. The agent acquaintance modelling process identifies and documents the various 
levels of interaction and communications among the agents.  
Once these models are established, any appropriate development platforms can be 
employed to realise the implementation.  
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Figure ‎5.3  is an integrated model representing the outcome of all the three design 
processes carried, out at the design stage. In principle, Gaia recommends a separate 
model as the deliverable for each design activity. While such modelling approach 
provides an unambiguous means to present a conceptual model of the design activities; 
the approach can result in volumes of models that require several efforts to navigate. 
Consequently, an integrated approach was adopted to aggregate the three models into a 
single model which is easy to perceive in a single instance.  
 
As it can be observed in Figure ‎5.3 that, the model entails instances of the types of 
agents employed, the services each agent is expected to provide and the high-level 
interaction or acquaintances required to address the problem collectively (The 
proposed architecture allows the framework to sit on the Hadoop framework or 
deployed within the Hadoop framework). From the figure, each agent type is assigned a 
Figure ‎5.3  A model of the agent types, services and acquaintances 
106 
 
set of functions (referred to in the figure as liveness properties). The figure also shows 
how the agent will interact with other functions or agents to perform the assigned 
functions. The merit of the model is that it presents a systemic representation of the 
framework and further projects how the functional requirements related to each agent 
in the framework is achieved. At this point, much information about the internal 
structure and the operations of the framework has been elicited and presented in a way 
that can easily be developed or implemented.  
 
Aside from the modelling of the functions and the communication of the agents, any 
non-functional requirements that may not necessarily be considered as specific agent 
service must also be addressed. The non-functional requirements considered are:   
a. Transparent to any vendor technologies 
b. Scalable by the integration of new agents 
c. Transparent to the domain knowledge or semantics 
 
Functional requirements, in this case, are those which directly relate to the core 
functionalities of the software agents. On the other hand, non-functional requirements 
define the backbench that can be used to assess the operation of the system in a given 
scenario.  The subsection below presents how the non-functional requirements for the 
framework were addressed.  
5.6.1 A transparent approach to interfacing the DDoS detection framework with 
the Hadoop cluster 
The transducer agent concept is adapted to interface with the Hadoop nodes and also 
serve as the gateway between the Hadoop platform and the agent community to make 
the framework transparent to the Hadoop cluster. The approaches have proven to be an 
effective way of interfacing a multi-agent based platform with any third party or legacy 
technologies [63]. Nevertheless, the choice of the right agent concept to employ in this 
regard must be made based on efficiency, effectiveness and feasibility of 
implementation. The decision in this instance was largely influenced by the fact that, the 
concept does not require access to the low-level code of the Hadoop kernel as compared 
to the wrapper agent concept. That is, transducer agents can be created with Hadoop’s 
application interface (API) to interface with the nodes in the cluster.  
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5.6.2 The scalability of the multi-agent DDoS framework  
One of the fundamental attributes of the Hadoop framework is its ability to scale to 
meet any operational demand. Consequently, it was imperative such fundamental 
requirement be addressed in the proposed framework so it can dynamically scale along 
the underlying Hadoop cluster. Address this requirement and an object-oriented 
concept called object interface was employed to ensure that each agent is designed to 
conform to a predetermined standard.  The interface design concept is an object-
oriented design principle that allows the application domain (in this case the 
framework) to each agent be developed with standard interfaces and characteristics 
such as the agent health check behaviour. Consequently, the framework can be scaled 
by the plugin in of new agents without changes to the existing configuration.  
5.6.3 Transparency to domain knowledge 
Lastly, the proposed framework is transparent to domain semantics. Thus, the agents 
must understand and speak a common language which is high-level to specific domain 
instructions. For example, the conventional approach to changing the user login details 
in Hadoop HDFS and MySQL server will require the application of autonomous 
command instructions. Consequently, a homogenous approach was adopted. Ontology, 
in this case, was employed to abstract the low-level domain semantics into standardised 
concept definitions. The approach then allows the gents to register to the same 
ontologies to infer the same meaning. For example, a single instruction to change user 
login details carries the same meaning with all transducer agents who will then use the 
respective low-level commands to enforce the instructions. As a result of the proposed 
approach, autonomous instructions is no more required to enforce action on the 
underlying Hadoop technologies (such as Apache HBase and the HDFS) as a single as 
instruction can get the job done.  
5.6.4 Approach to the design of the agent DDoS attack detection behaviour 
Once the three major requirements of the framework are addressed, a move is made 
from the high-level design to detail designs which will comprise of the identification and 
design of the agent’s behaviour (skills) and communication template to realise their 
functional requirements as presented in Table ‎5-4. As mentioned in sections 5.6, one 
important thing to establish at the design stage is to identify the type of agent concepts, 
their behaviours (skills) and the level of interaction required to realise the overall 
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system functions. Once those details are defined enough, the next thing is to design the 
behaviour and the communication templates identified (as modelled in Figure ‎5.3). At 
this point, the low-level algorithm of the behaviour and the cognitive system of the 
agent is designed in detail enough for implementation.  
 
Because the Gaia methodology does not provide any notation for low-level design and 
modelling of the agent’s behaviour, the algorithm of the techniques employed to realise 
the agent behaviours will be presented. Further, object-oriented tools such as sequence 
diagrams are employed to model the sequence of process execution. The BDI agent 
reasoning technique (BDI is explained in  Chapter 3) is also employed to describe and 
implement the agent’s cognitive systems [70].  Furthermore, a flow-metrics based 
technique was employed in this work to allow the transducer agents to monitor and 
detect DDoS attacks in the Hadoop cluster in real-time. A flow-metrics based technique 
was adopted because flow metrics-based analysis is known to attract a little 
computational cost[86]. The reader is referred to Appendix B for the description and 
justification of the choice of metrics.  
 
The rest of the section presents the agent implementation model in the form of the 
description of the techniques employed to realise key functions such as the detection of 
DDoS attacks.  
5.7 The design of real-time agent based DDoS detection technique using 
Cumulative Sum  
The proposed framework presents two separate DDoS detection behaviours of the 
transducer agents. The first DDoS detection behaviour employs a statistical technique 
called cumulative sum (CUSUM). The second DDoS detection behaviour is based on the 
linear weighted moving average (LWMA) technique. Both techniques detect and 
confirm a DDoS attack in two stages. The first stage involves the detection and 
confirmation of the DDoS attack by the transducer agents. When an attack is confirmed 
on the Hadoop node, the resident agent creates and sends attack report (the report 
properties such as timestamp, CUSUM results, node ID are defined in the attack 
ontology model) to the IC (Intelligent controller) agent for further analysis. In the 
second stage, IC agent then fused all the reports received within a given time frame to 
109 
 
confirm DDoS attack within the cluster and also suggest the attack behaviour. Thus IC 
agent is endowed with a data fusion technique which allows it to aggregate the DDoS 
attack reports it received to create a cluster view of the manifestation of the attacking 
technique. This approach is plausible to create a distributed DDoS detection mechanism 
that is fit for the distributed nature of Hadoop cluster and also presents the chance to 
perceive the attack holistically. For example, IC agent can confirm at the second stage if 
the reported attacks constitute a botnet attack and if the victim is within the cluster. 
Furthermore, malicious software operation activity can be confirmed from the average 
server load reported by the transducer agents. 
5.7.1 Background to the CUSUM-Based DDoS detection technique   
Concerning the real-time analysis of the network utilisation and average server load 
flow metrics, CUSUM is employed in the transducer agent’s cognitive system to realise 
the detection of DDoS attacks. The network utilisation metrics in this work are defined 
as a measure of aggregate bandwidth capacity being consumed every second. Likewise, 
the average server load metrics are defined as a measure of the processor’s capacity 
being consumed per second. In real-time means, the metrics are analysed at the end of 
the collection period (which is user-defined).  These two metrics provide the transducer 
agents with intrinsic real-time updates on the stream of traffic and the average load for 
discriminating between normal and abnormal behaviour on each node. In this case, the 
transducer agent’s belief desire intention (BDI) interpreter activates the metrics 
collection goal to collect the metrics of the sliding window period.    
 
The CUSUM DDoS detection technique involves:  
a. A Training process (i.e. the agent’s skills), which allows each transducer agent to 
be trained on the normal network and average server load behaviour of the 
Hadoop node. Normal behaviour is confirmed when the user-defined training 
period elapses 
b. Monitoring and detecting abnormal network and average server load behaviour 
c. Confirming a DDoS attack on the Hadoop node 
d. Sending CUSUM DDoS attack report to the IC agent for cluster-based analysis  
e. Fusing the CUSUM DDoS attack reports confirming DDoS attack in the cluster  
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CUSUM is a statistical technique typically used for monitoring the deviations of 
individual process measurements from the process target [59]. The target is the 
allowable process aim or the highest operation point of the process. The technique is 
designed to analyse a well-sampled data set to detect changes sequentially. The 
principal objective of the CUSUM is to calculate the cumulative sum of the process data 
to ensure the process activities are within a predetermined process target T and an 
allowable shift S, as shown in (5.1) and (5.2). 
 
𝐻(𝑖) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[0, 𝐻(𝑖 − 1) + 𝐶(𝑖) − (𝑇 + 𝑆)],   (5.1) 
 
𝐿(𝑖) = 𝑀𝑖𝑛[0, 𝐿(𝑖 − 1) + 𝐶(𝑖) − (𝑇 − 𝑆)],    (5.2) 
 
where H(i) and L(i) are the cumulative sums of high side and low side deviations from 
the process target for ith measurement C(i) of the process, and functions 𝑀𝑎𝑥[∙] and 
𝑀𝑖𝑛[∙] give the maximum and minimum value of their parameters respectively.  
Essentially CUSUM monitors the deviations of process activities over time and indicates 
when the cumulative deviation exceeds the allowable threshold or out of control.  
 
However, real-time monitoring and detection of an attack in Hadoop cluster will require 
that the agents monitor each metrics (in this case the bandwidth utilisation and average 
server load) in real-time for early detection during the attack contrary to the sample 
metrics used in other works[42][86]. Consequently, this research has developed a 
variation of the CUSUM technique to allow the agents to analyse all metrics and detect a 
DDoS attack in real-time. Moreover, the CUSUM as per its sequentially cumulative 
nature can detect changes in continuous flow metrics. However, it is ineffective when it 
comes to detecting an attack that transmits at a different speed, particularly when the 
attacking traffic is designed to be inconsistent to masquerade the legitimate traffic. 
Thus, high false positive detection can be recorded whenever an attack of such nature is 
detected. To further improve the existing CUSUM technique, mainly to detect a DDoS 
attack from network utilisation and average server load metrics, the CUSUM technique 
is optimised with a result validation technique to drop the false-positive ratio (FPR) 
significantly.  
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The variation of the CUSUM-based real-time DDoS detection technique developed in this 
work is based on the following modifications:  
a. Instead of analysing a sample of the metrics, the window (W) concept is 
employed to collect and analyse the sequence of metrics in each window as 
shown in Figure ‎5.4. This enables the agent to evaluate a set of metrics within 
each window period.  
b. ARL (Average Running Length) is defined in this case as the number of Ws to 
analyse before a decision on the CUSUM result is made. Furthermore, ARL will 
define the number of window anomalies confirmation required before a DDoS 
attack is confirmed on each Hadoop Node.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.4 depicts the window-based analysis concept. The outer boxer represents the 
definition of ARL and the two inner boxes represent the windows with the number 
metrics collected and analysed during each window period.  According to the diagram if 
the size of each window is five seconds, the metrics are measured every second, and the 
size of ARL is two, then five samples of the flow metrics will be collected at every 
window to analyse for anomalies, and then two adjacent windows will be analysed for 
anomalies before a confirmation of DDoS attack is made. The benefit of this approach in 
the real-time analysis of the flow metrics is that it allows the agents to manifest dynamic 
response time to attack. However, the downside of using W and ARL is that a new 
training session has to be conducted if the W and ARL values changes.  
 
 
 
Average Running Length (ARL = 2)  
Window 2 (W=5) 
 
 
 
Window 1 (W=5) 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.4 Model of the ARL window-based analysis concept 
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A.   Description of the CUSUM-based DDoS detection algorithm 
The description explains the step by step sequence of the DDoS detection process. 
Figure ‎5.5 further depicts logical sequence of the technique.   
 
The flow metrics collected on each node are analysed as follows after the values of ARL 
and W size is set. 
 
Step 1. Collect the incoming and outgoing traffic of w period and create a list of the 
average measurement of each window. The average traffic is collected as follows: 
 
µ𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑘/𝑤
𝑤
𝑘=0        (5.3) 
 
µ𝑜𝑢𝑡 = ∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑘/𝑤
𝑤
𝑘=0                   (5.4) 
 
Where µ𝑖𝑛 and µ𝑜𝑢𝑡 are the average incoming and outgoing network traffic of the 
current window respectively, 𝑤 is the size of the sliding window, 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑘 and 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑘 are the 
kth incoming and outgoing traffic measurement in the sliding window. 
                              
Step 2 – Find each sliding window’s standard deviation of the incoming and outgoing 
network traffic, σ𝑖𝑛 andσ𝑜𝑢𝑡, respectively. The standard deviation is used to set the 
allowable shift S from the target measurement and the control limit or threshold. 
 
σ𝑖𝑛 = √   
∑ (𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑖 −µ𝑖𝑛 ) 
𝑤
𝑖=0
 2
𝑤
,                   (5.5) 
 
σ𝑜𝑢𝑡 = √   
∑ (𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 −µ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) 
𝑤
𝑖=0
 2
𝑤
,                (5.6) 
      
where w is the size of the sliding window, µ𝑖𝑛 and µ𝑜𝑢𝑡 are the average incoming and 
outgoing traffic of the sliding window in (5.3) and (5.4) respectively. 
Step 3 – Set the user-defined network target for legitimate traffic and calculate the 
allowable shift from the target, i.e. T and S in (5.1), respectively. The standard deviation 
σ, i.e. σ𝑖𝑛 or σ𝑜𝑢𝑡, from Step 2 is used as the allowable slack.  
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Step 4 – Find the upper control limit, +𝜆, and the lower control limit, - 𝜆, for the 
legitimate metrics. 𝜆 can be chosen simply as𝜆 = 𝑚𝜎, where m is a constant and 𝜎 is the 
standard deviation of the legitimate metric. In this implementation,  𝜆 = 4𝜎 was chosen.  
 
Step 5 – The CUSUM equations, (5.1) and (5.2), are used to determine if each metric in 
the current sliding window exceeds the upper control limit +𝜆 and lower control limit 
−𝜆. Any cumulative sum of the deviation that exceeds the control limit is classified as 
abnormal.  
 
Step 6 – After the CUSUM exceed +λ in step 5, the algorithm verify (or validate) to check 
whether the real process data (sampled network measurement) are off target (i.e. 
measurement > T+S or < T-S):  
 
               𝛿𝐻(𝑖) =  𝐶(𝑖) − (𝑇 + 𝑆),              (5.7.a) 
 
   𝛿𝐿(𝑖) =  𝐶(𝑖) − (𝑇 − 𝑆),                                       (5.7.b) 
                       
          𝑎𝑏𝑀 = {
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸,    𝑖𝑓 (𝛿𝐻(𝑖) > 0||𝛿𝐿(𝑖) < 0),                            
𝐹𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐸,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                             
(5.7.c) 
 
 
where 𝛿𝐻(𝑖) > 0 means the ith real process value 𝐶(𝑖) is out of target on the high side, 
𝛿𝐿(𝑖) < 0 means the ith real measured process value 𝐶(𝑖) is out of target on the lower 
side.  
 
Step 7 – Confirm abnormal metrics for ith measurement in a sliding window if the 
following condition is true: 
 
𝑖𝑓 ((𝐻(𝑖) > 𝜆 || 𝐿(𝑖) < −𝜆) & (𝑎𝑏𝑀 ==  𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸))   (5.8) 
 
Step 8 – DoS attack at Hadoop node level is confirmed if the number of consecutive 
confirmed abnormal metrics in Step 7 is greater than a pre-set threshold G. In this 
implementation, G = 5 was chosen. 
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For brevity, the average server load version of the CUSUM algorithm is exempted since 
they follow the same logic.  
 
Once an attack is confirmed at the Hadoop node level, the IC agent will receive a DoS 
attack report from the transducer agent. The IC agent uses a data fusing technique to 
analyse the report from the transducer agent first to confirm the DDoS attack within the 
Hadoop cluster and then predict the nature of the attack.   
 
Start 
Set window size = WS
Set Average running length = ARL
Set Upper control limit = UC
Set Lower control limit = LC
 H(i) > UC 
OR
 L(i) < LC
Find CUSUM for current window
H(i) = Max[0,H(i-1)+C(i)-(T+S)]
L(i) = Min[0,L(i-1)+C(i)-(T-S)]
Confirmed attack 
Create and send attack 
report IC agent
Stop  
Yes
W(i) > ARLNo
Yes
No
 ((H(i)>λ || L(i)<-λ) & 
(abM == TRUE))
Yes
Confirm false alarm
No
 
Figure ‎5.5 Flowchart of the CUSUM-based DDoS detection technique 
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Figure ‎5.5 is the graphic representation of the logical sequence or the process flow of 
the CUSUM-based DDoS technique. Additionally, the figure shows the iterative flow of 
the sequence of CUSUM DDoS detection technique presented.  
The second stage of the DDoS detection technique is to aggregate the DDoS attack 
reports submitted by the transducer agents to create cluster level confirmation of the 
DDoS attack. For example, the IC agent which in this case also assume the additional 
role as the aggregator can conduct time similarity analysis on the time stamps of the 
DDoS attack reports to confirm Botnet DDoS attack. Consequently, the cognitive system 
of IC agent’s DDoS behaviour implements a data fusing technique which allows all DDoS 
report to be fused into a single report to confirm DDoS attack and also create a high-
level knowledge of the attacking technique.  
 
Each node under attack sent CUSUM attack analysis report of w*ARL period to the IC 
agent (w is the size of the sliding window, and ARL is the average running length value). 
The IC agent then conducts out of range analysis on the CUSUM results in the report to 
determine the CUSUM results that are out of the allowable range. Once the out of range 
analysis is completed, the IC agent then fuses the unique ID of the victim, the out of 
range values and the timestamp of each reported CUSUM result into a single report. The 
report provides further information to confirm DDoS attack within the cluster and to 
predict the behaviour of the attack. In implementation the value of w is used as the 
threshold for the number of reports to be analysed at a given instance. If there are n 
transducer agents, there will be (n*ARL)*w number of DDoS attack reports, aggregated 
into an attack report for each reported Hadoop node before confirming the DDoS attack. 
So, to determine Botnet (i.e. when more than one node is compromised to form zombie 
network to launch a DDoS attack) for example, we need to find if the reported zombies 
are more than one and if the reported attacks occurred around the same time.  
B.  The sequence of DDoS report fusion algorithm 
Step 1 – Sort out all high side and low side out-of-range CUSUM result from each report 
received as shown in (5.9). 
 
𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑢𝑡 = {𝐻𝑂𝑢𝑡(𝑖) ∶ 𝐻𝑂𝑢𝑡(𝑖) > 𝜆, ∀𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑛 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐿 ∗ 𝑤]},  (5.9) 
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where 𝐻𝑂𝑢𝑡(𝑖) is a list of CUSUM result being analysed on the high side for outgoing 
traffic, SHOut is the sorted list of out-of-range CUSUM result of 𝐻𝑂𝑢𝑡(𝑖).  
 
The report sorting technique in (5.9) is also applied to the generation of sorted lists of 
the out-of-range CUSUM results on the low side for outgoing traffic, the high side for 
incoming traffic and the low side for incoming traffic, respectively.  
 
Step 2 – Find the period (tp) when all the out of range detection took place in the DoS 
attack report submitted by the transducer agent. The period is defined between the 
early timestamp and later timestamp of the out of range CUSUM results.  
𝑙𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒[𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑢𝑡],    (5.10.a) 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒[𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑢𝑡],    (5.10.b) 
𝑡𝑝 = 𝑙𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡,       (5.10.c) 
where lt is the latest timestamp of the out-of-range CUSUM result per report. et is the 
earliest timestamp of the out-of-range CUSUM result per report. time is the timestamp 
of the out-of-range CUSUM result. 𝑀𝑎𝑥_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒[∙] and 𝑀𝑖𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒[∙] give the maximum and 
minimum timestamp of their parameters respectively. SHOut is the sorted list of out of 
range CUSUM result of 𝐻𝑂𝑢𝑡(𝑖) in (5.9). The time sorting technique in (5.10) are  
applied to the sorted lists of the out-of-range CUSUM results generated in Step 1.  
 
Step 3 – Aggregate the total number of out-of-range CUSUM result for both outgoing and 
incoming traffic. OH is used to represent the aggregated number of outgoing out-of-
range CUSUM result on the high side, and IH is used to represent the aggregated number 
of incoming out-of-range CUSUM result on the high side.  
 
Step 4 – Determine the status of the attack by the total out-of-range recorded CUSUM 
result. The two statuses considered are zombie, Z, and victim, V.  
 
Zombie is when the node is compromised to launch an attack or to run malicious 
software to deplete the node’s resource [87]; thus, the total out-of-range CUSUM result 
on the high side is used to determine whether the volume of outgoing traffic exceeds the 
threshold as shown in (5.11). At the same time, the algorithm assesses if the incoming 
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traffic measuring is depleting or rising.  Likewise, the victim is a node that is under a 
DDoS attack. The total high side out-of-range CUSUM result of incoming traffic is equally 
used to determine if the node is receiving abnormal traffic as shown in (5.12). In the 
same manner, the algorithm assesses if the outgoing traffic measuring is depleting. 
 
𝑍 = 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸, IF(𝑂𝐻 ≥ 𝑤)                                      (5.11) 
  𝑉 = 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸, IF (𝐼𝐻 ≥ 𝑤)                                   (5.12) 
where OH, and IH represents the total out-of-range CUSUM results obtained in Step 3 of 
the algorithm. The size of the sliding window 𝑤 is used as the threshold to determine 
the status of the attack.   
 
 Botnet in this work is explained as when an attacker forms a network of compromised 
(zombie) Hadoop nodes to launch a DDoS attack from the Hadoop cluster remotely.  
 
Step 5 – Determine whether Botnet attack occurred. Botnet in this work is described as 
when an attacker forms a network of compromised Hadoop nodes to launch a DDoS 
attack from the Hadoop cluster remotely. Botnet attack is confirmed by: 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑡 = 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸, 𝑖𝑓 ((𝑁𝑧 > 1)&(𝜎𝑇𝑆 ≤ (𝑤 × 𝐴𝑅𝐿))), (5.13) 
where 𝑁𝑧 denotes the total number of confirmed zombies in a list of fused CUSUM 
result, FR is the length of the lists of the out-of-range CUSUM results generated in Step 1, 
𝜎𝑇𝑆 is the standard deviation of the latest time of reported attacks and is given as 
follows: 
𝜎𝑇𝑆 = ∑
(𝑙𝑡(i)− µ𝑙𝑡 ) 
2
𝐹𝑅
 
𝐹𝑅
𝑖=0   
,           (5.14) 
 where µ𝑙𝑡 is the mean of the latest times of the lists of the out-of-range CUSUM results. 
Essentially, Step 5 will confirm that the botnet activities occurred around the same time. 
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5.8 The design of real-time agent based DDoS detection technique using 
linear weighted moving average  
LWMA is a weighted statistical analytic technique used to detect changes in moving data. 
The technique is mainly used in the financial market to monitor the movement of 
market prices to detect or responds to new price development [88]. LWMA is designed 
to emphasise its latest value by assigning higher weightings to the values as shown in 
(14). For example, given network metrics of 20 seconds, the first measurement read will 
be multiplied by its position or the second(s) it was captured. Thus if the first value is 
100kb/s, then 100kb/s will be multiplied by the first position (i.e. 100 X 1) and 120kbs 
X 2 for the second value until each value is accounted.  Ones each position is accounted 
for, the summation of the values are divided by the sum of the multipliers to obtain the 
recent LWMA value as presented in (15).   
 
𝐿𝑊𝑀𝐴 = ( ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝑖   
𝑤
𝑖=1 )/ ∑ 𝑖
𝑤
𝑖=1           (5.15) 
 
where 𝐿𝑊𝑀𝐴 is the weighted average of the current window under analysis, 𝑤 is the 
size of the sliding window under analysis, 𝑚 is the ith  measurement being analysed, i is 
the current position of  the sliding window under review.  
 
However, the LWMA technique was optimised by the introduction of additional 
parameters such as window size (WS), average running length (ARL), upper control 
limit and lower control limit. The additional parameters were necessary to allow real-
time monitoring of the network and load behaviours within a predetermined range (i.e. 
upper control limit and lower control Limit) to differentiate normal LWMA values from 
the abnormal LWMA values. Figure ‎5.6 is the flow chart depicting the LWMA based 
DDoS detection technique developed in this work.      
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Figure ‎5.6 Flow chart of the LWMA based DDoS technique 
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The monitoring and DDoS detection process of LWMA is presented in Figure ‎5.6. 
According to the figure, the fundamental element of the algorithm is step three, which is 
the determination of the LWMA value of each window. The algorithm then evaluates (i.e. 
Step 4) if the LWMA value is within the control limit or the node is behaving normally. 
An alarm is raised, and the DDoS report is generated if the LWMA of the window being 
analyzed exceeds the control limit. It can also be observed from the technique that, 
LWMA does not confirm DDoS attack based on a set of anomalous results but rather 
used each window’s LWMA value to make the decision. The reason such an approach is 
adopted in this case is that the technique is average based and so each LWMA value 
presents a reflective state of the node within the sliding window period. Essentially, this 
technique reduces the decision-making process of CUSUM and hence has the tendency 
of equally improving on the response time to the attacks (this will be confirmed in 
chapter six where the performance of each technique is evaluated).   
Similar to the sequence of CUSUM DDoS detection algorithm, the LWMA DDoS detection 
algorithm also involves: 
a. A training behaviour (i.e. the agent’s skills) which allows each transducer agent 
to dynamically train on the normal network and average server load behaviour 
of the Hadoop node. Normal behaviour is confirmed when the user-defined 
average running length (ARL) elapses 
b. Monitoring and detecting abnormal network and average server load 
behaviour 
c. Confirming a DDoS attack on the Hadoop node 
d. Sending LWMA DDoS attack report to the IC agent for cluster-based analysis  
 
The role of the window (W) and the Average Running Length (ARL) in the LWMA 
technique is the same as defined in the CUSUM technique. However, one fundamental 
difference is how LWMA determines its upper and lower control limit. Unlike CUSUM, 
LWMA does not make room for allowable slacks, and so the determination of control 
limits is based on the actual measurements used during the training period (the value of 
ARL determines the training period). Essentially, the maximum LWMA of the ARL is 
used as the upper control limit, and the minimum LWMA of the ARL is used as the lower 
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control limit. Thus an exact range of normal behaviour (for both network and server 
load) is determined without any assumption. The exclusion of assumptions such as the 
allowable slack (used by CUSUM) allows LWMA to avoid any potential human 
misjudgment when it comes to determining the normal and malicious behaviours of the 
Hadoop nodes.   
Despite the differences in the implementation, the technique will share the same aim as 
CUSUM. Thus LWMA is utilised to determine the variation in the bandwidth utilisation 
and server load within a set average running length (ARL).  
The concept of the ARL is adopted from the CUSUM algorithm and hence maintains the 
meaning as defined under the CUSUM algorithm. Consequently, any LWMA value of the 
two metrics which exceeds the upper or lower control limit is confirmed as a DDoS 
attack 
5.9 Description of the dynamic training technique 
The dynamic training behaviour allows the agent to train their knowledge(belief) of the 
normal bandwidth and server load behaviours for the first time at deployment. 
However, the volatility in the Hadoop nodes equally requires the training behaviour to 
observe the node for any significant changes from the previously known normal 
behaviour and then make the appropriate adjustment. The following scenarios explain 
the operation of the training technique.  
5.9.1 Scenario one – when a node is in an idle state 
Retraining is required when the node status changes from active state (i.e. when the 
node is actively processing request) to the idle state (i.e. when there’s no or lesser 
activity). Else the no activity status will manifest in the CUSUM result as a drop in load 
activity and the algorithm will report abnormal behaviour if training is not conducted to 
reflect the change in behaviour. Moreover, it will be difficult to differentiate legitimate 
traffic from a malicious one because a low-intensity attack, for example, can be wrongly 
classified as legitimate because it is transmitting within the previous legitimate range. 
So in such cases, the agent will have to retrain the belief with the traffic in the idle state 
to make accurate analysis and judgement.  
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A.   How to detect changes in the normal traffic  
To enable effective monitoring of the changes in the behaviour of the nodes, the 
transducer agent keeps periodic updates of the minimum and maximum legitimate 
network traffic in its belief. Subsequently, the agent will do a periodic check to confirm 
if average normal traffic recorded in its belief falls below the minimum measurement of 
the current normal activity traffic. If for example, the previous highest traffic 
measurement is less than the maximum measurement of the current normal activity 
traffic then the node can be considered to be in an idle state.  
5.9.2 Scenario Two - when normal activity on the node drops for some time 
The agents will have to retrain their belief any time there is a drop in legitimate 
activities to reflect the current behaviour of the node. Training in this scenario is 
essential to avoid the wrong classification of malicious activities.  
A.  How to detect a drop in legitimate load activity  
The current normal traffic in the agent’s belief is used to check if the average 
measurement falls within the average range of the current legitimate traffic. If it the 
previous traffic load falls below the current range of legitimate traffic, then retraining 
will be requested.  
5.9.3 Scenario Three: When the normal activity on the server increases 
If normal activity on the server increases then a retrain is required to adapt to the 
change else legitimate outgoing traffic, for example, can be considered as abnormal 
traffic at the CUSUM low side. Because the current normal activity measurement used 
for the previous training will be lesser than the current activity traffic being recorded. 
A.   The sequence of the training technique 
The agent behaviour responsible for the periodic training follows the following 
sequences to maintain up to date knowledge of the node.   
a. Read the most recent normal activity (using the bandwidth utilisation and 
average server load metrics) within a predetermined period from the agent’s 
belief. The period is specified in time and then converted to seconds. So for 
example, a request for a one-minute most recent normal activity on the Hadoop 
node will be converted to 60 s which will correspond to the first sixty records of 
normal metrics in the agent’s belief. Incidentally, the transducer agent keeps 
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real-time updates of normal traffic and server-load measurements in its belief 
(i.e. the agent collect and stores the normal measurements) for future 
comparison.  
b. Ones the normal measurements are retrieved, the window-based analyses are 
employed to find the average network traffic and server load of each window 
until ARL (average running length) elapses.  
c. Collect measurements of current activities on the Hadoop node within the 
predetermined training period and determine the average traffic and server load 
of each window, using the window-based analyses.  
d. Then compare the average current traffic and server load with the previous 
average traffic and server load (the previous average is based on the normal 
activity measurements retrieved from the agent’s belief). If the previous average 
traffic or server load is less than the average of current traffic or server load, 
then confirm upwards changes in the Hadoop node load or bandwidth activities. 
Likewise, if the previous average traffic or server load is greater than the average 
of the current normal metrics then confirm downwards changes in the node’s  
load or traffic activities  
e. Retrained agent with the current normal measurement. Figure ‎5.7 is the 
flowchart depicting the logic of the training technique. 
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5.10 Implementation of the agent behaviour and interactions 
Once the three major requirements of the framework are addressed, a move is made 
from the high-level design to detail designs. The detail design will comprise of the 
identification and design of the agent’s behaviour and communication template to 
realise their functional requirements as presented in Table ‎5-4. As mentioned in the 
previous sections, one important thing to establish at the design stage is to identify the 
type of agent concepts, their functions (behaviours) and the level of interaction required 
to realise the overall system functions. Once those details are defined enough, the next 
thing is to design the behaviour and the communication templates identified (as 
modelled in Figure ‎5.3). At this point, the low-level algorithm of the behaviour and the 
cognitive system of the agent is designed in detail enough for implementation.  
 
Because the Gaia methodology does not provide any notation for low-level design and 
modelling of the agent’s behaviour, the algorithm of the techniques employed to realise 
the agent behaviours will be presented. Further, object-oriented tools such as class 
diagrams and sequence diagrams are employed to model the sequence of process 
execution. The BDI agent reasoning technique (BDI is explained in  Chapter 3) is also 
employed to describe and implement the agent’s cognitive systems [70].   
 
The rest of the section presents the agent implementation model in the form of the 
description of the agent’ cognitive systems, and the algorithm of the techniques employ 
to realise key functions such the detection of DDoS attacks.  
 
It was established in chapter three that agents are autonomous and intelligent software 
modules in other words;  
a. They have skills or behaviour which allow them to perform their assigned tasks,  
b. They can communicate or share information with other agents based on defined 
internal protocol,  
c. They possess knowledge which allows them to understands the events in their 
domain 
d. They possess a cognitive system that allows them to reason and makes decisions 
autonomously. 
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 Consequently, the next sections will present how these key characteristics were 
realised for agent concept identified at the analysis stage (Refer to Table ‎5-4 for a 
summary of the agent types and their functional requirements) 
5.10.1 Transducer agents (Interface with the Hadoop nodes)  
According to Figure ‎5.3, the proposed solution will implement three different instances 
of the transducer agent type. One of the instances is the Hadoop node transducer agents 
which directly interfaced with all the nodes within the Hadoop cluster. From the 
proposed design, each node is assigned a dedicated agent who localises the detection 
technique to the assigned node. The one to one approach is ideal for a small node 
cluster. However, a similar design for a Hadoop cluster of about a hundred plus (which 
is usually the case for a commercial cluster) will mean over a hundred transducer 
agents will be required to interface each node. Indeed the resulted implementation 
could be a complex and complicated solution which may be difficult to maintain. In such 
instances, the design can be optimised by assigning the transducer agents to a 
subcluster of a manageable number of nodes. Thus one agent-to-many nodes approach 
can be employed to simplify the implementation.  
A.   A brief description of the adopted Communication template of the transducer 
agents 
 As defined in the agent service and acquaintance model, the agents use common 
language to exchange of messages with each other. Agent communication language is a 
standardised language which allows the exchange or sharing of information in an agent 
community as explained in chapter three. In this implementation, the FIPA SL language 
was adopted as the communication language. At this point, the acquaintance relation of 
the transducer agent with other agents (Reference the services and acquaintance model) 
are considered, and a corresponding interaction template is produced. A section of the 
interaction is presented in Table ‎5-5.  The table consists of a role, the originator of the 
interaction, the recipient and the internal protocol which define the mode and type of 
interaction. The standard FIPA interaction protocol was adopted as the interaction 
protocol. Chapter three gives a summary of the standard FIPA interaction protocol.  
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Table ‎5-5 A section of interaction table for transducer agent 
Interaction Initiator Recipient Interaction 
Protocol 
When 
Send health 
check response 
Transducer 
agent  
Intelligent 
Controller 
Agent 
FIPA 
Request 
When a health 
check request 
is received 
Send DDoS 
attack report  
Transducer 
agent 
Intelligent 
Controller 
Agent 
FIPA  
Inform 
When 
anomalies are 
detected, and 
DDoS attack is 
confirmed  
 
B.   List of the required behaviours of the transducer agents  
The main functional requirement for the Hadoop node transducer agents is to detect 
and report DDoS attack in real time. To deliver such requirements within the 
framework would mean that: 
a. The agent should first understand the normal behaviour of the node 
b.  Monitor the behaviour of the node in real time 
c. Dynamically adapt its knowledge of the normal behaviour as and when required.  
d. Detect abnormal behaviour from the normal behaviour  
e. Confirm if the abnormal behaviour constitute a DDoS attack 
f. Create and send a report of the attack if confirmed  
 
Consequently, the following was developed to create a behaviour which will allow the 
agent achieve the functional requirements.  
a. A dynamic training technique which will allow the agent to train its knowledge of 
the normal behaviour and also detect and retrain the knowledge when normal 
behaviour changes. The technique should work autonomously without human 
intervention. 
b. A technique to collect relevant metrics from the node for real-time analysis of the 
behaviour  
c. A technique to differentiate the normal behaviour from abnormal behaviour and 
also confirm if the anomalous behaviour constitutes a DDoS attack.  
d. A reporting mechanism to create and send a report of the attack once confirmed.  
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5.10.2 Data Persistent Agent  
Data persistent agent is defined in this work as a type of transducer agent that mainly 
interfaced with third-party database management system. In the general network 
management context, DP agent’s functional requirement can be defined to manage (i.e. 
store, retrieve, search and update) the network management information in a third 
party database. However, in this implementation, the DP agent’s functional requirement 
is defined to manage the domain knowledge (ontology) in third-party ontology database 
(i.e. OntoBase).  
 
Concerning the choice of the OntoBase, Apache HBase [20] is adopted as the OntoBase 
to manage the domain knowledge as defined in the ontology schema. HBase no-schema 
design makes it possible to implement an ontological model. The employment of Apache 
HBase to host ontology is novel in essence that HBase is not considered as a 
conventional OntoBase technology and hence has not been explored to manage 
ontology.  
A.    A brief description of the Ontology management behaviour of DP agent  
Essentially the design and implementation of DP agent mainly focused on the 
translation of agent requests into HBase native command to execute the request on the 
Apache HBase server. The result of the execution is subsequently instantiated as 
ontology concept and then wrapped in ACL message object that can be consumed by 
other agents particularly the IC Agent. Concerning ontology mapping of the HBase low-
level commands, a one to one mapping technique is employed. Thus each ontology 
action concept defined in the ontology model is mapped to a specific apache HBase 
native command. In this manner, the DP agent can easily map any request to low-level 
commands to carry out specific (e.g. store or retrieve ontology objects) task on HBase. A 
predefined static ontology mapping technique was employed in this implementation as 
a proof of concept. However, such an approach may not be the best choice for a large 
scale implementation. In such situation, a dynamic ontology mapping technique (which 
is outside the scope of this work) is recommended. The general ontology 
implementation concept is further explained in the ontology section.  
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B.   A brief description of the Health Check Behaviour of DP agent 
The health check behaviour of DP agent response to all health check requests from the 
IC agent. The content of the response will include the agent name and the unique ID to 
indicate the current status (i.e. active or inactive) of the agent. The health check 
response process is presented in the health check sequence diagram in Figure ‎5.8.  
 
 
Figure ‎5.8 The sequence of the health check process 
 
5.10.3 Policy management agent  
The policy management (PM) agent is the type of the information agent concept with a 
functional requirement to map high-level domain instructions it receives from UI agent. 
PM agent first maps the domain instruction from the UI agent to an instance of the 
domain ontology concept and then encapsulates the ontology in agent message for IC 
agent.  
A.   A brief description of the Ontology mapping behaviour of PM agent 
PM agent serves as the main point of contact for the UI agent by mapping the domain 
instructions from the UI agent to the domain ontology instances. For example, consider 
a scenario where system administrators periodically conduct system reviews (i.e. 
generate periodic system resource information) within a Hadoop cluster. 
Conventionally, retrieving periodic server resource information or log records from the 
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Hadoop file system (HDFS), Apache HBase server could be carried out by platform-
dependent scripts or administration of native commands on each server.  
 
The challenge with these conventional approaches resides in the fact that changes in 
resource information requirements would require corresponding updates in all the 
scripts or system administrators will periodically run separate native commands to 
retrieve the required information. The process may not seem challenging when dealing 
with a cluster of few hardware and application platforms but is certainly a tedious task 
when dealing with a large-scale corporate IT infrastructure running on various 
platforms. On the other hand, Ontologies can be employed in software agents to 
perform the same function autonomously as demonstrated in chapter four. 
 
Consequently, the same technique is employed to build an ontological description of the 
attack detection techniques (CUSUM and LWMA), to allow the agents to communicate 
the semantics of any attack report. Figure ‎5.9 is a section of the ontological model of the 
domain knowledge of the DDoS attack presented.  
 
The high-level definition of the components of the ontology is presented below: 
a. Concepts: Are definition of entities in a domain. In this scenario, the concepts are 
represented as CUSUM, NetworkCUSUMResultes, ServerLoadCusumResult, 
CUSUMResult and MeasurementProfile, LWMA.  
b. Predicates: These are expressions that say something about the domain or their 
entities. In this scenario, BelongsTo is defined as the predicate of the ontology.  
c. Agent Actions: These are dedicated concepts that show actions the domain 
agents can perform. 
The definition and implementation of concepts, predicates, action and relationships of 
the ontology provide the agents with a shared understanding of the domain. The use of 
ontologies, therefore, enables the agents to share, communicate, interpret and translate 
the DDoS attack reports from the transducer agents and IC agent respectively.  
Figure ‎5.9 is the domain ontology modelled. For a further understanding of the 
application of ontological concepts in multi-agent systems, the reader is referred to 
chapter four.  
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The design concept and the implementation of the PM agent allow the transparent 
approach to interacting with the low-level elements (e.g. Hadoop nodes) in the Hadoop 
cluster. For example changes in the CUSUM, parameters can be enforced on all nodes via 
the UI agent without concern for low-level implementation.   
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Figure ‎5.9 A section of the DDoS Ontology model 
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B.   A brief description of the Health Check Behaviour of PM agent 
The PM health check equally response to the IC agent health check request by 
responding to the requester with the identification details such as the agent ID and 
agent name. The response of the health check behaviour implementation follows the 
same implementation process as shown in Figure ‎5.8.  
5.10.4 User interface agent  
The user interface agent is an implementation of the UI agent concept with the 
functional requirements to interface with the end-user platform and wraps high-level 
domain commands in a message that can be consumed by the agent community 
particularly PM agent. As proof of concept, custom user-admin interface was developed 
to interface with the UI agent to allow the ender user to interact with the agent 
community through a set of predetermined domain vocabulary. Through these set of 
vocabularies, the end user can interact with the agent community via some activities 
such as adding technology to the framework and changing the DDoS detection algorithm 
parameters.  
A.    A brief description of the vocabulary mapping behaviour of user interface agent 
The set of domain vocabulary used, which also doubles as the instruction on the user 
interface is directly mapped to a corresponding agent action defined in the ontology. UI 
agent equally employs the one-to-one mapping technique to wrap and communicates 
the high-level commands to the agent community. Likewise, any agent output meant for 
the end user goes through an inverse process to translate it to user understandable 
information (e.g. converting the ontology DDoS report into a graph that can be easily 
understood by the end user).  
The UI agent equally implements its health check behaviour to respond to the health 
check request as already explained.  
5.10.5 System registration and management agent 
The SRM agent is an implementation of the information agent concept with the 
functional requirement to manage the profiles of all agents in the framework. The 
profiles are essential to identify each agent and also understand the role and the 
operational restrictions. SRM agent manages the profiles by keeping a regular update of 
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the register (which is implemented as an XML file) via a management behaviour which 
allows activities such as adding, searching, deleting and updating of the agent’s profile.  
The register is essential because it provides IC agent in particular with up to date 
information of each agent. The register is also used to confirm active agents during the 
health check process.  
5.10.6 Intelligent controller agent 
The IC agent is an implementation of the collaborative agent concept with the functional 
requirements to: 
a. Coordinate and validate the operational activities of all the agents by ensuring 
that each agent complies with all user-defined protocols. The internal protocols 
are implemented as agent ontologies to allow multiple instantiations of the 
protocols concepts. 
b. Fuse and analyse DDoS reports from transducer agents to confirm a DDoS attack 
in the Hadoop cluster.  
c. Ensure agent availability through the health check mechanism.  
A.   A brief description of the DDoS Report fusing Behaviour of intelligent controller 
agent 
The DDoS detection mechanism is in two stages. The first stage (which is the DDoS 
detection) takes place at the Hadoop node level by the transducer agent. The detection 
on each node is carried out by the interfaced agent without any knowledge of the events 
on the other nodes. So at the DDoS detection stage, it is impossible to get a cluster-level 
view of the anomalies. Nonetheless, the framework should be able to detect when 
multiple attacks occur and also create a better knowledge of the behaviour of the attack.  
B.   A brief description of the Protocol Behaviour of intelligent controller agent 
Agents are autonomous entities, but they operate according to predetermined protocols. 
As observed in Table ‎5-4, each of the identified agents is equally assigned permissions 
and protocols which defined the conditions of their operations. Consequently, a star 
topology communication technique was adopted to ensure full compliance with the 
protocol. Thus each agent communication is routed through the IC agent who ensures 
that each protocol as defined by the end user is complied with. For example, the agents 
are only allowed to communicate with other agents in the same layer. However, the 
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agents are only allowed to communicate across layers via IC agent. Figure ‎5.10 is a 
model of the protocol enforcement mechanism. From the figure, it is observed that the 
communication protocol engine is used to manage the instances of protocol ontology. 
Moreover, the protocol engine is implemented as a native class object which provides 
the prerequisite interface for IC agent to add, update search and remove the protocol 
instances. Furthermore, the protocols are enforced as and when messages or request 
are received by the IC agent.  
 
Read/Write 
protocols Add/Update agent 
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Figure ‎5.10 A model of the protocol enforcement mechanism 
 
C.   A brief description of the Health Check Behaviour of intelligent controller agent 
The health check behaviour implements a mechanism to ensure agents availability. The 
mechanism works by sending periodic (the end user defines the time interval via UI 
agent) request to all agents to respond with their profile. Furthermore, the behaviour 
tracks all responses received and match with the number of agents in the agent register 
to ascertain if all agents have responded. Agents who fail to respond to the health check 
request within a defined time frame are considered as dead or inactive, and a 
notification is sent to UI agent to raise the alarm to restart the agent (The restart 
mechanism is outside the scope of this work and hence not considered).  
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Figure ‎5.11  The final Implementation model of the multi-agent-based framework. 
Agents A, B, C, and D are the transducer agents that interface with the Hadoop nodes 
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5.11 The final deliverable of the Gaia analysis and design methodology 
The Analysis and design methodology aims to systematically translate a problem 
statement or system requirements into a multi-agent system that is capable of 
delivering the expected results. In this work, Gaia methodology was adopted to design 
and describe the model of the proposed DDoS detection framework that can easily be 
developed on any multi-agent development platform. The systematic approach allowed 
for detail design and description of each component of the proposed framework and 
how they can seamlessly operate to provide the real-time distributed DDoS detection 
mechanism. Figure ‎5.11 is the final model which illustrates the architecture of the 
proposed framework. The model illustrates the deployment of the adopted agent 
concepts in the respective layers and also shows how the layers are organised to 
provide separation of concern in the proposed framework. According to Figure ‎5.11, the 
PMKIL layer will mainly address all information and policy management task via the UI 
and PM agents. Additionally, the layer will directly interface with external management 
platform via a bespoke interface. The double arrows also depict the flow of 
communication among the agents, between the layers or with an external platform (i.e. 
either with an external management platform or the Hadoop testbed).   
 
In addition to information management task, the DMAL layer also hosts two important 
files (i.e. AgentRegiste and TechProfile) which allow the framework to manage all the 
agents and the external technologies. According to the model, DMAL is also designed to 
interface with third-party data repository which serves as the data repository for some 
information management functions, via a bespoke interface. The layer achieves its 
functional requirements via the System Registration Agent and Data Persistence Agent       
The next layer of the framework is designed to host all the transducer agents which will 
directly interface with the external technologies (in this case the Hadoop nodes) they 
are assigned to manage. The collaborative agent (IC agent) is also located in AMRL to 
manage all the agent operations and also to enforce all internal protocols and policies.  
The layered architecture also depicts how each agent will sit and interact in the 
framework to achieve the individual functions. Moreover, the model depicts how the 
entire framework will interface and interact with the Hadoop cluster (which is the four-
node Hadoop testbed). The internal behaviours and communication patterns described 
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at the design stage will now be developed with a preferred multi-agent development 
platform.  
5.12 Summary 
Application of software agent paradigm in network management has evolved 
significantly [29][37][89][38]. The progressive research and commercial development 
interest mostly stem from the intelligent and autonomous capabilities of the concept.  
However, the domain is still emerging and hence is not extensively explored in other 
domains such as the Big Data security. Consequently, the Gaia methodology is employed 
to evolve the implementation of the multi-agent based framework to detect DDoS attack 
within a Hadoop cluster. The DDoS detection mechanism based on two statistical 
techniques (Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) analysis, and Linear Weighted Moving Average 
(LWMA) analysis) are presented to demonstrate a novel approach to creating 
lightweight and efficient DDoS detection techniques. In Chapter six, the evaluation 
result and analysis of the prototype of the proposed framework are presented.  
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  Chapter 6
Results and Evaluation 
6.1 Introduction 
As presented in chapter five, the CUSUM DDoS detection mechanism is in two stages. 
The first stage involves detection and confirmation of a DDoS attack by the transducer 
agents on the interfaced node(s). Once the attack is confirmed on the node, the 
transducer agents create (according to the description of the ontology) and send an 
attack report to the IC agent. IC agent then fuses the attack reports received within a 
given time frame to confirm DDoS attack in the Hadoop cluster and also suggest the 
attack behaviour. Consequently, IC agent is endowed with a data fusion technique which 
allows it to aggregate the DDoS attack reports it received from the transducer agents to 
create a cluster view of the manifestation of the attacking technique. This approach is 
vital in getting a holistic view of an attack in a Hadoop cluster. For example, IC agent can 
confirm the reports if the nodes have been compromised (i.e. when the nodes are used 
as zombies) to launch a DDoS attack from the cluster. Furthermore, malicious software 
activities can be confirmed from the average server load reported by the transducer 
agents.  
 
Consequently, a prototype of the multi-agent framework was developed and 
experimented on the Hadoop testbed to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed 
framework. The results of the experiments will prove that the proposed framework is 
effective. Moreover, the novel DDoS detection techniques employed in the transducer 
agents are indeed efficient and can leverage the bandwidth utilisation and average 
server load flow metrics to detect TCP SYN flooding and UDP flooding attacks. 
Moreover, the evaluation results will confirm that the proposed framework can provide 
intelligent, real-time node-level DDoS detection mechanism in a Hadoop cluster with 
less than 20 s response time. 
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6.2 Experiment setup  
A test bed of the proposed framework was implemented to simulate the framework’s 
ability to provide Hadoop internal DDoS detection mechanism. The experiment setups 
are depicted in Figure ‎6.1 and Figure ‎6.2.  
 
Hardware Setup 
1. Dell Power Edge SC 1435 servers [90] were used to create a four-node network as 
shown in Figure ‎6.1. 
2. The servers have Quad-core AMD Opteron 2800 MHZ and the RAM of 8049 MB. 
3. A 64-bit PC with 3.7 GB memory and i5 Core processor was used to host and deploy 
the MapReduce Jobs to the Hadoop cluster. 
4. A 64-bit PC with 3.7 GB memory and i5 Core processor was used to deploy the 
prototype of the multi-agent framework to monitor and analyse the behaviours 
of the Hadoop nodes.  
Software Setup  
1. Apache Ambari 2.0.1 was used to deploy a four-node Hadoop 2.0 cluster on Linux 
Ubuntu 12.04.2 servers which are running on the Dell Power Edge SC 1435 [90]. 
2. Ubuntu desktop 15.0 were deployed as the underlying operating system for the 
Desktop PCs. 
3. JADE, a multi-agent development software framework with agent development 
libraries and tools was used to develop the proposed multi-agent framework 
(including all the agents, the protocol and ontology management engines) [12].  
4. The step-by-step deployment guide employed to deploy the Hadoop Big Data 
framework is excluded from this section for brevity. However, the reader is 
referred to [90] for comprehensive information on the deployment of the 
Hadoop 2.0 framework in the Ubuntu environment.  
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Figure ‎6.1 The setup of the Hadoop testbed 
 
The Figure ‎6.1 is the set diagram of the Hadoop and the multi-agent systems testbed.  
The Hadoop cluster comprises the four Hadoop nodes in a star network. The cluster has 
one client which creates and sends MapReduce jobs to the cluster and a PC hosting the 
prototype of the multi-agent framework. They are both connected to the Hadoop cluster 
via local area network 
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Figure ‎6.2 A model of the experiment setup 
141 
 
Figure ‎6.2 is a model depicting the software and hardware setup of the evaluations. The 
model shows that the framework prototype is deployed in a client machine to interface 
with the Hadoop nodes to read and analyse the network traffic and server load in real-
time. The results of the analysis are also generated to confirm or deny the existence of a 
DDoS attack. The MapReduce application (referred to as MapReduce client) is deployed 
to generate activities on the Hadoop cluster by sending live MapReduce job requests to 
the Hadoop cluster and stream live data from the Hadoop cluster.  The attacker 
represents the nodes used to create the botnet and launch the TCP SYN flooding and 
UDP flooding attacks.  
 
Firstly, all agents in the proposed framework have been implemented according to their 
functional description presented in chapter five. Transducer agents in this work are A, 
B, C and D (Interfacing the respective Hadoop nodes in the cluster). The transducer 
agents are designed to interface between the networked nodes (i.e. Hadoop nodes) and 
the agent community in the framework (see Figure ‎5.11).  Moreover, they are 
implemented to collect and analyse the network and average server load flow metrics to 
detect the DDoS attack. The agent’s interface capabilities are implemented with the 
respective APIs of the node they interface. For example, the HDFS API was used to 
develop the interface and command mapping functionalities for the Hadoop node 
transducer agents. Likewise, the native JADE ontological libraries were used to 
implement the DP agent with an additional role as the ontology management engine for 
the agent community. The ontological model is used to describe the domain properties, 
types and entity relationships as presented in Figure 5.9. The definition and 
implementation of ontology concepts, predicates, action and relationships of the 
ontology provide the agents with a shared understanding of the domain semantics. The 
use of ontologies makes the agents able to share the DDoS attack reports, communicate 
operational information and interpret and translate domain vocabulary into agent 
messages or low-level commands (if it is transducer agent) without low-level 
knowledge of the intended technology. 
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6.3 Performance evaluation of the CUSUM and LWMA technique under TCP 
SYN flooding attack  
The functional capabilities of the software agents are dependent on the inherent skills. 
Agent skills are functional components or modules which allow the performance of 
specific task as defined by the owner. In Section 5.10 the skills or behaviours of the 
proposed agents were designed according to their functional requirements. Specifically, 
the proposed framework was designed to provide an inherent DDoS detection 
mechanism for the Hadoop software framework. Consequently, two statistical 
techniques (CUSUM and LWMA) were used to develop DDoS detection skills that will 
enable the transducer agents to use bandwidth utilisation and server load flow metrics 
to monitor and detect DDoS attacks on the nodes.   
The aim of this section, therefore, is to evaluate the performance of the transducer 
agents in detecting DDoS attacks. Two DDoS attacks (i.e. TCP SYN flooding and UDP 
flooding) were unleashed on the Hadoop test bed to generate malicious traffics in the in 
the experiment.  
 
The performance of the framework in all scenarios was evaluated regarding total attack 
detected (AD), response time (RT), false positive ratio (FPR) and false negative ratio 
(FNR).  
1. AD is defined as the total malicious measurement detected. Number of false 
positives (FP) is defined as the total number of legitimate measurement detected 
as malicious.  
2. Number of false negatives (FN) is defined as the total number of malicious 
measurements failed to be detected. 
3. FPR and FNR are defined as follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑅 = 𝐹𝑃/𝐴𝐷,         (6.1) 
𝐹𝑁𝑅 = 𝐹𝑁/𝐴𝐷,      (6.2) 
4. Response Time (RT) is defined as the elapsed time from when the first anomaly is 
detected to when the attack is confirmed.  
5. Total attack sent (AS) is defined as the total number of malicious requests sent from 
the attacker. 
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6.4 Classification of the evaluation scenarios   
Two evaluation methods (i.e. Offline and real-time) were employed to evaluate the 
performance of the framework. The offline method provides a controlled environment 
for testing the framework with predetermine sets of measurements to predictably 
confirm the accuracy and efficiency of the framework. The data used in the offline 
evaluation were collected from the Hadoop test bed during legitimate activities and an 
attack. Thus the UDP and TCP SYN flooding attacks were launched on the test bed 
during which the measurements (i.e. network utilisation and average server load) were 
collected. The measurements were then fed into the framework in a controlled manner, 
first of all, to observe if the agents will be able to accurately detect all attack instances 
on the test bed and also discriminate the normal behaviour from the malicious 
behaviour. The offline analysis aims to validate the efficiency of the DDoS techniques 
employed in the transducer agents.     
While the offline evaluation method establishes the framework’s ability to detect UDP 
and TCP SYN flooding attacks; the real-time evaluation method will aim to evaluate the 
framework’s ability to detect the attacks in real Hadoop environment. In the real-time 
instance, the agents are deployed to sit on the Hadoop cluster to observe and learn the 
legitimate behaviour of the nodes for a predetermined training period and also monitor 
the behaviours to detect and confirm DDoS attack when present. Thus the framework’s 
ability to protect a Hadoop cluster in a real environment is evaluated.  
In the next section, the results from the offline and real-time evaluations will be 
presented and analysed.  
 6.5 Offline evaluation of the detection of high-intensity TCP SYN flooding 
attack. 
The experiment for this evaluation was conducted in a controlled environment or 
offline on the Hadoop testbed. Thus the performances of the agents were observed 
when they were exposed to a controlled size of normal and malicious traffic and server 
load measurements collected from the Hadoop testbed. Firstly, the agents were trained 
with legitimate measurements collected during a MapReduce job. The size of the 
training measurements constituted eight hours of normal activity. Furthermore, a DDoS 
attacking tool called hping3 was used to launch a DDoS attack on the live Hadoop test 
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bed during which the bandwidth utilisation and average server load measurements 
were collected. Hping3 is a security auditing and testing tool used to audit and test 
network security systems such as firewall [91].  Hping3 is also used to explore and 
highlight vulnerabilities in networks and security systems for the necessary security 
attention.  Likewise, another DDoS attack tool called Low Orbit Cannon (LOIC) was used 
to launch a UDP flooding attack in the Hadoop cluster at a separate instance. LOIC is an 
open-source network stress testing and DDoS attack tool. LOIC was initially developed 
by praetox technologies but later released under the open source license.  The 
experiments were conducted in two attacking scenarios.  
In the first scenario, the hping3 tool was used to form a botnet of two Hadoop nodes to 
remotely launch TCP SYN flooding attack from the cluster [27] (it is assumed that the 
Hadoop nodes are exposed to the attacker because the testbed perimeter security is 
already compromised). The first scenario aims to evaluate the agent's ability to detect 
when a Haddop node is compromised to launch a DDoS attack from within a Hadoop 
cluster. The Low Orbit Cannon tool was used in the second scenario to launch low-
intensity UDP flooding attack on victim within the cluster. Likewise, the second 
attacking scenario is aimed at detecting when a Hadoop node fall victim of the low-
intensity DDoS attack. The victim in the second scenario is the Hadoop NameNode.   
The malicious traffic was generated regarding the hping3 attack properties presented in  
Table ‎6-1 to simulate fluctuating traffic and to test the agent’s ability to discriminate 
random anomalous behaviours from the legitimate MapReduce activities actively 
running in the Hadoop cluster.  
This section presents a comparative analysis of the performance of the agents when 
exposed to the high-intensity TCP SYN flooding attack. In this experiment, the agents 
were tasked to use relevant flow metrics and then employ the novel detections 
technique to analyse and report on the behaviour of a victim of a TCP SYN flooding 
attack. Thus incoming traffic and average server load are the main point of analysis for 
the agent although both incoming and outgoing traffic is analysed in a live environment. 
The performance of the two techniques (i.e. CUSUM and LWMA) are analysed regarding 
the performance evaluation metrics. The objective here is to understand how the two 
techniques will perform under the given situation. The results will, therefore, be 
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presented in the same order of consideration. Each detection technique was evaluated 
under the same condition but in separate instances. Additionally, both techniques were 
exposed to thirty minutes training period, which constitutes 1800 legitimate network 
traffic and average server load measurements to ensure the same level of intelligence of 
the legitimate behaviour of the Hadoop nodes. Also, the same values for the following 
CUSUM and LWMA tuning parameters were used for both techniques to ensure 
consistency in the evaluation. The values for the tuning parameters during the training 
period were: 
ARL == 360 
SW == 5 
 
Thus 360 windows of five measurements constitute 1800 seconds of network traffic 
and server load measurements.  
The tuning parameters values for the monitoring and analysis period were: 
ARL == 20  
SW == 5 
Thus twenty windows of five measurements will be analysed in each running period. 
The SW value of five was adopted to accommodate any legitimate spike that may occur 
during the analysis.  
 
The table below presents the hping3 parameters used to launch the TCP SYN flooding 
attack.  Some of the parameters did not require values. 
 
Table ‎6-1 hping3 attack properties 
hping3 
flag 
Meaning values 
-c Number of packets to send  60,000 
-d Size of packets 120 
-s Sending TCP SYN packets  
- 
-w Window size 64 
-p Destination port  80 
--flood Flooding mode - 
--rand Generating random source IP - 
--source  Initial source IP Address - 
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The table below presents the legitimate behaviour and the control limits obtained when 
the transducer agents conducted thirty minutes of training with the CUSUM techniques.  
 
The values in the tables are the output of the CUSUM detection technique after the 
agents have analysed the network and the average server load measurements collected 
from the Hadoop nodes. Thus the variations in similar results in subsequent tables are 
legitimate and a reflection of the dynamic behaviour of the Hadoop nodes. Essentially 
because the agents collect and analyse the network and server load measurements in 
real time, any change in behaviour will reflect in these metrics (i.e. network traffic and 
average server load) which will, in turn, reflect in the outcome of the CUSUM output 
when processed by the agents in the framework.  
 
The table below presents the legitimate behaviour (i.e. the output of the CUSUM 
detection algorithm ) and the control limits obtained when  the transducer agents 
conducted thirty minutes long training with the CUSUM technique. 
 
Table ‎6-2 The Agent's current belief as a result of the 30 minutes CUSUM training 
Agent’s current 
belief 
Upper control limit 
 
Lower control limit 
Target 
 
Incoming traffic 
KB/s 
80976  -80976 5000 
Outgoing traffic 
KB/s 
78688 -78688 5000 
One minute load % 1.11 
-1.11 
 
1.0 
Five minutes load % 0.25 -0.25 
1.5 
 
Fifteen minutes 
load  % 
0.1 -0.1 1.5 
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The table below presents the legitimate behaviour(i.e. the output  of the LWMA 
detection algorithm or technique)   and the control limits obtained when  the transducer 
agents conducted thirty minutes long training with the LWMA technique. 
 
 
Table ‎6-3 The Agent's current belief because of the 30 minutes LWMA training 
Agent’s current 
belief 
Upper control limit 
 
Lower control limit 
Incoming traffic 
KB/s 
889 1 
Outgoing traffic 
KB/s  
2588 0 
One minute 
load % 
0.42 0.1 
Five minutes 
load % 
0.2 
 
0.1 
Fifteen minutes 
Load % 
0.21 0.1 
 
The table below presents the performance evaluation results when the framework was 
exposed to detect a high-intensity TCP SYN Flooding attack. 
 
Table ‎6-4. The Evaluation results of the CUSUM technique in detecting 
high-intensity TCP SYN Flooding attack 
ARL Traffic 
Source 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
First Incoming  
20 
18 1 2 5.56 11.12 
Outgoing 0 0 0 0 0 
Second Incoming 
 
 
28 
 
26 0 2 0 7.70 
Outgoing 0 0 0 0 0 
Third Incoming  
35 
32 0 3 0 8.58 
Outgoing 0 0 0 0 0 
   
 
The graph below presents how the CUSUM technique detected the TCP SYN flooding 
attack in the incoming traffic during the first ARL period. The corresponding graph for 
the outgoing traffic presented in Appendix A 
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Figure ‎6.3 Detection of TCP SYN Flooding attack on incoming traffic on first ARL 
 
 
6.5.1 Offline performance  analysis of the CUSUM-based DDoS detection technique 
According to the CUSUM evaluation results in Table ‎6-4, the technique can detect high-
intensity DDoS attack with less than 12% false negative ratio and less than 6% false 
positive ratio.  The cause of the false positive and false negative is indeed attributed to 
the cumulative approach used by the CUSUM technique. Figure ‎6.3 is the detection 
result on the incoming traffic during the first ARL.  In this instance, it is observed from 
Figure ‎6.3 that the first ARL analysis of the incoming traffic flagged anomalous traffic 
from the twenty-first second. However, the cumulated results of the twenty-first and 
twenty-second traffic deviation were not significantly high enough to exceed the upper 
control limit although the deviation exceeds the traffic target of 5000 KB/s as presented 
in  Table ‎6-2. Consequently, the technique falsely classified traffic deviations as 
legitimate traffic despite them being malicious. Likewise, the technique falsely classified 
the forty-fifth CUSUM deviation as malicious traffic when the traffic had returned to 
normal activity (i.e. the network traffic is now behaving within the target) at that point. 
The observations indicate that the CUSUM-based technique can’t detect sudden changes 
in the network traffic or the server load graph unless the deviation is progressive over 
some time or the difference between the current and previous sum is far greater than 
the previous sum. That is why the technique failed to precisely acknowledge the forty-
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fifth results in Figure ‎6.3 as the sharp fall of the malicious traffic into the legitimate 
traffic range.  
The graph below presents how the CUSUM technique detected the TCP SYN flooding 
attack in the incoming traffic during the second ARL period. The corresponding graph 
for the outgoing traffic presented in Appendix A 
 
 
 
However, according to Fig. ‎6.4 which present the detection result on the incoming traffic 
during the second ARL the technique rightfully judged the first two traffic deviations in  
Fig. ‎6.4 as legitimate as the trend progresses.  The same observations were made during 
the second and third ARL analysis (the rest of the graphs are shown in Appendix A Fig. 2 
to Fig. 14), particularly of the false negative classification. According to the evaluation 
results, false classification only occurs at the sudden change in the traffic amplitude.  As 
a result, it can be inferred that the technique is slow in detecting sudden fluctuations in 
the network traffic and hence can incur high false negative ratio if the attacking 
technique is designed to fluctuate the malicious traffic during transmission.  
Despite the limitations, it can also be observed from the evaluation results that the 
CUSUM technique is sensitive and can accurately detect a high-intensity DDoS attack 
from the network flow measurements. According to the evaluation results, the 
technique can confirm a DDoS attack in less than ten seconds as shown in Figure ‎6.3. 
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According to Figure ‎6.3, the attack begun in the twentieth seconds and was confirmed 
(i.e. when it exceeded the upper control limit) within the first five seconds. Moreover, 
the traffic fluctuations were detected near 100% accuracy as shown in Figure ‎6.3 and 
Fig. ‎6.4. Ten seconds response time to attack is indeed fast and can provide enough time 
for mitigation the risk of the attack.  
The graph below presents how the CUSUM technique confirmed the demand of TCP SYN 
flooding attack in average load of the victim. The figure shows how the node is 
consuming its process resource whiles under TCP SYN Flooding attack. 
 
Figure ‎6.5 TCP SYN Flooding attack minister on the one-minute server load 
 
In addition to the traffic analysis, the technique equally reported the impact of the 
anomalous activity in the server load during the attack. The server load CUSUM graph 
provides additional information about the malicious activities as detected and reported 
by the detection technique. More specifically, the server load reports on the demand on 
the server in three different time instances (i.e. one minute, five minutes and fifteen 
minutes). Figure ‎6.5 represents the progressive build-up of the malicious load or the 
impact of the attack on the server load. As shown in Figure ‎6.5 it can be observed that 
the process demand on the server exceeded the control limit during the attack. As the 
incoming network chart reveals malicious network traffic; the server load analysis gives 
insight into how fast the server is heading into the denying of service mode. Contrarily 
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to the existing denying of service detection techniques [61][92][29], the dual analysis of 
both network traffic and server load behaviour provides comprehensive insight into the 
malicious activities and the lifespan of the server in the Hadoop cluster. Thus the 
technique provides the transducer agents with the prerequisite skill for monitoring the 
behaviour of the Hadoop nodes and makes a comprehensive judgement of any malicious 
activities that can prevent legitimate access with further insight into the depleting 
lifespan of the node under attack. Such insightful information can further be leveraged 
to speed up mitigation decisions in response to the attack.     
From the evaluation results, it can be confirmed that the proposed CUSUM technique 
can detect high-intensity attack in less than ten seconds with minimal room for 
misjudgement which in this case did not have any significant impact on the detection 
accuracy. The results also reveal that the CUSUM technique is not swift enough to detect 
fluctuations in the traffic and hence it is likely to misjudge initial results after any 
fluctuation. However, as shown in Table ‎6-4, Figure ‎6.3, Fig. ‎6.4 and Figure ‎6.5 the 
technique nonetheless, provides a novel approach to leveraged flow metrics to detect 
DDoS attacks at Hadoop node-level with high response time.  
6.5.2 Offline performance analysis of the LWMA-Based DDoS detection technique 
Because LWMA is an average based analysis technique, the detection approach is more 
high-level than the CUSUM technique. Unlike CUSUM-based technique which takes a 
granular look at every measurements, LWMA conducts a snapshot analysis of the 
network traffic and the server load. Thus LWMA reports on the state of the network and 
the server load within a given period (e.g. the sliding window).  As explained in Section 
6.3, the sliding window concept was employed in this implementation to serve as a 
window of analysis. The technique considers the volume of each measurements in the 
current window under analysis and determines if the weighted average measurement 
exceeds the control limit (i.e. if it is malicious). Additionally, LWMA considers the 
positions of the metrics to determine their weight before finding the average 
measurements. Essentially, high malicious network traffic or server load measurements 
in a window will subsequently produce malicious window average. Also, the position or 
the time the measurement was captured has a significant impact on the outcome of the 
analysis. For example, if the last three measurements of the current window represents 
normal behaviour, then that will take precedence in the overall judgement for that 
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period. Consequently, the FNR and FPR evaluation will consider the window that failed 
to report an attack as false negative and the window that wrongly reported attack as 
false positive. The merit of such periodic analyses is that it produces snapshot 
behaviour of the network and the server load and hence informed faster response to 
attacks without further analysis of the result compare to the CUSUM technique. The 
assertion is confirmed in the next section which analyses the performance of the LWMA 
technique.  
 
The graph presents the detection result of the LWMA technique during the first ARL. 
The figure indicates a snapshot of legitimate activity until the fifth window when the 
TCP SYN Flooding attack occurred. The fluctuations in the malicious traffic represent 
the impact of the attack. 
 
Fig ‎6.6 LWMA Result of the incoming traffic First ARL 
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The graph below presents the detection result of the LWMA technique during the first 
ARL. The figure indicates that the load on the victim exceeded the control limit or the 
legitimate range during the TCP SYN Flooding attack period. 
 
Fig ‎6.7 LWMA Result One Minute Sever Load First ARL 
The figure below presents the detection result of the LWMA technique during the 
second ARL. The figure indicates that the malicious activity in the incoming traffic 
continued into the second ARL analysis until window 11, 17, 18, 19 and 20 which 
reported the network around the time was legitimate. The corresponding analysis in the 
outgoing traffic is presented in Appendix A. 
 
Fig ‎6.8 LWMA Result Incoming Traffic Second ARL 
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The table presents the evaluation results of how the LWMA technique performed when 
exposed to detect TCP SYN Flooding attack on the Hadoop.  
Table ‎6-5. The Evaluation results of the LWMA-Based technique 
in detecting TCP SYN Flooding attack 
ARL Traffic 
Source 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
First Incoming 
 
 
44 
13 0 0 0.0 0.0 
 
Outgoing 
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Second Incoming 
 
 
 
39 
12 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Outgoing 
 
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
 
Regarding the response time to TCP SYN Flooding attack, LWMA detected and reported 
the attack in the fourth window which represents the first to fifth seconds after the 
attack was launched. Thus, LWMA also detected and confirmed the attack in five 
seconds according to Fig ‎6.6. Furthermore, it can be observed from window position 
four that the technique accurately and timely reported the sudden changes in the 
network traffic. In this instance, the notification of the malicious traffic was immediate 
compared to the progressive approach of the CUSUM technique.  According to Table ‎6-5, 
44 malicious requests were sent during the first ARL. In response, LWMA reported 13 
instances (i.e. windows) where significant malicious metrics were detected. This 
indicates that LWMA captured the 44 malicious network activities in thirteen instances 
during the first ARL. Moreover, Fig ‎6.6 and Fig ‎6.8 equally reported fluctuations in the 
network traffic during the attack period.  
Moreover, it can be observed from Fig ‎6.6 that window 9 and 12 reported a drop in the 
network amplitude during the attack. However, the drop was not significant enough to 
return the traffic to reflect a change from malicious traffic to the legitimate traffic range.  
What the drop indicates is that only a few metrics within the window were considered 
to be normal, but enough malicious measurements were captured during that period, so 
the average traffic within the period was malicious. Incidentally what LWMA is saying in 
this instance is that significant numbers of malicious traffic were captured though there 
was little legitimate traffic during the period under analysis. However, Windows 17, 19 
and 20 in Fig ‎6.6 reported normal network activities during that period.  Likewise, 
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windows 11 to 14 and 17 to 19 in Fig ‎6.8 equally reported normal activities in the 
network traffic during those periods which indeed reflects the state of the Hadoop node 
at the time. It can, therefore, be inferred from the result that the LWMA-based technique 
can project more reflective activities within that period and confirm the overall 
behaviour which was alarming or malicious in this instance.  Regarding the response 
time to attack, it can be inferred from the result that the LWMA-based technique can 
equally detect high-intensity TCP SYN flooding attacks in 5 seconds with 0% FNR and 
FPR.  
A.   Determination of the FPR and FNR under the LWMA technique 
The determination of FNR and FPR in LWMA takes a different viewpoint than the 
CUSUM technique. In the LWMA technique, the determination is made based on the 
reported windows rather than the individual measurements which constitute the 
window. Thus because LWMA evaluates and reports on the weighted average of the 
window, the final determination ( the weighted average) is rather considered to be 
either true or false positive or false negative.  For example, if the LWMA-based 
technique reports malicious weighted average during a period of normal activity, then 
that will be classified as FN or vice versa. According to Table ‎6-5, the 13 anomalous 
windows reported in the first ARL and 12 anomalous windows reported in the second 
ARL were both accurate periodic analysis based on the FNR and FPR results. The results 
also confirmed the LWMA-based technique as sensitive to high-intensity TCP SYN 
flooding attack. Furthermore, the technique accurately reported the behaviour in the 
outgoing traffic during the first and second ARL results as legitimate. Thus the result is 
consistent with the outcome of the CUSUM results which also reported zero anomalous 
traffic in all the three ARLs.   
B.    Analysis of the effect of the TCP SYN Flooding attack on server load  
Regarding the effect of the malicious activities on the server load, the LWMA-based 
technique rather reported abnormal average load in all the windows according to 
Fig ‎6.7. Unlike the CUSUM one minute server load graph, the LWMA one minute server 
load graph projects a more reflective impact regarding how much the server is affected 
by the attack over time and also provide a substantial indication to predict the eventual 
consequences within a time frame easily.    
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Overall, it has been proven that the CUSUM-based and the LWMA-based techniques can 
detect TCP SYN flooding attacks from the bandwidth utilisation and average server load 
metrics with less than 20 seconds response time. Contrary to other current detection 
approaches [60], the novel techniques employ a dual analytical approach to observing 
both the network traffic and the server load at the same time. As a result, they provide 
more insightful information about the attack with a good indication of the lifespan of the 
victim. The approach will not only improve mitigation time to DDoS attack but will also 
assist decision making by indicating the lifespan (i.e. deterioration effect on the 
processor) of the victim. 
6.6 Offline evaluation of the detection of low-intensity UDP flooding attack 
The UDP Flooding attack was set up to simulate a low-intensity attack in the cluster. The 
aim is to transmit malicious traffics alongside legitimate traffic.  Consequently, the UDP 
attack traffic transmitted within the range of 600 KB/s and 8000 KB/s which are similar 
to legitimate traffic range according to the legitimate behaviour values presented in 
Table ‎6-2. According to the training results as presented in Table ‎6-2, the transducer 
agent is trained to use a legitimate traffic target of 5000 KB/s for both the outgoing and 
the incoming traffic. Furthermore, the agent has been trained to believe that any traffic 
within the upper and lower control range should be classified as legitimate and should 
not raise the alarm. Essentially, the attack is set up to transmit malicious traffic at a rate 
lower than the legitimate behaviour. In this case, it is expected that the CUSUM-based 
technique will detect this low-intensity attack, particularly at the lower control limit. 
The attack started transmitting from 10:15:50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
 
The table below presents the knowledge (i.e. belief) of the normal behaviour obtained 
from the CUSUM algorithm at   the end of the training period on the node. 
Table ‎6-6 The Agent's Current belief as a result of the CUSUM training 
Agent’s Current 
belief 
Upper control limit 
 
Lower control limit Target 
 
Incoming Traffic 
KB/s 
80976 -80976 5000 
Outgoing Traffic 
KB/s 
78688 -78688 5000 
One Minute Load % 1.11 -1.11 
 
1.0 
Five Minutes Load % 0.25 -0.25 1.5 
 
Fifteen Minutes 
Load %  
0.1 -0.1 1.5 
 
The graph presents the result of the CUSUM technique after analysing the incoming 
traffic to detect low-intensity UDP flooding attack. 
 
Fig ‎6.9 UDP flooding attack result of in the incoming traffic 
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The graph below presents the result of the CUSUM algorithm after analysing the 
outgoing traffic to detect low-intensity UDP Flooding attack. 
 
 
6.6.1 Offline performance evaluation of the of the CUSUM DDoS-based technique 
in detecting the low-intensity UDP flooding attack  
According to the Fig ‎6.9 all malicious traffic from 10:15:50 to 10:16:00 were within the 
legitimate range, and so the technique did not flag them as malicious. Indeed, the 
decision unveils a limitation with the CUSUM-based technique, which is the technique is 
sensitive to high-intensity attacks, according to the TCP SYN flooding attack evaluation 
results. However, this result shows that the CUSUM-based technique is ineffective in 
detecting low-intensity attacks. The reason for such performance is attributed to the 
fact that the deviation of each CUSUM analysis is not added to the high side unless it 
exceeds the target on the high side. Likewise, the deviation will not be added to the low 
side unless the outcome is far from the target on the low side. Consequently, the further 
the measured network metrics are from the target (i.e. the belief), the higher the high 
side or low side CUSUM builds up until it exceeds the upper or lower control limit to 
confirm anomalous activities. Additionally, the technique returns the deviation to zero if 
the outcome of the CUSUM-based analysis is on target. So what Fig ‎6.10 also indicates is 
that the results from all the malicious traffic analysed during the attack period were on 
target, and so the high side and the low side deviation returned to zero. Thus, the 
CUSUM-based technique confirmed the network traffic to be within the legitimate range. 
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However, it can be observed from 10:16:02 to 10:16:05 that the measured traffic 
exceeded the target significantly, but that was not high enough to cause the CUSUM of 
the deviation to exceed the upper control limit to raise the alert, so it was still classified 
as legitimate. At this point, although the traffic has exceeded the target the upper 
control limit (upper control limit are determined during the training period) from the 
normal behaviour was also further to detect the low, malicious traffic.  
The result further reveals another challenge regarding the definition of the CUSUM 
upper and lower control limit, particularly in this context. The challenge is because the 
control limits are based on the normal behaviour and also set during the training period 
they remain static during the detection stage until new training is conducted. Not only 
that the values of the control limits also depend on the actual traffic and server load 
behaviour of the node. So even if another training is conducted the result will end up the 
same if there’s no behavioural change on the node. To improve the setup of the control 
limit, a more dynamic approach that is based on the target can be employed. For 
example, a threshold to measure the number of metrics that exceed the target can be set. 
The threshold can then be used to flag the measurements that exceed the target but not 
significant enough to add to the CUSUM. Thus if the value of five is defined as a target 
threshold, then an alert will be raised if such results are detected.  
According to Fig ‎6.10, the outgoing CUSUM result equally reported false negative results 
during the attack. Because the technique failed to detect the malicious TCP SYN ACK  in 
the victim’s outgoing traffic.  The server load analysis in Fig ‎6.11  did not report any 
significant change in the server during the attack. The server load result can, however, 
be inferred as accurate because the traffic request was largely within the normal 
behaviour. So it is expected that not much will change on the server load ultimately.  
The Evaluation of the performance of the CUSUM-based technique in the experiment 
has revealed that the technique is very ineffective when it comes to detection low-
intensity attack. That means the CUSUM-based technique is unlikely to be effective in 
detecting masqueraded attacks. According to Table ‎6-7, the ineffectiveness is confirmed 
by the 100% false positive ratio reported by the evaluation results.   
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The graph below presents the result of the CUSUM technique after analysing the 
outgoing traffic to detect low-intensity UDP Flooding attack. 
 
Fig ‎6.11 UDP Flooding attack result one minute load Second ARL 
 
The table presents the evaluation results for the CUSUM algorithm when exposed to 
detect UDP Flooding attack on the victim. 
Table ‎6-7 The Evaluation results of the CUSUM technique of in detecting UPD attack 
ARL Traffic 
Source 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
S 
 
First Incoming 
 
 
87 
0 0 87 0.0 100 1 
 
Outgoing 
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 
Second Incoming 
 
 
79 
0 0 79 0.0 100 1 
Outgoing 
 
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 
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6.6.2 Offline performance evaluation of the LWMA-based technique in detecting 
low-intensity UDP flooding Attack  
 The LWMA-based technique was evaluated under the same experimental set up as the 
CUSUM-based technique. Moreover, the same training period was maintained for both 
techniques to ensure equal exposure to the experiment set up and training conditions. 
Because LWMA only decides on the weighted average of the sliding window, a longer 
ARL value (i.e. 20) was used in this experiment to allow a broader coverage of the 
normal behaviour of the node. However, the SW value of 5 (i.e. measurements per each 
window) was maintained for the analysis and detection section. One significant 
difference between the CUSUM and LWMA technique is the definition of the upper and 
lower control limits.  CUSUM defines the control limits as a product of σ(sigma) of the 
normal measurement. However, the LWMA-technique defines the control limits as the 
maximum and minimum average traffic or server load obtained during the training 
period. Thus the LWMA-technique sets the control limits based on the exact average 
values without making provision for any predetermined targets and allowable slacks 
from the target. Unlike CUSUM-based technique, the LWMA-based technique 
determines the legitimate behaviour based on a more reflective behaviour of the nodes 
(i.e. the technique does not make room for any assumptions). The current knowledge of 
the normal behaviour in  
 
Table ‎6-3 is maintained in this experiment for the analysis and detection of the UDP 
flooding attack. 
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The graph below presents the detection of the UDP flooding attack in the incoming 
traffic during the first ARL analysis. The traffic above the upper control limit represents 
the malicious traffic detected 
 
 
Fig ‎6.12  LWMA Result for Incoming Traffic First ARL 
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The graph below presents the detection results of the UDP flooding attack in the 
outgoing traffic during the first ARL analysis. The traffic above the upper control limit 
represents the malicious traffic detected 
 
 
Fig ‎6.13 LWMA Result Outgoing Traffic First ARL 
 
The performance evaluation results of the LWMA technique is present in Fig ‎6.12 and 
Fig ‎6.13. From Fig ‎6.13 the MapReduce activities were accurately captured by the 
LWMA technique from the first window to the sixth window; representing the first 
thirty-two seconds of the legitimate activities. The manifestation of the malicious traffic 
started from window seven (i.e. from 10:15:50). Furthermore, it can be noted that 
window seven registered a drop and then a gradual rise of the traffic activities until the 
traffic amplitude exceeded the control limit. Ones again the LWMA technique precisely 
captured the malicious traffic from the seventh window and discriminated the sturdy 
malicious network behaviour during that period. Furthermore, the technique 
responded to the attack within five seconds range. 
According to the performance, the LWMA technique has maintained consistent 
response time over two different types of DDoS attacks (i.e. UDP and TCP SYN flooding).  
Moreover, Fig ‎6.12 and Fig ‎6.13 reported all the fluctuations in the traffic and also 
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7 to 12 reported the same malicious manifestation in the network traffic as reported by 
the CUSUM technique except that the LWMA technique provides consistent accuracy in 
detecting either UDP flooding or TCP SYN flooding attacks.    
Concerning the impact of the malicious incoming traffic on the outgoing traffic, Fig ‎6.12 
reports that the node equally exhibited abnormal outgoing traffic during the attack. This 
indicates that the server can exceed the legitimate threshold and eventually 
overwhelms its process capacity whiles responding to the excessive UDP requests from 
the attacker. The observation further reveals the importance of the dual analysis of the 
network traffic to detect anomalous activities. Furthermore, the performance evaluation 
results presented in Table ‎6-8 indicates that 87 malicious packets were sent during the 
first ARL and the LWMA technique confirmed DDoS attacks in 13 windows. Likewise, 
105 malicious packets were sent during the second ARL which DDoS attacks were 
confirmed in 19 windows. All the malicious windows equally represent all the periods 
the attacks occurred. Concerning the results, it can be concluded that the LWMA-based 
technique is sensitive to low-intensity attacks contrary to the CUSUM-based technique.  
Regarding the impact on the server load, Fig ‎6.14 reports that the load consistently 
exceeded its normal threshold as it responds to the UDP packets from the attacker. The 
result also indicates that the server is being overwhelmed by the demands it is receiving, 
and hence it can run out of capacity to meet further requests.  
From the outcome of the evaluation, it can be inferred that the LWMA-based technique 
is more sensitive to low-intensity attacks than the CUSUM-based.  While the CUSUM-
based technique failed to maintain consistent accuracy across these two attacks, the 
LWMA-based technique has been consistent both in the response time and sensitivity to 
TCP SYN flooding and UPD flooding attacks.   
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The graph below presents the impact of the UDP flooding attack on the node during the 
first ARL analysis. The average measurement above the upper control limit represents 
the malicious load detected. The impact analysis result of the five and fifteen minutes’ 
measurements are presented in Appendix A 
 
 
Fig ‎6.14 LWMA Result One Minute Sever Load First ARL 
 
The table shows the performance of the LWMA technique when exposed to 
detect the low-intensity UDP flooding attack.  
Table ‎6-8 The Evaluation results of the LWMA technique of in detecting UPD attack 
ARL Traffic 
Source 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
S 
 
First Incoming 
 
 
87 
13 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 
 
Outgoing 
2 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 
Second Incoming 
 
 
105 
19 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 
Outgoing 
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6.7 Analysis of the effect of the training period on detection accuracy 
In Section 6.5.1, it was confirmed that the CUSUM technique is ineffective when it comes 
to detecting low-intensity UDP flooding attacks. Moreover, one of the key reasons was 
attributed to the fact that the training period adopted for that experiment resulted in 
setting the control limits significantly high to detect when an attack is transmitting with 
low intensity. Consequently, the CUSUM technique recorded high false positive ratios.  
Given such observation, this section of the experiment will investigate the effect of the 
training period on the detection accuracy of the two detection techniques by 
considering the false positive and false negative rates. The evaluation of the training 
period is indeed essential to establish if the training period has an effect on the 
detection accuracy and also ascertain the best training periods for both CUSUM and 
LWMA techniques in terms of the detection accuracy.  
 In this experiment, the ARL and SW values for the analysis and detection stages remain 
constant. Moreover, the value of the target traffic and the average server values are also 
kept constant during the training periods.   
6.7.1 Analysing the effect of the training period on the CUSUM-based technique in 
detecting TCP SYN Flooding attack 
This section will analyse the effect of the training period on the performance of the 
DDoS detection algorithm. The aim is to suggest the best training period for effective 
performance.  
A.   Comparing the effect of the training period on the determination of the control 
limits 
Two training periods (i.e. one minute long and one hour long) were adopted.  The first 
experiment was conducted with transducer agent trained with one-minute long 
measurements (i.e. 60 samples of network traffic and load measurements) representing 
one-minute long metrics collected during legitimate MapReduce job. Likewise, the 
second experiment was conducted with a transducer agent trained with one hour long 
(i.e. 3600 samples network traffic and server load measurements) of legitimate 
MapReduce job. Table ‎6-9 presents the comparative values of the tuning parameters for 
both one minute and one-hour training periods.  
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The table compares the outcome of one minute and one-hour training period. 
The outcome represents the agent’s current knowledge of the normal behaviour 
of the interfaced Hadoop node. 
Table ‎6-9 The Agent's Current belief of the one-minute and one-hour CUSUM training 
One-minute Training One-hour Training 
Agent’s Current 
belief 
(output of  the 
CUSUM analysis) 
Upper  
control 
limit 
 
Lower 
control 
limit 
Target 
 
Upper 
control 
limit 
 
Lower 
control 
limit 
Target 
 
Incoming Traffic 
KB/s 
1053 -1053 5000 80976 -80976 5000 
Outgoing Traffic 
KB/s 
46138 
 
-46138 5000 84443 -84443 5000 
One Minute Load 4.44 
 
-4.44 
 
1.0 1.1 -1.1 1.0 
 
Five Minutes 
Load 
1.11 -1.11 1.5 0.24 -0.24 1.5 
 
 
Fifteen Minutes 
Load  
1.11 
 
-1.11 1.5 0.1 -0.1 1.5 
 
Essentially, the training period has a great effect on the upper and lower control limit of 
the CUSUM technique. According to the control limits for the network traffics, longer 
training period will result in high upper and lower control limits. Likewise, a shorter 
training period (in this case one minute) equally reduces the upper and lower control 
limit. However, the results of one-minute average server loads for both training periods 
give a different view of the theory. In this instant, the one-minute training period set 
higher and lower control limits than the one-hour training period.  The occurrence can 
be explained as the effect of the behaviour of the load during the one-minute period. 
Thus, the upper and lower control limits are the product of standard deviation σ of the 
load and traffic over time according to the CUSUM technique. So, the one-minute period 
presented high variation in behaviour which subsequently affected the upper and lower 
control limits for the CUSUM of server load. By comparing the one minute and one hour 
upper and lower control limits, it can be inferred that the control limits are largely 
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determined by the manifestation of the activities (i.e. variations in the measurement 
captured) rather than the length of the training period.  
The same outcome is confirmed by comparing the one hour control limit value of the 
incoming traffic in Table ‎6-9 with the 30 minutes control limit value of the incoming 
network value in Table ‎6-2. Although the one-hour training period used 1800 additional 
measurements to train the agent about the incoming traffic, it produced the same result 
as the thirty minutes of training.  It can, therefore, be concluded from the comparative 
analysis of the control limit values that, a Hadoop node with high volumes of traffic or 
activities is likely to set a higher control limit by use of the CUSUM technique than the 
node with fewer activities or traffic. Indeed the control limit has the direct effect on the 
ability to detect malicious activities.  
B.    Effect of the training period on the detection accuracy 
Regarding how the technique performed with one-minute long training, Table ‎6-10 
presents the performance evaluation results. According to the results, the CUSUM 
technique is ineffective in detecting DDoS attack with a short training period, and the 
reason is manifested in the false positive rates for both ARL analyses. Thus, the 
technique falsely classified legitimate traffics as malicious due to the significant drop in 
the control limit according to Table ‎6-9. It is therefore inferred from the results that, 
unlike the one-minute server load control limit, there was less volume of traffic in the 
incoming network traffic hence the lower control limit. The same can be said of the 
outcome of the second ARL analyses.  
However, the performance of the one-hour training period produced equal accurate 
results as the thirty minutes training period (see Table ‎6-4). According to the 
performance evaluation results in Table ‎6-10, the technique is more accurate and 
sensitive to DDoS attack with a one-hour training period. Even though the evaluation 
results registered 6.7% and 10.26% false negative rates, the cause is rather attributed 
to the swiftness in responding to variation in the traffic rather than the effect of the 
training period. Nonetheless, the technique is confirmed accurate and sensitive to DDoS 
attacks with a one-hour training period.  
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The table below compares the detection results based on the current belief of the 
normal behaviour of the node presented in Table ‎6-9. 
Table ‎6-10 CUSUM detection results with one-minute and one-hour training 
 CUSUM detection results with a 
one-minute training period 
CUSUM detection results with a one-
hour training period  
ARL Traffic 
Source 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
AS AD FP FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
 
 
First 
Incoming 
 
 
48 
69 22 0 31.89 0 48 
 
45 0 3 0 6.7 
 
Outgoing 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Second 
Incoming 
 
 
43 
64 19  29.69 0 43 
 
39 0 4 0 10.26 
Outgoing 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
. 
6.7.2 Effect of the training period on the LWMA technique in detecting TCP SYN 
flooding attack 
This section of the experiment seeks to investigate how training period affects the 
performance of LWMA in detecting TCP SYN flooding attack. The same experimental 
setup was maintained for both the CUSUM and LWMA techniques to expose the two 
techniques to the same conditions. The experiment aims to establish the trade-offs 
between the training period and detection accuracy.  Consequently, the FNR and FPR 
values are used to evaluate the performance of the technique. The experiment was 
conducted in two different instances as explained earlier.  
A.   Comparing the effect of the training period on the determination of the control 
limits 
Table ‎6-11 presents the training effects of the one minute and the one hour training 
periods. Contrary to the CUSUM technique it is observed from the results that both one 
minute and one-hour long training set the same upper control limit for the incoming the 
and outgoing traffic. This is an apparent indication that the Hadoop node maintained a 
consistent periodic behaviour on the traffic for the entire one hour. However, the same 
cannot be said of the lower control limits for both traffics. Whiles the one-minute 
training maintains a high lower control limit; the one-hour training settled on a much 
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lower control limit. Apparently, the network traffic experienced much lower activities 
after the first one minute hence the difference. However, the behaviour of the server 
load presented a consistent behaviour for both the one minute and one-hour training 
periods. Consequently, it can be inferred that the changes in the network behaviour 
after the first one minute was not significant enough to cause any significant shift in the 
server load.  Another consistent inference is that shorter training period is unlikely to 
capture the substantial behaviour of the server (as confirmed by the lower control limit 
values) and can, as a result, affect the detection accuracy.  The observation (particularly 
on the lower control limit) is consistent with the training behaviour of the training 
result of the CUSUM technique.  
The table below compares the training outcome of the one-minute and one-hour 
training periods under the LWMA technique. The outcome represents the agent’s 
current belief of the normal behaviour of the node.    
Table ‎6-11 The Agent's Current belief of the LWMA  training 
One-minute Training 
One-hour Training 
Agent’s Current belief 
(Output of LWMA 
analysis) 
Upper control 
 limit 
 
Lower control  
limit 
Upper control 
 limit 
 
Lower control  
limit 
 Incoming Traffic KB/s 889 73 889 1 
Outgoing Traffic KB/s 2588 28 2588 1 
One Minute Load 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.1 
Five Minutes Load 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
0.1 
Fifteen Minutes Load  0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 
 
B.   Effect of the training period on the detection accuracy 
Concerning how the two training sessions affected the performance of the LWMA 
technique, no significant effect was observed. According to the one-minute training 
result in Table ‎6-12, the LWMA technique classified thirteen windows as malicious (i.e. 
containing high malicious measurements) during the first ARL analyses for incoming 
traffic. In the same manner, twelve windows were classified as malicious during the 
second ARL.  Incidentally, the one hour-based performance results in Table ‎6-12, 
confirms that the agent performed with the same level of accuracy when trained for 
one-hour long. According to the two results, the LWMA technique is accurate and 
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sensitive to detect DDoS attack with both short and long-term training. The observation 
is consistent with the upper control values of both training periods. Thus, the LWMA 
technique was less affected by the training period compared with CUSUM, particular 
when judging malicious activities based on the incoming traffic.  It can, therefore, be 
confirmed from the results that, accurate periodic analysis of Hadoop node behaviour is 
not significantly affected by the training period. That means LWMA technique will be 
quicker in retraining its knowledge to adapt to changes in behaviour contrary to the 
CUSUM technique which requires longer training to be more accurate in its decisions. 
Consequently, the LWMA technique is considered to be more dynamic regarding 
adaptation to changes in the behaviour of the Hadoop node than the CUSUM technique. 
Because it requires less training period to adapt its belief to change in node behaviour.  
 The table below compares the detection results based on the current belief of the 
normal behaviour of the node presented in Table ‎6-11. 
Table ‎6-12 LWMA detection results with one-minute and one-hour training 
 Impact of one minute 
training period  
Impact of one hour 
training period 
 
 
 
 
 
ARL Traffic 
Source 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
AS AD FP FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
First Incoming 
 
 
44 
13 0 0 0.0 0.0 44 
 
13 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Outgoing 
 
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Second Incoming 
 
 
 
39 
12 0 0 0.0 0.0 39 
 
12 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Outgoing 
 
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
 
From the performance results of the CUSUM technique shown in Table ‎6-10, it is 
confirmed that a longer training period (i.e. above thirty minutes) is ideal if high 
accuracy is expected. It is also observed that a one-hour training period does not make 
much difference in the detection accuracy when compared with the detection accuracy 
of the thirty minutes training period shown in Table ‎6-4. So, if possible, the training 
should be conducted within the range of thirty minutes to one hour, especially with the 
CUSUM technique. However, the LWMA technique has shown to be effective even with 
one-minute training.  Consequently, it is suggested that the LWMA technique should be 
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considered when faster adaptation to changes in behaviour is required. On the other 
hand, the CUSUM technique should be considered if granular analyses and classification 
of the behaviour of the node are required.  
The next section will also consider how the two techniques also perform when exposed 
to low intensity (UDP flooding) attack in the same experimental setup.  
6.7.3 Analysis of the effect of the training period on the CUSUM-based technique 
in detecting UDP flooding attack 
This section will analyse the effect of the training period on the performance of the 
DDoS detection algorithm. The aim is to suggest the best training period for effective 
performance.  
A.    Effect of the training period on the detection accuracy 
Relatively, the CUSUM technique has maintained the same ineffective performance 
under low-intensity attack (UDP flooding in this instance). When CUSUM was exposed 
to the low-intensity attack, it was observed, according to Table ‎6-13 that, the technique 
is first of all not effective when tasked to detect low-intensity attacks. Secondly, the 
significant drop in the upper control limit further incurred higher false positive ratio as 
presented in Table ‎6-13 predictably; shorter training period contributed to the high 
false positive ratio. Likewise, in the one-minute training in Table ‎6-13, no significant 
improvement was noted when the same experiment was conducted with an hour 
training belief. It was observed from that; there was an improvement in the FPR 
however; the longer training period did not improve the performance anymore better 
than reported in the thirty minutes training period in Section 6.4.1.  What has further 
confirmed in this case was that thirty minutes and a one-hour training period could 
produce the same level of detection accuracy.   
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The table below compares the CUSUM technique’s results of detecting UDP flooding 
attack with one-minute training period and the detection results with a one-hour 
training period. 
Table ‎6-13 CUSUM detection results with one-minute and one-hour training 
 Detection results with one-
minute training 
Detection results with one-hour 
training 
ARL Traffic 
Source 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
First Incoming 
 
 
87 
110 29 6 26.37 5.46  
87 
0 0 87 0 100 
 
Outgoing 
1 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 
Second Incoming 
 
 
79 
88 5 4 5.67 4.55  
79 
0 0 79 0 100 
Outgoing 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
6.7.4 Analysis of the effect of the training period on LWMA-based technique in 
detecting UDP flooding attack 
A.   Effect of the training period on the detection accuracy 
The evaluation results under this experiment also confirm the consistency in the 
performance of the LWMA technique regarding the impact of the training period on the 
detection accuracy. From Table ‎6-14, it is observed that LWMA maintained the same 
level of accuracy regardless of the type of attack and training period. Compared with the 
performance under the TCP SYN flooding attack, the results confirm that the LWMA 
technique will produce the same result even with a shorter training period. Overall, it is 
inferred that the technique can produce a consistent level of accuracy regardless of the 
volatility in the Hadoop cluster.  
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The table below compares the LWMA technique’s results of detecting UDP flooding 
attack with one-minute training period and the detection results with a one-hour 
training period.  
Table ‎6-14 LWMA detection results with one-minute and one-hour training 
 Detection results with one-
minute training 
Detection results with one-hour 
training 
ARL Traffic 
Source 
AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
AS AD FP FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
First Incoming 
 
 
87 
13 0 0 0.0 0.0  
87 
13 0 0 0.0 0.0 
 
Outgoing 
2 0 0 0.0 0.0 2 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Second Incoming 
 
 
105 
19 0 0 0.0 0.0  
105 
19 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Outgoing 
 
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
 
6.8 Real-time performance evaluation of the framework 
The performances of the transducer agent’s DoS detection skills or techniques have 
been evaluated in previous sections (see Sect. 6.3, Sect. 6.4, Sect. 6.5 and Sect. 6.6) to 
establish their effectiveness. The first evaluation adopted a controlled methodology 
which allowed for the evaluation and performance analysis in a controlled manner. 
According to the evaluation results, the proposed DoS detection skills are effective and 
able to detect DDoS attacks (i.e. UPD and TCP SYN flooding attacks). However, the 
methodology does not expose the framework to real Hadoop environment conditions, 
and thereby the results are exclusive of any operational or environmental impact on the 
performance. Essentially, any potential operational or environmental impact must be 
considered in the evaluation to establish how the framework will perform in a real 
Hadoop environment. Consequently, this section of the evaluation will seek to 
understand how the proposed framework will perform in a real Hadoop environment 
amidst any potential impact.   
6.8.1  Criteria of the real-time experiment  
A live experiment gives the agents full exposure to the Hadoop environment and also 
allows a holistic evaluation of the framework. Furthermore, the collective performance 
of each layer is assessed regarding the overall response time to DDoS attack in the 
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Hadoop cluster. In this experiment, the agents are deployed to interface with the 
Hadoop nodes to monitor the behaviour and report anomalous behaviour in real time. 
Thus as the transducer agents are observing each node, IC agent will also be monitoring 
its message queue to analyse and respond to the reports from the transducer agents.  
The real-time experiment was set up to model a live DDoS attack on a Hadoop cluster. 
The objective of the experiment is to; 
1. Evaluate the overall performance of the framework in the event of an attack in a live 
Hadoop cluster. 
2. Evaluate the response time to DDoS attack at the node level in a real Hadoop 
environment. 
3. Evaluate how long it takes the IC agent to confirm DDoS attack in a real Hadoop 
environment.  
4. Evaluate the effect of the framework in detecting a DDoS attack on live Hadoop 
cluster.  
6.8.2 Experiment setup and real case experiment scenarios 
Given the objectives listed above, the framework was fully deployed to sit on the 
Hadoop cluster via the UI agent. The UI agent was used to create the description of the 
Hadoop nodes and DDoS attack according to the ontological model presented in Chapter 
5. The framework was evaluated in two real case scenarios to detect TCP and UDP 
flooding attacks on the four-node Hadoop testbed.  
A.   First scenario: real-time detection of botnet attack in Hadoop cluster  
1. Description of the experiment 
In the first attack scenario, the attacker used hping3 to form a botnet of two nodes to 
remotely launch TCP SYN flooding attack from the cluster as depicted in Fig ‎6.15 [27]. 
 The figure describes the experiment set up and the attacking technique employed to 
carry out a TCP SYN flooding attack experiment. According to Fig ‎6.15, the secured 
perimeter of the Hadoop cluster was compromised to create the botnet of Node1 and 
Node 2 to launch the TCP SYN flooding attack from the Hadoop cluster.  
 
 The first scenario aims to evaluate the framework’s ability to detect a DDoS attack on 
the compromised nodes and also confirm the attack behaviour when a Hadoop cluster 
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fall victim of a Botnet attack. A MapReduce job was executed on the testbed during the 
attack and also for eight hours to establish legitimate activity on the Hadoop cluster. 
The legitimate period allows the transducer agents ample time to train their beliefs of 
all possible normal behaviour of the Hadoop nodes. For real-time and distributed 
analysis of the proposed mechanism, an extended period of training is recommended to 
establish substantial intelligence of the normal behaviours of the Hadoop node 
particularly in a volatile environment such as the Hadoop framework.   
 
The Botnet attack scenario models a real case where the attack is launched from 
multiple zombies (in this case node 1 and node 2) within the Hadoop cluster at a single 
victim outside the network. The intent is to increase the attack traffic intensity to attain 
DDoS attack on the target within shortest a possible time minute. In this experiment, the 
attack is launched during legitimate MapReduce activity to allow realistic evaluation of 
the framework’s ability to discriminate between normal and abnormal traffic.  The 
scenario assumes both zombies will be transmitting at a high rate to generate sufficient 
traffic to crash the victim in one minute. Therefore the intent is to evaluate the 
framework’s ability to detect high-intensity attack in one minute concerning the 
evaluation criteria.  
A Botnet activity denies legitimate access and at the same time overwhelm server’s 
processor’s queue with an excessive demand that can eventually crash the zombie 
machine if not mitigated on time. An ARL > 1 was chosen to allow sufficient period to 
not misconstrue a legitimate peak activity (particularly during Hadoop backup) as 
malicious measurements. Additionally, three ARL decisions were evaluated in the 
Botnet DDoS attack scenario to ascertain how the framework performed against the 
performance evaluation criteria used. The performance was evaluated in both detection 
stages; the DDoS detection by the transducer agents and the DDoS report fusing 
technique to confirm DDoS by IC agent.    
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The botnet model describes the experiment set up and the attacking technique 
employed for the experiment. The secured perimeter of the Hadoop cluster was 
compromised to create the botnet of Node1 and Node 2 to launch the TCP SYN flooding 
attack from the Hadoop cluster.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig ‎6.15 Model of Botnet attack scenario 
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The model describes the experiment set up and the attacking technique employed for 
the experiment. The attacker first compromised the secured perimeter of the Hadoop 
cluster to have access to the victim and then launch a UDP flooding attack from outside 
the cluster to the victim which Node 3 in the model.   
 
MapReduce Client
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MapReduce Job
Attacker
                                                              
Victim of the DDoS attack in in the 
cluster 
Malicious UDP 
traffic to victim
node
 2
node 
1
node
 3
node
 4
 
Fig ‎6.16 Model of UDP flooding attack scenario 
 
2. Performance Evaluation Criteria  
The performance of the implementation in both scenarios was evaluated regarding the 
same criteria presented in Section 6.3.  
3. Analysis of how the framework performed in detecting and confirming a DDoS 
attack on the Hadoop node 
Table ‎6-15 presents the evaluation result of node 1 (one of the compromised nodes). 
According to the result, the framework can confirm a DDoS attack on node 1 in 19 s. A 
response time of 19 s to attack indeed provides significant time for mitigation before 
the node gets into a critical stage. What the result also indicates is that a high-intensity 
attack capable of crushing a Hadoop node in one minute can be detected with enough 
elapse time for mitigation.   
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The detection result for the first ARL analysis if showed in Fig ‎6.17 and Fig ‎6.18 showed 
the impact of the attack on the incoming traffic and how the CUSUM detected and 
confirmed the anomalies in the incoming traffic. Likewise, Fig ‎6.18 present the impact of 
the attack on the outgoing traffic. Furthermore, Fig ‎6.18 shows how the CUSUM 
technique detected anomalies and also confirmed the attack on the outgoing traffic.  
 
According to Fig ‎6.17, the first anomaly was detected on node 1 in the incoming traffic 
four seconds after the attack was launched and this occurred at 11:59:42. Under the 
similar circumstance, it will be expected that the malicious activities on the outgoing 
traffic, first exceed the control limit but that was not the case in this experiment.  
 
According to Fig ‎6.18, the attack (i.e. the malicious TCP SYN requests) manifested in the 
outgoing traffic from 11:59:40. However, Fig ‎6.17  also shows that node 1 experienced 
malicious response from the victim during the attack, so much to flag anomalous 
network activities before the outgoing request exceeded the control limit. The 
observation indeed confirms that real-time analysis of both outgoing and incoming 
network traffic can increase the response time to attack.  In this scenario, the agent 
flagged rather the anomalous activity on the incoming traffic when it exceeded the 
upper control limit before outgoing traffic exceeded the control limit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 
 
The graph below depicts hoe the CUSUM analysed and judge the incoming traffic during 
the first ARL analysis.  
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Fig ‎6.17 CUSUM result chart for incoming traffic in the first ARL on node 1 
 
The graph below depicts hoe the CUSUM analysed and judge the outgoing traffic during 
the first ARL analysis.  
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 Fig ‎6.18 CUSUM result chart for outgoing traffic in the first ARL on node 1 
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As the attack continued, constant buildups of anomalies were also detected in the 
incoming traffic during the second and third ARL analysis. It was also observed that the 
agent also reported abnormal behaviour in the incoming traffic which also confirmed 
the characteristics of a TCP SYN flooding attack. 
Fig ‎6.19 presents the impact on the TCP SYN flooding attack on the server load for the 
first one minute. The figure depicts how the CUSUM technique analysed the impact and 
the detection of the anomalous load on the victim. According to Fig ‎6.18, the agent 
reported constant drops in the outgoing network activity on the node before the attack 
was launched. The drop in the outgoing traffic equally reflects the drop in the first one-
minute load activity presented in Fig ‎6.19. It can, therefore, be inferred from the 
observation that, there was a change (a drop in the process demands) on the normal 
activity before the attack occurred. The effect of the drop in the load equally affected 
how the malicious activities quickly manifested in the average server load. Nonetheless, 
the benefits of analysing the server load and the network traffic at the same time are 
confirmed by the timely detection of the anomalous activities and sudden change of the 
node’s behaviour.  
 
The graph below depicts how the CUSUM technique accessed the first one minute load 
of the load during the first ARL analysis. The observation made indicates a drop in the 
load which is generally a reflection of a drop of activities on the Hadoop node. 
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 Fig ‎6.19 CUSUM result chart for first one minute load in the first ARL on node 1 
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The table presents the evaluation results of the real-time detection of the TCP SYN 
flooding attack with the CUSUM technique on Node 1.  
 
Table ‎6-16 Table I: DDoS detection evaluation on node 1 
Attack launch time = 11:59:38 First Anomaly detected time: 11:59:42 
Response Time: 00:19   Attack confirmed Time 12:00:01 
ARL Traffic Source AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
First Incoming  
0 
1 0 0 0 0 
Outgoing 0 0 0 0 0 
Second Incoming 
 
 
8 
 
8 0 0 0 0 
Outgoing 8 0 0 0 0 
Third Incoming  
8 
6 0 0 0 0 
Outgoing 8 0 0 0 0 
 
Regarding the detection accuracy of the CUSUM technique, the agent detected attack 
accurately with both FPR and FNR reporting 0% as showed in Table ‎6-16. The eight 
anomalies reported in Table ‎6-16 is equally captured by Fig ‎6.21 which represents the 
second ARL outgoing traffic CUSUM result charts of node 1.   
 
Fig ‎6.20 which represents the second ARL incoming traffic CUSUM result charts of node 
1, the technique can also capture the fluctuations in the traffic in real time.  
Fig ‎6.20 captures the gradual build of the attack intensity on the node and the eight 
anomalies reported in the incoming traffic due to the intense TCP SYN requests 
transmitting from the zombie (i.e. the compromised node).  Similarly, Fig ‎6.21 also 
proves continues transmission of abnormal traffic during the attack. Furthermore, both 
outgoing and incoming traffic analysis confirmed attack to provide further intrinsic 
insight into the behaviour of the attack.   
The graph below depicts the outocome of  the CUSUM analysis of the incoming traffic 
during the second ARL analysis.  
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Fig ‎6.20 CUSUM result chart for incoming traffic in the second ARL on node 1 
 
The graph below depicts the outocome of  the CUSUM analysis of the outgoing traffic 
during the second ARL analysis.  
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Fig ‎6.21 CUSUM result chart for outgoing traffic in the second ARL on node 1 
 
Table ‎6-17  presents the performance results from the second compromised zombie or 
Node 2. According to the evaluation results, the agent is equally able to detect an attack 
when present and also report attacks from both the outgoing and incoming traffic. 
However, the results reported one anomaly on the first ARL incoming traffic which was 
classified as FP which constitutes 10% FPR of the overall performance. Nonetheless, the 
second and third ARL decisions were evaluated as accurate and sensitive. Regarding 
real-time and distributed detection of a DDoS attack in the Hadoop framework, the 
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evaluation results confirmed that the proposed architecture is a viable DDoS detection 
model for a Hadoop cluster.   
 
The table below presents the evaluation results of the real-time detection of the TCP 
SYN flooding attack with the CUSUM technique on Node 2. The graphs of the detection 
evaluation results on Node 2 are presented in appendix A. 
 
Table ‎6-17 DDoS detection evaluation on node 2 
Attack launch time = 11:59:40 First Anomaly detected time: 11:59:45 
Response Time: 00: 05   Attack confirmed Time 11:59:45 
ARL Traffic Source AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
First Incoming  
6 
1 1 0 10 0 
 
Outgoing 
6 0 0 0 0 
Second Incoming  
10 
0 0 0 0 0 
Outgoing 10 0 0 0 0 
Third Incoming  
10 
0 0 0 0 0 
Outgoing 10 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Concerning the performance of the framework in a real Hadoop environment, 
evaluation results have confirmed that the transducer agents are still sensitive to TCP 
SYN Flooding attacks and can provide DDoS protection to the Hadoop node by use of the 
bandwidth utilisation and average server load metrics. Regardless of the predictable 
and the unpredictable operational impact, the result confirmed that TCP SYN flooding 
attacks can be confirmed on multiple Hadoop nodes in less than twenty seconds. Thus 
the framework can provide significant response time to attack with high detection 
accuracy in a Hadoop cluster.     
 
The second stage of the distributed DDoS detection is the fusion of the DDoS attack 
reports confirming a DDoS attack within the cluster. The report fusion technique elicits 
and aggregates the out of range metrics of each DoS CUSUM reports received from the 
transducer agents and then classify the status of the node based on the aggregated 
metrics. In essence, the IC agent monitors its message queue to receive attack reports 
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from the transducer agents. The reports are picked up by the agent for further analysis 
and aggregation as and when they arrive. The value of 5 was used in this case as the 
threshold to determine the status of the DataNode in a given instance. Thus the data 
fusion skill will, for example, confirm a DataNode to be a zombie if five out of range 
outgoing traffic is detected within the reported period.  
Table ‎6-18 presents the evaluation results of the fusion and analysis of the attack 
reports, where nodes 1 and 2 were predictably classified as zombies during the TCP 
SYN flooding attack. For example, IC agent received a report of malicious activities 
which spanned from 11:59:41 to 11:59:50. According to the results, the agent then 
confirmed node 1 as a zombie as a result of the six malicious outgoing traffic 
measurements detected within that space of time. Indeed IC agent’s accession confirms 
the transducer agent’s reports in Fig ‎6.22, Fig ‎6.23, Fig ‎6.24, Fig ‎6.259, Fig ‎6.26.   It can 
be noted from Fig ‎6.20 in particular that malicious activities were confirmed on the 
node around the same period, so the conclusion made by IC agent is accurate and 
timely. The first reported from node 2 however, confirmed normal activities on the 
network. The conclusion in this instance also confirms an accurate judgment because 
the attack started at 11:59:40.  
The table below presents the evaluation result of the data fusing technique. The table 
shows how the IC agent confirmed the botnet attack in real-time. UoR in: is the high side 
out of range CUSUM in the incoming traffic. LoR in: is the low side out of range CUSUM 
in the incoming traffic. UoR out: is the high side out of range CUSUM in the outgoing 
traffic. LoR out: is the low side out of range CUSUM in the outgoing traffic. 
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Table ‎6-19 Result of the data fusion algorithm during TCP SYN flooding attack 
 
However, the second reports from node 1 and 2 confirmed that both nodes were 
compromised around the same time (i.e. from 11:59:51 to 12:00:00).  Moreover, it was 
observed from the results that both nodes also became victims during the attack which 
was due to the abnormal incoming TCP SYN-ACK responses from the victim. The 
observation indicates that zombies can equally be overwhelmed by the response of TCP 
SYN requests. Furthermore, the BotNet DDoS attack was confirmed within the cluster 
between 12:00:01 to 12:00:13 based on the outcome of the time series analysis.  
 
The attack confirmation period, therefore, indicates that the multi-agent distributed 
DDoS detection technique can detect and confirmed DDoS attacks on multiple Hadoop 
nodes in approximately thirty-five seconds. The high response rate in search distributed 
environment is first attributed to the fact that the detection technique is lightweight and 
therefore does not incur high computational time. Secondly, multi-agent allows 
concurrent operation by a single agent so process times can be reduced by tasking an 
agent to carry out the dual operation with less computational cost.  Unlike a 
conventional software application, it is observed from this approach that software 
agents can also reduce code and application complexity by performing concurrent tasks. 
 
Based on the outcome of the real-time experiment, it can be inferred that the proposed 
framework can be leveraged to provide a distributed, real-time multi-stage DDoS 
detection mechanism within the Hadoop framework. The novel approach can provide a 
tailored and intelligent approach to detecting DDoS attacks at Hadoop node level with 
Node 
 
Early 
Time 
Later 
Time 
UoR 
in 
LoR 
in 
UoR 
out 
LoR 
out 
zombie victim 
1 11:59:41 11:59:50 1 0 6 0 true false 
2 11:59:33 11:59:42 1 0 0 0 false false 
1 11:59:51 12:00:00 0 0 9 0 true false 
2 11:59:43 11:59:52 8 0 8 0 true true 
1 12:00:01 12:00:11 0 5 8 0 true true 
2 12:00:04 12:00:13 6 0 8 0 true true 
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high response time, the centralised data fusion technique also provides high-level 
insight into anomalous activities within the cluster.  
B.   Second Scenario: real-time detection of UDP flooding attack in a Hadoop cluster  
A second attacking tool, Low Orbit Cannon, is used in the second scenario to launch low-
intensity UDP flooding attack on victim within the cluster as shown in Fig ‎6.16. The 
victim in the second scenario is the Hadoop NameNode. The second attacking scenario 
is aimed at detecting when a Hadoop node fall victim of the low-intensity DDoS attack. 
Likewise, the experiment (UDP flooding attack) is aimed to determine the elapsed time 
to detect a DDoS attack on a victim within the Hadoop cluster. The experiment used SW 
value = 5 and ARL value = 2 the value for the CUSUM tuning parameters. Thus, the 
transducer agents will observe two SWs before making a decision. 
The table below presents the evaluation results of the real-time detection of UDP 
flooding attack using the CUSUM technique. 
 
Table ‎6-20 DDoS evaluation results for the UDP Flooding attack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table ‎6-20 presents the evaluation results from the second scenario (the UDP flooding 
attack). Here again, the framework demonstrated high sensitivity to detect when a node 
falls victim to UDP flooding attack. This indicates that the framework is sensitive and 
able to use flow metrics to discriminate between regular Hadoop activity from 
anomalous activity accurately (thus TCP SYN flooding and UDP flooding attacks) when 
present.   
     
Furthermore, Contrary to the manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack, it was 
observed in the second scenario evaluation results that the node depleted significantly 
ARL Traffic Source AS AD FP 
 
FN FPR 
% 
FNR 
% 
First Incoming  
5 
5 0 0 0 0 
 
Outgoing 
0 0 0 0 0 
Second Incoming  
1 
1 0 0 0 0 
Outgoing 0 0 0 0 0 
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in the outgoing traffic while under UDP flooding attack (as shown in Fig ‎6.27 and 
Fig ‎6.28). This indicates that UDP flooding attack can prevent two-way traffic by 
saturating the network bandwidth with the malicious request. 
The graph below presents the result of the detection of the UDP flooding attack on the 
incoming network during the ARL analysis.  
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Fig ‎6.27 CUSUM UDP flooding chart for incoming traffic in first ARL 
 
The graph below presents the result of the detection of the UDP flooding attack on the 
outgoing network during the ARL analysis.  
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Fig ‎6.28 CUSUM UDP flooding chart for outgoing traffic in first ARL 
 
6.9 Comparison of the proposed framework with the state-of-art. 
This section will compare the performance of the cumulative sum and linear weighted 
moving average based DDoS detection technique proposed in this work with the 
exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) DDoS detection algorithm proposed 
by[62]. In their work, the authors employed the EWMA technique to detect high-
intensity TCP SYN flooding attacks. Details of the proposed algorithm are presented in 
[62]. The authors used actual network traffic data from the MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The 
network data contains a trace of network activities collected during legitimate activities. 
The experiment investigated the performance of EWMA algorithm in detecting low and 
high-intensity attacks. The experiment results concluded that the EWMA algorithm 
performed well for high rate attack with detection rate between 30% - 100% while 
having a false positive rate between 30%-60%. However, the experiment was not 
conducted within a big data environment such as the Hadoop cluster.  
 Consequently, the EWMA based DDoS detection technique was implemented in the 
proposed framework as an agent behaviour which to allowed the agents employ the 
behaviour to detect the both high-intensity and low-intensity DDoS attacks in a live 
Hadoop node. The node in this experiment was the victim of the TCP SYN flooding and 
UDP Flooding attacks. The aim is to expose the proposed EWMA-based DDoS detection 
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technique to big data environment to compare the performance with the CUSUM and 
LWMA based DDoS detection techniques proposed in this work. 
The same experimental setup and scenarios were maintained to expose the EWMA 
technique to the same conditions as CUSUM and LWMA. The experiment aims to 
establish the efficiency of the EWMA DDoS detection technique on a big data system.   
Consequently, the False Negative Ratio (FNR) and False Positive Ratio FPR metrics are 
used to evaluate the performance of the detection techniques, given the same conditions 
and training period.  The next section will present the comparative results of the 
experiment.  
6.9.1 Comparative result of the performance of the CUSUM, LWMA and EWMA 
detection algorithm in detecting high-intensity attacks (i.e. TCP SYN flooding).  
The table below compares the performance of the proposed CUSUM-based LWMA-
based detection technique with the state-of-the-art EWMA-based detection technique.  
Table ‎6-21 High-intensity attack detection Performance comparison with one-minute and one-hour training 
 
Detection results with one-
minute training 
Detection results with one-hour 
training 
 
Traffic 
Source 
CUSUM LWMA EWMA CUSUM LWMA EWMA 
AS 48 44 21 48 44 21 
AD 
Incoming 69 13 6 45 13 6 
Outgoing 0 0 10 0 0 0 
FPR % 
Incoming 31.89 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Outgoing 0.0 0.0 19.1 0.0 0.0 16.7 
FNR % 
Incoming 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 
Outgoing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
The table shows how the EWMA-based DDoS detection technique performed in 
comparison with CUSUM and LWMA based techniques when exposed to detect a high-
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intensity TCP SYN flooding attack in a live Hadoop environment. According to the 
results, the LWMA-based detection algorithm is more efficient in detecting high-
intensity TCP SYN flooding attack with a one-minute training period, when compared 
with the CUSUM-based and the EWMA-based detection techniques. Although the 
EWMA-based technique detected attacks in six windows in the incoming traffic, it 
reported 19.1% false positive ratio in the outgoing traffic. The high FPR in this instance 
can be attributed to the fact the technique was not designed to train on the different 
behaviours of the incoming and outgoing traffic.  Consequently, the technique as 
proposed by [62]  is unable to make an accurate judgement on incoming and outgoing 
traffic in real-time.  However, the EWMA-based technique is confirmed to be efficient in 
detecting high-intensity attack than the CUSUM-based technique. The observation 
further confirms that the average based-based techniques can detect attacks with a 
short training period.  
Similarly, the LWMA-based technique is confirmed to be efficient in detecting high-
intensity attacks when the techniques were trained for a one-hour. The result indicated 
a marginal improvement in efficiency when the EWMA technique was trained for one-
hour. However, the improvement was not significant enough to outperform the LWMA-
based technique. It can, therefore, be inferred from the result that the EWMA-based 
technique is more efficient with a longer training period. However, it has been 
confirmed in this work that a technique that requires a longer training period will not 
be effective in detecting DDoS attacks in dynamic environments such as the Hadoop.   
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6.9.2 Comparative result of the performance of the CUSUM, LWMA and EWMA 
detection algorithm in detecting low-intensity attack (i.e. UDP flooding).  
The table below compares the performance of the proposed CUSUM-based LWMA-
based detection technique with the state-of-the-art EWMA-based detection technique 
Table ‎6-22 Low-intensity attack detection Performance comparison with one-minute and one-hour training 
 
Detection results with one-
minute training 
Detection results with one-hour 
training 
 
Traffic 
Source 
CUSUM LWMA EWMA CUSUM LWMA EWMA 
AS 87 87 40 87 87 40 
AD 
Incoming 110 13 3 0 13 0 
Outgoing 1 2 10 0 0.0 0 
FPR % 
Incoming 26.37 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Outgoing 0.0 0.0 20 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FNR % 
Incoming 5.46 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 100 
Outgoing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
In the second experiment the EWMA-based detection technique was exposed to a live 
low-intensity UDP flooding attack as was done with the CUSUM-based and the LWMA-
based techniques. The table compares the performance of the three techniques 
regarding efficiency. The result indicates that the EWMA-based DDoS detection 
technique proposed by [62] is ineffective in detecting a low-intensity DDoS attack in a 
live Hadoop environment. However, the LWMA-based technique is confirmed to be 
more efficient in detecting a DDoS attack in the Hadoop environment when compared 
with the CUSUM-based technique and the EWMA-based technique. Moreover, the result 
indicates that the CUSUM-based technique is even more efficient in detecting low-
intensity UDP flooding attack in a Hadoop environment than the EWMA-based 
technique. The inefficiency in the EWMA-based technique can be attributed to the fact 
that EWMA is designed to give more weight to the last value captured in the period of 
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analysis (in this case the analysis window). Essentially, EWMA is designed to detect and 
report changes in a stream of data easily. While such design principle is efficient in the 
financial market where the technique originally emanated from, further mechanisms to 
confirm or deny if the fluctuations constitute malicious activities will be required in a 
network security environment.  
Given limitations in the EWMA, the authors of [62] optimised the original EWMA 
technique to make more the technique efficient in detecting DDoS attacks.  However, the 
optimisation technique was not designed for the dynamic and unpredictable 
environment such as the Hadoop cluster.  
The comparative results presented in this section confirms that the proposed 
framework more efficient in detecting a DDoS attack in a Hadoop environment than the 
state-of-the-art EWMA-base detection technique.   Although, in the high-intensity attack 
scenario the CUSUM-based technique is indicated to be less effective than the EWMA-
based detection technique, EWMA is average-based and as a result cannot perform 
detail analysis as CUSUM technique.  
6.10 Summary 
Despite the significant progress made in securing the framework, Hadoop still lacks 
adequate inherent security mechanism to protect the valuable data against DDoS 
attacks.  In this chapter, we have deployed a four-node Hadoop cluster to experiment 
with the proposed multi-agent based DDoS detection framework. The experiment 
results show that the proposed framework can detect DDoS attacks on multiple Hadoop 
nodes with less than twenty seconds response time and 10% false positive ratio. Two 
methods (i.e. offline and real-time) were used to experiment and evaluate the 
performance of the framework. While the offline evaluation method took an intrinsic 
approach to evaluate the detection techniques, the real-time method evaluated the 
overall performance of the framework in a real live Hadoop environment.  
The results of the offline evaluation have confirmed that both DoS techniques (i.e. 
CUSUM-based and LWMA-based) can detect DoS attack in the Hadoop cluster by 
analysing the network and average server load flow metrics. The respond time to detect 
and confirm a TCP SYN flooding attack on the Hadoop node for both techniques is less 
than ten seconds. However, the CUSUM-based technique is confirmed to have 
194 
 
drawbacks in using flow metrics to detect low-intensity attack (i.e. UDP flooding attack) 
effectively. It has also been proven that the CUSUM-based technique requires longer 
training period (that is more metrics covering the larger scope of activities on the node) 
to make accurate discrimination of normal and anomalous activities on the Hadoop 
node. On the other hand, the LWMA-based technique can make accurate discrimination 
even with shorter training. Consequently, it has been concluded that the proposed DoS 
detection techniques are viable to detect DoS attacks on Hadoop nodes.  
Regarding the real-time analysis, the evaluation result has confirmed that the 
transducer agents can dynamically detect the volatility in the Hadoop nodes in the 
framework.  Moreover, the framework also provided a mechanism which allowed the 
transducer agents to dynamically contextualise their belief of normal behaviour and 
hence, can detect attacks with accuracy and high sensitivity to attacks. It is confirmed 
from the results that network flow metrics provide contextual insight into the 
behaviour of the network traffic and can, therefore, be leveraged to detect TCP SYN 
flooding and UDP flooding attacks. Moreover, the distributed multi-agent framework 
also serves as a viable means to provide distributed real-time, a DDoS detection 
mechanism for the Hadoop framework which is currently unavailable within the 
Hadoop framework. The experiment results also revealed that high and low-intensity 
DDoS attacks targeting a Hadoop cluster could be detected and confirmed from network 
and average server load flow measurements in less than 12s. This means high-intensity 
DDoS attacks designed to cause a denial of service in one minute can be detected with 
enough time for mitigation. Likewise, low-intensity attacks design to disrupt the 
operations (especially the response to a request) can be detected.  
The data fusion technique analyses and fuses the values of the DoS reports including the 
time stamps and the out of range measurements to create a cluster-level report to 
confirm DDoS the attack.  
Contrary to current multi-agent based DDoS detection mechanism, the proposed 
framework is an intelligent inherent DDoS detection mechanism that is adaptable to the 
architecture and operational behaviour of the Hadoop framework. From the results, it 
has been confirmed that the proposed framework can improve on the existing inherent 
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security vulnerabilities in the Hadoop framework, by providing intelligent, distributed 
DDoS attack mechanism that is cognisance of the Hadoop framework.  
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  Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work 
7.1 Contribution and achievements 
DDoS attacks are known to be very disruptive and dangerous to any computer 
infrastructure. They are designed to explore and bypass existing security structures to 
have direct access to the target victim. As the techniques employed in this kind of 
attacks are getting smarter by the day, the detection and mitigation techniques equally 
need to evolve to avoid the consequences of the attacks. This work has presented the 
state of the art and security challenges in the BD technologies particularly about the 
current advancement and the research direction of the internal security mechanism of 
the Hadoop framework. The literature review has confirmed that BD technology such as 
Hadoop has made significant progress in providing an inherent security mechanism to 
encrypt data and also ensures robust client and user authentication. However, the 
current state of the technology still lacks inherent security mechanisms to detect DDoS 
attacks and as a result, relies on a secured network perimeter to protect itself against 
such attacks. The literature review has also shown that the software agent concept has 
been employed in the research community to create smart DDoS detection in a dynamic 
computing environment. However, current work does not utilise a singleton software 
agent-based framework that allows intelligent, real-time distributed monitoring and 
analysis of the network and average server load measurements to detect DDoS within 
the Hadoop framework. Moreover, the operational advantages of a software agent 
concept have not been explored in the Hadoop framework. Consequently, a multi-agent-
based framework to detect DDoS attack within the Hadoop framework was proposed. 
Contrary to existing DDoS detection techniques, the proposed framework is informed 
by Hadoop’s unique design and inherent security requirement to provide internal 
security mechanism within a Hadoop framework. The employment of a software agent 
further introduces intelligent operation into the BD technologies which are currently 
not the case. Thus, an internal security layer that will serve as the secondary DDoS 
detection mechanism to the perimeter security is essential especially in an event where 
the network perimeter is compromised.  Moreover, the Hadoop framework is 
characterised by an unconventional behaviour which makes it impossible to directly 
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employ the perimeter based DDoS technologies to create an internal security 
mechanism for the Hadoop framework.  
Consequently, this work has proposed a DDoS detection mechanism that will contribute 
to the resolution of the inherent security vulnerabilities in the Hadoop software 
framework.  The contributions achieved under this work include; 
7.1.1 Design and implementation of a multi-agent distributed detection 
mechanism  
An outline of the underlying philosophies of the types of software agents was 
acknowledged and employed to create a distributed multi-agent detection system. The 
multi-agent system is capable of learning (i.e. increasing in domain knowledge) and 
making an intelligent decision about anomalous behaviours in the Hadoop cluster and 
the right course of action on behave of its users. Moreover, the distributed multi-agent 
mechanism has proven as a viable means to provide distributed real-time, a DDoS 
detection mechanism for the Hadoop framework which is currently unavailable within 
the Hadoop framework. Contrary to current multi-agent based DDoS detection 
mechanism, the proposed distributed approach is an intelligent inherent DDoS 
detection mechanism that is adaptable to the architecture and operational behaviour of 
the Hadoop framework. From the results, it has been confirmed that the proposed 
framework can improve on the existing inherent security vulnerabilities in the Hadoop 
framework, by providing intelligent, distributed DDoS attack mechanism that is 
cognisance of the Hadoop framework.  
7.1.2 Design and implementation of a novel statically based DDoS detection 
techniques  
A novel DDoS detection mechanism based on two statistical techniques (Cumulative 
Sum (CUSUM) analysis, and Linear Weighted Moving Average (LWMA) analysis) were 
presented to demonstrate a novel approach to creating lightweight and efficient DDoS 
detection techniques. The experiment results show that the proposed framework can 
detect DDoS attacks on multiple Hadoop nodes with less than twenty seconds response 
time and 10% false positive ratio. Two methods (i.e. offline and real-time) were used to 
experiment and evaluate the performance of the framework. While the offline 
evaluation method took an intrinsic approach to evaluate the detection techniques, the 
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real-time method evaluated the overall performance of the framework in a real live 
Hadoop environment.  
 
The results of the offline evaluation have confirmed that both DDoS techniques (i.e. 
CUSUM-based and LWMA-based) can detect a DDoS attack in the Hadoop cluster by 
analysing the network and average server load flow metrics. The respond time to detect 
and confirm a TCP SYN flooding attack on the Hadoop node for both techniques is less 
than ten seconds. However, the CUSUM-based technique is confirmed to have 
drawbacks in using flow metrics to detect low-intensity attack (i.e. UDP flooding attack) 
effectively. It has also been proven that the CUSUM-based technique requires longer 
training period (that is more metrics covering the larger scope of activities on the node) 
to make accurate discrimination of normal and anomalous activities on the Hadoop 
node. On the other hand, the LWMA-based technique can make accurate discrimination 
even with shorter training. Consequently, it has been concluded that the proposed DDoS 
detection techniques are viable to detect DDoS attacks on Hadoop nodes.  
 
Regarding the real-time analysis, the evaluation result has confirmed that the 
transducer agents can dynamically detect the volatility in the Hadoop nodes in the 
framework.  Moreover, the framework also provided a mechanism which allowed the 
transducer agents to dynamically contextualise their belief of normal behaviour and 
hence, can detect attacks with accuracy and high sensitivity to attacks. It is confirmed 
from the results that network flow metrics provide contextual insight into the 
behaviour of the network traffic and can, therefore, be leveraged to detect TCP SYN 
flooding and UDP flooding attacks. The experiment results also revealed that high and 
low-intensity DDoS attacks targeting a Hadoop cluster could be detected and confirmed 
from network and average server load flow measurements in less than 12s. This means 
high-intensity DDoS attacks designed to cause a denial of service in one minute can be 
detected with enough time for mitigation. Likewise, low-intensity attacks design to 
disrupt the operations (especially the response to a request) can be detected. 
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7.1.3 A novel ontological DDoS attack description and management mechanism 
that report DDoS attacks  
This work has designed and implemented multi-agent based DDoS attack ontological 
model based on the CUSUM and LWMA technique. The description allows the agents to 
share information or reports about the DDoS attack in real-time.  
 
7.1.4 Design and implementation of a novel real-time agent training technique   
The real-time training technique proposed in this work allowed the transducer agents 
to dynamically train their knowledge to adapt to the legitimate change in the behaviours 
of the Hadoop nodes. The periodic training allowed the transducer agents to accurate 
discriminate normal behaviour from anomalous behaviour at any point in time.  
 
7.1.5 A novel time series data fusion technique  
The data fusion technique analyses and fuses the values of the DDoS reports including 
the time stamps and the out of range measurements to create a cluster-level report to 
confirm DDoS the attack. 
 
7.2 Future work 
7.2.1 Application of machine learning algorithm in the dynamic multi-agent 
training technique. 
In this work, a dynamic training technique which allows the agents to adapt to 
legitimate behaviours of the Hadoop nodes has been implemented. The current training 
mechanism is not predictive. Essentially, the technique is unable to analyse patterns in 
historical data to predict possible change in legitimate behaviours. Although the current 
dynamic training technique allows the dynamic training as proposed in this work, it is 
not proactive to changes and tends to fail to detect malicious activities during the 
training section. In the future, an intelligent technique that analyses the changes in the 
bandwidth utilisation and average server load, retrains the agent's beliefs to adapt to 
the changes and detects DDoS attacks in real-time will be implemented. Thus the 
training technique will be enhanced with a machine learning algorithm such as neural 
networks [77] [80]. The integration of machine learning will allow the software agents 
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to analyse historical data to predict the possible changes in on the nodes and then train 
the agents accordingly in advance. This work will be achieved by extending the 
capabilities of the current training technique with a neural network-based algorithm 
that allows the transducer agents to analyse historical data and train the agents in 
advance. The application of the machine learning algorithms in the multi-agent system 
has attracted research and commercial interests in recent times [32][6]. The integrating 
of the two paradigms allows the development of intelligent and distributed systems that 
are capable of executing the required functions autonomously.  
7.2.2 Integration of intelligent ontological mapping algorithm into multi-agent 
framework,  
One fundamental characteristic of the software agents is the ability to communicate and 
exchange relevant information autonomously [93][7]. The agents rely on the domain 
ontological description to interpret the information they receive. The integration of the 
ontological description and mapping mechanism also allows the agent to map the high-
level domain semantics to agent performative dynamically. This work proposed a novel 
ontological mapping mechanism which allows the multi-agent to map the ontological 
description of the DDoS attacks to their communication performative. The mapping 
mechanism allowed them to interpret the attack reports sent by the transducer agents 
and map the high-level user commands to machine-level commands. However, the 
proposed mapping mechanism employs a one-to-one static mapping technique. A static 
mapping technique is not scalable and does allow the agents to extend their domain 
vocabulary dynamically [6]. 
Consequently, the future work will employ a dynamic ontology mapping techniques to 
implement a dynamic ontological mapping technique that allows the agents to map the 
communication performative to ontological description dynamically. Furthermore, a 
technique to dynamically map high-level user commands instances to the machine-level 
commands will be implemented. This work will be achieved by extending the current 
one-to-one mapping technique with a BDI-based technique that will allow the dynamic 
mapping of new domain language to machine-level commands and the communication 
performative.   
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 7.2.3 Application of machine learning and data mining algorithms in the multi-
agent framework to detect DDoS attacks.  
The proposed multi-agent DDoS detection framework employs statistical-based DDoS 
detection techniques as agent behaviours to analyse network and server load flow data 
to detect DDoS attacks. In the future, the application of machine learning-based DDoS 
detection algorithm and data mining-based DDoS detection algorithm will be 
investigated and implemented. The implementation will further be experimented in the 
Hadoop environment to evaluate and compare the performance with the existing 
statistical-based technique which will lead to further publications.  
 
 
 
   
.  
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Appendix A 
OFFLINE EVALUATION RESULTS 
A.1 ADDITIONAL CUSUM ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE TCP SYN FLOODING 
ATTACK PRESENTED IN CHAPTER SIX  
The figures provided are additional results of the performance of the CUSUM technique 
when detecting TCP SYN flooding attacks on the victim node. The test conditions are 
presented in chapter six where the performance of the technique was evaluated.   
A. The additional detection result of the first ARL of the CUSUM TCP SYN 
flooding  results presented in chapter six 
 
Fig A.‎0.1 TCP SYN Flooding attack on Incoming Traffic during first ARL 
The graph shows a normal activity in the incoming traffic and  malicious traffic above the upper control 
limit during the attack  
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Fig A.‎0.2  TCP SYN Flooding attack on Outgoing during ARL ONE. The graph shows a normal activity in 
the outgoing traffic during the attack   
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.3  TCP SYN Flooding ATTACK on One minute sever load during the first ARL. The graph shows a 
gradual built up of load on the server during the attack.  
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Fig A.‎0.4 TCP SYN Flooding Five minutes sever load during the first ARL. The graph shows a gradual 
built up of load on the server during the attack.  
 
 
Fig A.‎0.5 TCP SYN Flooding Fifteen minutes sever load during first  ARL ONE. The graph shows a 
gradual built up of load on the server during the attack.  
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B. The additional detection result of the second ARL of the CUSUM TCP SYN 
flooding  results presented in chapter six 
 
Fig A.‎0.6 TCP SYN Flooding on Incoming Traffic during the second ARL.  
The graph shows a normal activity in the traffic and malicious traffic above the upper control limit during 
the attack  
 
 
Fig A.‎0.7 impact of TCP SYN Flooding on Outgoing Traffic during the second ARL. 
The graph shows a normal activity in the traffic during the attack   
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Fig A.‎0.8 Impact of the TCP SYN Flooding on One minute sever Load during the second ARL. 
The graph shows a gradual built up of load on the server during the attack.  
  
 
Fig A.‎0.9 Impact of TCP SYN Flooding on Five minutes sever Load during the second ARL.  
The graph shows a gradual built up of load on the server during the attack.  
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Fig A.‎0.10 Impact of TCP SYN Flooding on Fifteen minutes sever Load during the second ARL.  
The graph shows a gradual drop of load on the server during the attack.  
 
C. The additional detection result of the third ARL of the CUSUM TCP SYN 
flooding  results presented in chapter six 
 
Fig A.‎0.11 Impact of TCP SYN Flooding on Incoming Traffic during the third ARL THREE. The graph 
shows a normal activity in the traffic and malicious traffic above the upper control limit during the attack  
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Fig A.‎0.12 impact of TCP SYN Flooding on outgoing Traffic during the third ARL.  
The graph shows a normal activity in the traffic during the attack   
 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.13 Impact of TCP SYN Flooding on One minute sever Load during ARL.  
The graph shows a gradual built up of load on the server during the attack.  
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Fig A.‎0.14 Impact of TCP SYN Flooding attack on Five minutes sever Load during third ARL.  
The graph shows a gradual built up of load on the server during the attack.  
 
A.2 LWMA ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE TCP SYN FLOODING ATTACK 
The figures provided are additional results of the performance of the LWMA technique 
when detecting TCP SYN flooding attacks on the victim node.  The test condition is 
presented in chapter six where the performance of the technique was evaluated. 
A. The detection result of the first ARL of the CUSUM TCP SYN flooding  results 
presented in chapter six 
 
Fig A.‎0.15 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the Incoming Traffic during First ARL. 
The traffic below the upper control limit indicates a normal activity in the normal, traffic above the upper 
control limit indicate malicious activity in the network. 
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Fig A.‎0.16 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the Outgoing Traffic during First ARL. 
The graph indicates the normal activity in the traffic. 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.17 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the one minute load during First ARL.  
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server during the attack. 
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Fig A.‎0.18 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the five-minute load during First ARL. 
 The graph indicates the malicious load on the server during the attack. 
 
   
 
Fig A.‎0.19 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the fifteen-minute load during First ARL. 
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server during the attack. 
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B. The detection result of the second ARL of the CUSUM TCP SYN flooding  results 
presented in chapter six 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.20 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the Incoming Traffic during the second ARL. 
The traffic below the upper control limit indicates a normal activity in the normal, traffic above the upper 
control limit indicate malicious activity in the network. 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.21 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the Outgoing Traffic during the second ARL. 
The graph indicates the normal activity in the traffic. 
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Fig A.‎0.22 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the one minute load during the second ARL. 
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server during the attack. 
 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.23 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the five-minute load during the second ARL. 
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server during the attack. 
 
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
A
ve
ra
ge
 L
o
ad
 (
%
) 
 
Window Position  
Server load Upper control limit Lower control limit
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
A
ve
ra
ge
 L
o
ad
 (
%
) 
 
Window poition  
LWMA Result Five Minutes Sever Load Second ARL  
Server load Upper control limit Lower control limit
214 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.24 LWMA analysis of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the fifteen-minute load during the second 
ARL. The graph indicates the malicious load on the server during the attack. 
 
A.3 Additional CUSUM analysis results of the UDP flooding attack 
The figures provided are additional results of the performance of the CUSUM technique 
when detecting UPD flooding (low intensity) attacks on the victim node.  The test 
condition is presented in chapter six where the performance of the technique was 
evaluated. 
The network traffic or the server load that exceeds the control limits indicate malicious 
activity on the network or the server load.  
A. The additional detection result of the first ARL of the CUSUM UDP flooding  
results presented in chapter six 
 
Fig A.‎0.25 CUSUM analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the Incoming Traffic during the first ARL. The 
graph indicates the network traffic within the control limit. 
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Fig A.‎0.26 CUSUM analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the outgoing Traffic during the first ARL.  
The graph indicates the network traffic within the control limit. 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.27 CUSUM analysis of the UDO flooding attack on the one minute load during the first ARL.  
The graph indicates a normal load behaviour on the server.  
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Fig A.‎0.28 CUSUM analysis of the UDO flooding attack on the five minutes load during the first ARL.  
The graph indicates a normal load behaviour on the server.  
 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.29 CUSUM analysis of the UDO flooding attack on the fifteen minutes load during the first ARL. 
The graph indicates a drop in the load on the server. 
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B. The additional detection result of the second ARL of the CUSUM UDP flooding  
results presented in chapter six 
 
Fig A.‎0.30 CUSUM analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the Incoming Traffic during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates the network traffic within the control limit. 
 
 
 
Figure A.‎0.31 CUSUM analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the outgoing Traffic during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates the network traffic within the control limit. 
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Fig A.‎0.32 CUSUM analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the one minute load during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates a normal load behaviour on the server.  
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.33 CUSUM analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the five minutes load during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates a normal load behaviour on the server.  
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Fig A.‎0.34 CUSUM analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the five minutes load during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates a spike in the load on the server and a sharp drop in the load on the server. 
 
 
A.4 LWMA ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE UDP FLOODING ATTACK 
The figures provided are additional results of the performance of the LWMA 
technique when detecting UPD flooding (low intensity) attacks on the victim node 
presented in chapter six.  The test condition is presented in chapter six where the 
performance of the technique under the UDP flooding attack was evaluated.  
A. The additional detection result of the first ARL of the LWMA UDP flooding  
results presented in chapter six 
 
Fig A.‎0.35 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the Incoming Traffic during the first ARL.  
The graph indicates a normal activity in the traffic and then rise above the control limit which indicates 
malicious activities in the traffic 
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Fig A.‎0.36 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the Outgoing Traffic during the first ARL.  
The graph indicates a normal activity in the traffic and then rise above the control limit which indicates 
malicious activities in the traffic 
 
 
 
 
Fig ‎0A.‎0.37 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the one minute load during the first ARL.  
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server.  
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Fig ‎0A.‎0.38 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the five minutes load during the first ARL.  
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server.  
 
 
 
 
Fig ‎0A.‎0.39 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the fifteen minutes load during the first ARL.  
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server.  
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B. The additional Detection result of the second ARL of the LWMA UDP flooding  
results presented in chapter six 
 
Fig ‎0A.‎0.40 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the Incoming Traffic during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates a rise above the control limit which indicates malicious activities in the traffic 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.41 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the Outgoing Traffic during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates a normal activity in the traffic and then rise above the control limit which indicates 
malicious activities in the traffic 
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Fig A.‎0.42 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the one minute load during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server.  
 
 
Fig  A.‎0.43 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the five minutes load during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server.  
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Fig A.‎0.44 LWMA analysis of the UDP flooding attack on the fifteen minutes load during the second ARL.  
The graph indicates the malicious load on the server.  
 
A.4 Results of The Real-Time Detection Botnet DDoS Attacks 
The figures provided are additional evidence of the TCP  SYN flooding attacks on the 
zombie nodes (i.e. node One and node Two). The graphs are the detection performance 
during the botnet attack.  
CUSUM analysis graph of the TCP SYN Flooding attack 
A) An additional result from node one - First ARL Analysis graph 
 
Fig A.‎0.45 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Incoming Traffic on node one during the First 
ARL. The graph indicates a normal activity in the traffic and gradual build-up in the traffic during the 
attack.  
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Fig A.‎0.46  Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Outgoing Traffic on node one during the First 
ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the traffic activity and gradual build-up in the traffic during the attack.  
 
 
Fig A.‎0.47 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in One Minute on node one during 
First ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load  
 
Fig A.‎0.48  Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in Five Minutes on node one 
during First ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load  
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Fig ‎0A.‎0.49 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in Fifteen Minutes on node one 
during First ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load  
 
B) An additional result from node one - Second ARL Analysis graph 
 
Fig A.‎0.50 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Incoming Traffic on node one during the 
Second ARL. The graph indicates normal traffic below the control limit and malicious traffic above the 
control limit.  
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Fig A.‎0.51 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Outgoing Traffic on node one during the 
Second ARL. The graph indicates malicious traffic above the control limit.  
 
 
Fig A.‎0.52 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in One Minute on node one during 
Second ARL 
 
Fig ‎0A.‎0.53 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in Five Minutes on node one 
during Second ARL 
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Fig A.‎0.54 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in Fifteen Minutes on node one 
during Second ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load.  
C) An additional result from node One Third ARL Analysis graph 
 
Fig A.‎0.55 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Incoming Traffic on node one during the 
Third ARL. The graph indicates a normal activity and malicious traffic above the control limit 
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Fig A.‎0.56 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Outgoing Traffic on node one during the 
Third ARL. The graph indicates a normal activity and malicious traffic above the control limit 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.57 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in One Minute on node one during 
Third ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load  
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Fig A.‎0.58 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in Five Minutes on node one 
during Third  ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load 
 
Fig A.‎0.59 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in Fifteen Minutes on node one 
during Third ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load 
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 A) Additional Detection result from node two - first ARL analysis graph 
 
Fig A.‎0.60 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Incoming Traffic on node two during the first 
ARL. The graph indicates a normal activity on the network traffic.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.61 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Outgoing Traffic on node two during the first 
ARL. The graph indicates a normal activity and malicious traffic which is showing as above the control 
limit   
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Fig A.‎0.62 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in One Minute on node two during 
first ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig ‎0A.‎0.63 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in five Minutes on node two 
during first ARL. The graph indicates the malicious load on the server. The load above the control limit is 
malicious.  
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Fig A.‎0.64 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in fifteen Minutes on node two 
during first ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Additional Result from node one-second ARL analysis graph 
 
Fig A.‎0.65 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Incoming Traffic on node two during the 
second ARL. The Graph indicates normal activity in the traffic  
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Fig A.‎0.66 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Outgoing Traffic on node two during the 
second ARL. The graph indicates malicious activity in the traffic.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.67 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in one Minute on node two during 
the second ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load  
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Fig A.‎0.68 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in five minutes on node two 
during the second ARL. The graph indicates the malicious load on the server because the load exceeds 
the control limit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.69 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in fifteen minutes on node two 
during the second ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load. 
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C) An additional result from node one - third ARL analysis graph 
 
Fig A.‎0.70 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Incoming Traffic on node two during the third 
ARL. The graph indicates normal activities in the traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.71 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on Outgoing Traffic on node two during the third 
ARL. The graph indicates malicious activities in the traffic  
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Fig A.‎0.72 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in one Minute on node two during 
third ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.73 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in five Minutes on node two 
during third ARL. The graph indicates the malicious load on the server  
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
12:00:01 :03 :04 :05 :06 :07 :08 :09 :10 :11
Se
rv
er
 lo
ad
 C
U
SU
M
 (
%
) 
Time Series  
CUSUM High Side CUSUM Low Side Upper Control Limit  Lower Control Limit
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
12:00:01 :03 :04 :05 :06 :07 :08 :09 :10 :11
A
ve
ra
ge
 lo
ad
 C
U
SU
M
 (
%
) 
Ttime Series 
CUSUM High Side CUSUM Low Side Upper Control Limit  Lower Control Limit
238 
 
 
 
Fig A.‎0.74 Manifestation of the TCP SYN flooding attack on server load in fifteen Minutes on node two 
during third ARL. The graph indicates a drop in the server load  
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Appendix B 
B.1 Justification of the choice metrics for the real-time analysis of the 
network traffic and average server load 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a well-known attacked and hence has attracted 
significant detection techniques [26][4][27][29][42]. However, current packet-based 
analysis detection techniques are characterised by high computational overhead. 
Consequentially such detection techniques will not be an ideal choice if the aim is to 
create internal DDoS detection mechanism for the Hadoop framework. Essentially, high 
computational overhead as a result of the detection activities tends degrading overall 
system performance on the Hadoop node. However, a flow-metrics based technique was 
adopted because flow metrics-based analysis is known to attract a little computational 
cost [86].  
 
The next design consideration was the choice of metrics which will provide reflective 
insight into the network and server load behaviour of the node having established the 
detection approach. A DDoS attack experiment was conducted on the internally 
deployed Hadoop test bed to ascertain the right metrics to use to establish such 
behavioural metrics, particularly during normal and abnormal instances. DDoS attack is 
known to deny legitimate access to network resources by overwhelming the victim with 
the malicious request until the victim become unresponsive [94]. Based on these 
characteristics, TCP SYN and UDP flooding attack were launched to attack a node in the 
cluster to observe how the attack manifest in the bandwidth utilisation and the server 
load metrics when a node fall victim of the TCP SYN Flooding attack. Secondly, the 
attacking tool (i.e. hping3) was used to create a botnet with two Hadoop nodes to 
launch a DDoS attack to ascertain the behaviour when the nodes are compromised as 
zombies to launch DDoS attacks. The results of the experiment are presented in the next 
section.  
B.2 Confirmation Of The Choice Of Metrics For The Analysis And 
Detection Of Dos Attacks On The Hadoop Node 
1. The objective of the experiment  
The objective is to find out how TCP SYN and UDP Flooding attack manifest themselves 
in a Hadoop cluster and how they impact on network traffic and the average server load. 
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2. The aim of the experiment  
The aim is to ascertain the manifestation of these attacks in the bandwidth utilisation 
and the server load within the Hadoop cluster. An understanding of these attack 
manifestation can then be used to develop BDI-based detection techniques to 
intelligently detect UDP and TCP SYN Flooding attacks in a Hadoop cluster. 
 
3. Experiment Methodology 
A MapReduce job was developed to process and anonymised the source IP address in a 
NetFlow data on the Hadoop cluster to create legitimate activities on the cluster. The 
MapReduce job deployed on the cluster was left running for five hours to determine all 
possible legitimate bandwidth and server load utilisation. The average and maximum 
bandwidth and server load utilisation measurements were then used as the threshold to 
determine any malicious impact during the attack. hping3 [91]was used to inject TCP 
SYN attack into the cluster during the legitimate MapReduce activity. Likewise, low 
orbit cannon (LOIC) DDoS tool was used to inject UDP flooding attack into the cluster 
during the legitimate MapReduce activities.   
 
Understanding how each attack manifests itself in these identified metrics is essential to 
building a distinctive manifestation profile of each attack. Consequently, each attack 
was launched alongside the normal MapReduce job activity for one minute.  Two native 
Linux utilities (i.e. ifstat and uptime) were then used to collect real-time measurement of 
the bandwidth and server load utilisation from the victim machines. The utilisation was 
measured every second to provide the most granular view of the attack impact. 
 
4. First experiment scenario - TCP SYN Flooding attack  
The attacker in this scenario used the fping3 tool to compromised two data nodes and 
used them as zombies to launch TCP SYN Flooding attack from within the cluster. The 
victim was the NameNode. The following properties were used to define the attack 
intensity in the hping3 tool: 
Number of packets: 300000 
Size of packets sent to the target machine: 120 
Type of packets: TCP SYN packets 
Type of attack: flooding  
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TCP window: 64 
Total packet transmitted: 16,399,882 
 
5. Second experiment scenario  
The attacker in this scenario used the LOIC tool to launch a UDP flooding attack into the 
Hadoop cluster. Two machines were used to constitute the attack machine or the 
attackers. Each one has installed the LOIC tool to launch a simultaneous UDP Flooding 
attack from outside the Hadoop cluster to the victim (i.e. Hadoop NameNode) in the 
cluster. The following properties were used to define the attack intensity in each LOIC 
tool: 
Type of Packets UDP 
Target port: 22 
Threads: 1000 
Total request sent: 179,121,117 
 
6. The observations from the experiment  
According to Fig B.1, Fig B.2, Fig B.3, Fig B.4, Fig B.5 and Fig B.6, the result from the 
attack experiment confirmed the bandwidth utilisation and average server load as the 
potential metrics to provide reflective insight into the real-time behaviour of network 
bandwidth and the server load. In this experiment, the highest bandwidth utilisation 
and average server load in one hour of legitimate MapReduce activities are used to 
compare with the same metrics during the attacks. The impact of TCP SYN and UDP 
flooding were observed from two perspectives. The first one observed how the impact 
manifest in these metrics when the node fell victim to these two attacks. Moreover, the 
second instance also observed how the impact is manifested when the node is 
compromised (i.e. becomes a zombie) to launch TCP SYN flooding attacks from the 
Hadoop cluster.  
 
Fig B.1 and Fig B.2 show the attack manifestation on both the network traffic and the 
server load during the TCP SYN Flooding botnet attack. While the node was registering 
abnormal traffic, the server load was equally registering abnormal load during the 
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attack. Likewise, Fig B.3, Fig B.4 registered abnormal traffic volume and abnormal load 
when the node fell victim to the TCP SYN flooding attack.  
However even though the UDP flooding attack equally registered abnormal incoming 
traffic manifestation (shown in Fig B.5), it was observed from Fig B.6 that the impact on 
the server load was not as significant as registered during the TCP attack. Nonetheless, 
the one-minute server load metrics recorded an abnormal behaviour during the attack. 
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Fig B.1 Impact of the TCP SYN Flooding botnet attack on network bandwidth on zombie node 
 
Fig B.1  shows the impact of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the network bandwidth of 
the victim. The malicious traffic manifested in the outgoing traffic because the victim 
node was used to launch the attack.  
 
 
Malicious traffic 
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Fig B.2 Impact of the TCP SYN Flooding botnet attack on the server load on zombie node 
 
Fig B.2  shows the impact of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the average load of the 
victim.  
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Fig B.3 Impact of the TCP SYN Flooding attack on network bandwidth on victim node 
 
Fig B.3 shows the impact of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the network bandwidth of 
the victim. The malicious traffic manifested in the incoming traffic because the second 
victim node was the recipient of the malicious TCP SYN request from the attacker 
(which was the first victim node). 
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Fig B.4 Impact of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the server load on victim node 
Fig B.4  shows the impact of the TCP SYN flooding attack on the average load of the 
second victim. 
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Fig B.5 Impact of the UDP flooding attack on network bandwidth on victim node 
 
Fig B.5  shows the impact of the UDP flooding attack on the network bandwidth of the 
victim node. The malicious traffic manifested in the incoming traffic because the victim 
node was the recipient of the malicious UDP packets from the attacker.  
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Fig B.6 Impact of the UDP Flooding attack on server load on victim node 
Fig B.6  shows the impact of the UDP flooding attack on the average load of the victim 
node. 
 
Indeed the low impact can be attributed to the fact that the traffic intensity of the UDP 
flooding attack is lower than the TCP SYN flooding attack.  Consequently, it is assumed 
that significant impact will equally be registered on the server load if the Node falls 
victim to high-intensity UDP flooding attack. The network traffic metrics both provide 
real-time manifestation or insight into the activities of both the outgoing and the 
incoming traffic. The dual metrics (i.e. observing both incoming and outgoing network 
metrics) is significant because it will provide the agent with the means to observer 
traffic in both ways at the same time. 
 
B.3 Description of the average Server load metrics 
 The underlying Linux Ubuntu operating system on which the Hadoop software was 
deployed captures the Node’s average server load behaviour in three instances.  Thus a 
snapshot of the load behaviour for the past one minute, five minutes and fifteen minutes. 
Essentially, the one minute indicates how fast the server is responding to the process 
request arriving in the process queue. Consequentially, a rise in the one minute load 
indicates that the server is responding to requests more than expected. However, the 
rise in the one-minute load metrics alone should not be a cause of alarm because the 
five minutes metrics will indicate if the incoming requests in the process queue are 
Malicious load  
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taking longer to respond or not. Even at this point, it cannot be considered as the server 
is on the verge of giving up on responding to request until the fifteen minutes load 
metrics also start rising. 
 
 Likewise, it was observed from Fig B.2, Fig B.4 and Fig B.6‎that, the three average 
server load metrics registered progressive rise during the attacks. Indications that the 
server is being overwhelmed by the request and can lead to a crash if nothing is done to 
mitigate the problem. The HDFS equally relies on the operating system’s load 
measurements to determine the load of each node.  
 
Based on the outcome of the DDoS attack experiments, the network traffic and average 
server load metrics were employed by the DoS detection techniques to monitor and 
detect DoS attacks on the Hadoop nodes.   
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Register service
 IC
 start IC
 start all agents 
Register services
Start-up agent All agents
Test connection with vendor tools
Vendor agents
Agent register 
 Register all agents in agent 
register 
Report connection status
UI Agent
Set agent status
Report agent status
 
Fig B.7 A sequence diagram depicting the boot sequence. The model explains the process involve in the 
starting and activating the agents within the framework.  
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based solution the 
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Use another 
development 
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1. System requirement elicitation 
with  Use Case Modelling 
2. Initial Agent identification
3. Agent responsibility Identification 
5. Agent refinement 
6. Agent deployment information
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identification 
1. Agent Splitting margin/Renaming
2. Agent Interaction specification 
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6. Agent-resource Interaction 
7. Agent-User Interaction
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10. Content Language Selection
No
Yes 
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3. Design
4. Implementation and 
testing
 
Fig B.8 Flow chart depicting the evolution stages in the GAIA methodology 
Fig B.8 presents all the stages involved in the GAIA methodology. According to the 
flowchart, GAIA is a sequential methodology which evolves the multi-agent agent design 
process from the preliminary planning stage (i.e. stage 1) to the design stage (i.e. stage 3). 
The three main stages in GAIA are labelled as 1. Preliminary planning, 2. Analysis and 3. 
Design. 
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Fig B.9 Flowchart of the dynamic training technique 
Fig B.9 is the flow chart depicting the sequence of the novel dynamic training technique 
which allows the transducer agents to dynamically update their knowledge when the 
legitimate behaviour of the Hadoop nodes changes. 
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